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Zusammenfassung
Derzeit erleben wir die Ära, in der durch die zunehmende Verbreitung von miteinander ver-
bundenen, eingebetteten Geräten sich das sogenannte „Internet of Things“ (IoT) manifestiert.
Obwohl derartige Endgeräte oft als „smarte Objekte“ bezeichnet und ihnen somit eine gewisse
Intelligenz unterstellt wird, ist aus Perspektive der IT-Sicherheit oftmals das Gegenteil der Fall.
Die Einwirkung der Märkte im Bereich kommerzieller IoT-Geräte führt zur Minimierung der Her-
stellungskosten sowie der Produkteinführungszeiten. Dieser weit verbreitete Trend hat einen
direkten, desaströsen Einfluss auf die Sicherheitseigenschaften der Geräte. Eine Großzahl ak-
tuell genutzter und zukünftig produzierter Plattformen implementieren keinerlei oder nur un-
zureichende Sicherheitsmechanismen. Vor allem das Fehlen sicherer Hardware-Komponenten,
unterbinden oftmals die Implementierung sicherer Protokolle und Anwendungen.
Diese Arbeit widmet sich einem grundsätzlichen Lösungsansatz, welcher es erlaubt, kom-
merzielle, eingebettete Geräte, die durch das Fehlen sicherer Hardware-Komponenten ver-
schiedensten Angriffen ausgesetzt sind, nachträglich absichern kann. Im speziellen, nutzen
wir das Konzept der Physikalisch Unkopierbaren Funktionen (PUFs), um Hardware-basierte
Sicherheitsanker in Standard-Hardware-Komponenten zu erstellen. Wir setzen dabei auf die Var-
ianz von Static Random-Access Memory (SRAM) und Dynamic Random-Access Memory (DRAM)
Modulen, welche während der Herstellungsprozesse induziert werden, um intrinsische, speicher-
basierte PUF Instanzen zu extrahieren und darauf aufbauend, sichere und leichtgewichtige Pro-
tokolle und Anwendungen zu entwickeln.
In einem ersten Schritt führen wir zu diesem Zwecke eine empirische Evaluation ausgewählter
und repräsentativer Gerätetypen bezüglich ihrer PUF-Eigenschaften durch. Als nächstes nutzen
wir die Gerätetypen, welche sich durch die Existenz guter PUF-Instanzen für die darauf fol-
gende Entwicklung leichtgewichtiger Sicherheitsanwendungen und -protokolle qualifizieren. Im
zweiten Teil der Arbeit stellen wir verschiedene Software-basierte Sicherheitslösungen vor, die
speziell für die charakteristischen Eigenschaften von eingebetteten Geräte konzipiert sind. Im
speziellen umfassen diese Lösungen eine Secure Boot Architektur sowie einen Ansatz, die In-
tegrität von Firmware durch Bindung an die zugrundeliegende Hardware zu schützen. Weiterhin
wird ein leichtgewichtiges Authentifizierungsprotokoll vorgestellt, welches die Charakteristiken
eines neuartigen DRAM-basierten PUF-Typs ausnutzt. Als letztes wird ein Protokoll vorgestellt,
welches erlaubt, die Sicherheit des Software-Zustandes von entfernten, eingebetteten Geräten
sicher zu attestieren.
II
Abstract
We are currently living in the era in which through the ever-increasing dissemination of inter-
connected embedded devices, the Internet-of-Things manifests. Although such end-point devices
are commonly labeled as “smart gadgets” and hence they suggest to implement some sort of
intelligence, from a cyber-security point of view, more then often the opposite holds. The market
force in the branch of commercial embedded devices leads to minimizing production costs and
time-to-market. This widespread trend has a direct, disastrous impact on the security properties
of such devices. The majority of currently used devices or those that will be produced in the
future do not implement any or insufficient security mechanisms. Foremost the lack of secure
hardware components often mitigates the application of secure protocols and applications.
This work is dedicated to a fundamental solution statement, which allows to retroactively secure
commercial off-the-shelf devices, which otherwise are exposed to various attacks due to the lack
of secure hardware components. In particular, we leverage the concept of Physically Unclonable
Functions (PUFs), to create hardware-based security anchors in standard hardware components.
For this purpose, we exploit manufacturing variations in Static Random-Access Memory (SRAM)
and Dynamic Random-Access Memory modules to extract intrinsic memory-based PUF instances
and building on that, to develop secure and lightweight protocols and applications.
For this purpose, we empirically evaluate selected and representative device types towards their
PUF characteristics. In a further step, we use those device types, which qualify due to the ex-
istence of desired PUF instances for subsequent development of security applications and pro-
tocols. Subsequently, we present various software-based security solutions which are specially
tailored towards to the characteristic properties of embedded devices. More precisely, the pro-
posed solutions comprise a secure boot architecture as well as an approach to protect the integrity
of the firmware by binding it to the underlying hardware. Furthermore, we present a lightweight
authentication protocol which leverages a novel DRAM-based PUF type. Finally, we propose a
protocol, which allows to securely verify the software state of remote embedded devices.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In the Internet-of-Things (IoT) [LTL16] embedded devices, particularly low-cost andresource-constrained platforms are becoming the fundamental building blocks for many
facets of life. Innovation in this space is not only fueled by making devices ever more pow-
erful, but also by a steady stream of even smaller, cheaper, and less energy-consuming “smart
things” that enable new features and greater automation at home, in transportation [Sye+12],
smart factories [Zue08; Zue10] and cities [Zan+14]. Primarily, miniaturization and cost reduc-
tion of Microcontroller Unit (MCU) and System on Chip (SoC) designs have enabled the creation
of almost ubiquitous smart devices, from smart thermostats and appliances to smart phones and
embedded car entertainment systems. Besides private applications of embedded platforms, they
are employed to enhance the degree of industrial automation and in particular, to realize “Indus-
try 4.0” [Jaz14]. Generally in the industrial domain, embedded devices are increasingly used as
integral part of more complex Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) [LS16]. CPS are commonly lever-
aged in production systems, for the purpose of process monitoring and controlling or to realize
responsive quality management [LCK16]. Substituting traditional components in this domain
such as programmable logic controllers (PLC) and remote terminal units (RTU), embedded sys-
tems are employed to sense and control physical processes as well as communication interfaces
for (existing) industrial automation systems to the Internet or an internal network [Jaz14].
Unfortunately, the novelty of this field combined with dominating market forces to minimize cost
and time-to-market also has a devastating impact on security. In particular, one major concern is
that these devices often lack hardware as well as software implementations of sufficient security
mechanisms [Sch14b; VT12]. As a result, the proliferation of such “smart” devices leads to a
constant discovery of new security vulnerabilities [Her+14; Cos+14; Def15; Gre15; Fos+15].
Moreover, constraints on the available memory and computational power have an impact on the
security of these devices. Means to provide robust identification and authentication of involved
devices and mechanisms to securely store long-term cryptographic keys, while minimizing the
chances of their illegitimate extraction or access, are particularly demanding tasks for this device
class. Besides interconnected platforms, the ability to recognize and establish trust in embedded
devices is even becoming relevant for ultra low-cost storage devices, including SD-cards and USB
sticks that are exchanged with third parties and hence can be infected or replaced by malicious
hardware in order to attack the host [b313; NL14]. Moreover, Bluetooth devices may offer
an even larger attack surface since typically employed security mechanisms were shown to be
insufficient [Rya13; SW05].
In order to establish trust in these resource-constrained devices, respective security solutions
must be based on realistic assumptions concerning the specific hardware capabilities of these
devices. Hence, a meaningful approach of designing security protocols and applications to-
wards the peculiarities of low- cost and embedded devices begins with defining requirements
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of such solutions, taking into account the limitations imposed by the underlying platforms. A
first requirement is imposed by the device class considered in this thesis, namely Commercial
Off-The-Shelf (COTS) embedded devices, which usually do not implement secure hardware such
as Trusted Platform Module (TPM), Intel Software Guard Extensions (SGX) or ARM TrustZone
for economic reasons. Hence, secure protocols and applications cannot rely on dedicated secure
hardware, such as TPM or a Trusted Execution Environment (TEE). Instead, they are usually
restricted to standard hardware components. Hereafter we denote standard hardware as such
components that are produced for general-purpose usage and which are not application specific.
Common examples for standard hardware components comprise Static Random-Access Mem-
ory (SRAM), Dynamic Random-Access Memory (DRAM), Central Processing Units (CPUs) and
Graphics Processing Unit. A second important requirement derives from the very limited com-
putational resources and memory-related capabilities of such devices. In particular, a security
solution only qualifies if it exhibits a small memory footprint and if it relies on building blocks
that are computationally efficient. Cryptographic protocols that are specifically optimized to-
wards such constrained devices, are commonly denoted as lightweight security protocols [EK07].
Hence, the adoption of classical yet more heavyweight approaches, such as most asymmetric
cryptographic systems, is not a viable option for many MCUs-based device types (cf. Chap-
ter 2.2). In particular, for ultra low-cost 8 bit microcontrollers, that are found in smart cards
or RFID chips, efficient implementation of traditional cryptographic solutions is a non-trivial
task. From the perspective of the memory domain (8 bit MCUs are usually limited to 256B to
1 kB RAM), implementations of public-key cryptographic systems are indeed feasible, especially
when leveraging ECC that uses smaller key sizes compared to RSA, to achieve equivalent secu-
rity levels [Bro09]. However, the time required for decryption, encryption, signing or verifying
a signature can be tremendous. As shown in [Pie00], RSA suffers from computing expensive
decryption, which can take up to several hundreds of seconds using a 2048 bit key on an 8MHz
platform. Leveraging ECC, the decryption process was shown to be inefficient on a similar plat-
form, requiring up to 8 s using a 193 bit key, with both key sizes of RSA and ECC providing
comparable security levels. Further approaches towards efficient implementations of public-key
cryptographic systems and signature schemes show similar runtime results, which are in the
same order of magnitude [PLP06; LGK10]. In many applications these performance character-
istics are not acceptable. Moreover, such devices do not allow for hardware customization after
their acquisition “off- the-shelf” and obviously not after their deployment to their field of opera-
tion. Thus, a third vital requirement to any security solution applicable to such devices is to be
a purely software-based solution, i.e., to not require any hardware modifications. Instead, solu-
tions must build on existing hardware capabilities a well as features provided by the firmware
drivers and libraries. In order to establish better understanding of the hardware capabilities of
the targeted device class, we provide a detailed description of the device class considered in this
thesis in Chapter 2.2. At last, a fourth requirement for successfully addressing the challenge of
establishing trust in commercially available embedded devices is to consider the major phases
of utilization of such devices firmware1 and its interaction with remote entities in its entirety.
In particular, major distinct execution phases of firmware on embedded devices comprise i) the
boot phase conducted by the boot loader, ii) execution phase of the firmware application and
iii) authentication towards external interconnected entities. Furthermore, especially in the case
of low-end embedded devices, the possibility to attest the level of trust and to re-establish trust
in case of being compromised by malware (i.e., “device recoverability”) is becoming an increas-
ingly vital requirement. We argue that only a holistic approach that considers all these aspects
1 In this work, we will use the terms software and firmware interchangeably.
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that emerge during the interaction with COTS embedded platforms suffices in order to establish
trust in said platforms.
With those identified requirements at hand, providing strong security guarantees becomes a
challenging task. In this thesis we propose to address these challenges by leveraging the concept
of memory-based intrinsic Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs) to provide a hardware-enforced
security anchor on low-cost devices, which can be established efficiently and by software-only
means. PUFs exploit device-unique physical characteristics of the underlying hardware, that
can be used to derive “fingerprints” of hardware components. Based on these device-unique
fingerprints, cryptographic keys can be extracted that allow for the subsequent employment of
lightweight security protocols and applications on the targeted devices.
Although PUFs have been made a subject of discussion in previous works in the literature, up to
now the majority of research has considered PUFs to be a security building block, which has to be
added explicitly during the design phase of the chip (i.e., either as part of an Application-Specific
Integrated Circuit (ASIC) or Field-Programmable Gate Array (FPGA)) before it can be utilized,
in turn requiring a priori design decisions. As a result, most low-cost devices, which are usually
optimized towards cost-efficient manufacturing and hence do not allow for modifications of the
production process, have not been addressed in existing research.
However, many commercially available devices already contain standard components that can
be leveraged for PUF use. In particular, some memory modules already present in COTS devices
– specifically SRAM and DRAM – exhibit good PUF behavior, even though such modules were not
designed for the purpose of using them as PUFs in the first place. In the first part of this thesis,
we investigate whether it is possible to find and utilize existing PUF instances in commercially
available low-cost embedded devices. Having found usable PUF instances, the second part of
this thesis is dedicated to the development of lightweight security protocols that leverage those
PUF instances in order to eventually establish trust in those otherwise unprotected low-cost
devices. In particular, we present the following PUF-enabled applications and protocols that
provide security for the phases of interaction with embedded low-end devices:
1. Secure boot of the device firmware application.
The presented solution provides a software-only mechanism to guarantee boot time in-
tegrity of firmware application. For this purpose we leverage the intrinsic SRAM PUF
instance, in order to derive a device-unique key, which is subsequently used to decrypt
the firmware application by an immutable boot loader. Hence, this solution effectively
protects against firmware replacement or extraction on low-end embedded devices.
2. Integrity protection during execution.
Having secured the loading of the firmware application, a next step is to protect the exe-
cution time integrity of the application, i.e. to prevent against analysis and modification at
runtime. TO this end, we combine the technique of self-checksumming codes with SRAM-
based PUFs to protect against modification of the firmware execution and binding of the
same to the underlying platform.
3. Lightweight mutual device authentication.
We present a very lightweight protocol that allows for mutual authentication of heavily
resource-constrained devices with an external verifier. While we leverage a novel DRAM-
based PUF construction, we avoid computational expensive error-correction, which is tra-
ditionally required to derive a robust key from PUF instances and hence would otherwise
render PUF usage impractical on very resource-constrained devices. Instead, we leverage
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the characteristics of the underlying DRAM-based PUF to realize a more lightweight and
robust mutual authentication scheme.
4. Remote attestation and device recovery.
We propose a novel attestation scheme entitled “Boot Attestation”, which is the first remote
attestation protocol that is optimized towards highly resource-constrained off-the-shelf de-
vices. It supports a variety of standard hardware components, intrinsic PUFs amongst
others, which are used as a Root of Trust (RoT). From this RoT and based on a symmetric
attestation key, software integrity of the individual firmware stages is measured and com-
mitted immediately, resulting in a so-called “Chain of Trust”. The scheme allows for device
recovery after runtime compromise and can be extended to support various read-world use
cases, such as third party verification or key provisioning.
1.1. Research Goal and Research Question
Addressing the class of commercial embedded devices that lack dedicated secure hardware mech-
anisms, the research goal of this work is to establish trust in such platforms by leveraging existing
on-board memory components as PUF instances, with particular focus on SRAM and DRAM mod-
ules. For this purpose, this thesis tries to answer the following research question:
Do standard memory components, implemented on commercial off-the-shelf microcontrollers, show
physical variations that exhibit PUF-like behavior, such that these components can be exploited as
hardware-based security anchors in lightweight security protocols?
Hence, the focus of this thesis lies on the physical variations of said memory components found
on COTS embedded devices, which will be analyzed with regards to their PUF characteristics
and which subsequently serve as a basis for constitutive security protocols and applications.
By focusing on the physical layer, i.e., considering standard hardware components, which are
intrinsically part of commercial low-cost platforms as security primitives, we achieve manifold
desired properties:
1. By focusing on the physical level of standard hardware components, i.e., SRAM and DRAM
modules, which can be found on the majority of COTS devices, we achieve a high degree of
independence from vendor-specific implementation decisions, including individual layouts
of the Printed Circuit Board (PCB), on- or off-chip organization or interaction of functional
elements of the MCU that resides at the core of all the considered device classes (cf. Chap-
ter 2.2). Functional elements typically comprise the CPU, memory components, timers and
external peripheral components.
2. By relying on standard hardware components, we allow for developing secure protocols
and applications that help to maintain trust in COTS embedded devices, despite the ab-
sence of secure hardware components, which are otherwise required in traditional security
solutions [Tru11].
3. By carefully designing secure protocols and applications solutions to require software-only
modifications, any changes to the hardware are avoided entirely. Hence, implementation
of PUF-based security solutions is simplified tremendously, immediately providing support
of a broad range of COTS devices.
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4. Lastly, we allow for retro-fitting hardware-based security anchors to legacy devices, which
are already in-field, in order to deploy supplementary security features.
1.2. Methodology
In order to answer the research question and to efficiently realize the research goal, the first
part of this work deals with the identification, extraction and evaluation of PUF instances ex-
tracted from standard hardware found on COTS embedded devices. The second part of this
thesis presents secure software solutions, i.e. secure boot, code integrity protection, mutual au-
thentication and remote attestation, that are based on the PUF instances previously identified.
Moreover, the underlying device types are leveraged as evaluation platforms to prove the feasi-
bility and efficiency of the implementations. From this methodical approach a gradual process
results as follows:
1. In a first step, commercial embedded platforms are identified, which have a large scope of
application among typical use cases of IoT and thus are qualified representatives for the
targeted device class.
2. After identifying wide-spread embedded platforms, means to extract PUF instances from
each device’s SRAM and DRAM modules are identified. This step involves physically mea-
suring the targeted hardware components in order to extract a significant number of PUF
measurements. The extraction process must be software-only, i.e., without requiring any
hardware modifications that are usually infeasible on COTS platforms.
3. The measurements obtained in the previous step serve as the data set for subsequent eval-
uation of the identified PUF instances towards various PUF characteristics. Evaluation is
done in order to be able to quantify PUF characteristics that have an influence on the
security of the overlying protocols.
4. Finally, based on those PUF instances that yield positive evaluation results with respect to
their PUF characteristics, security protocols and applications were developed in order to
show how to establish trust in these devices.
1.3. Thesis Outline
Given the research methodology introduced in this chapter, the remainder of this thesis is struc-
tured as follows.
Chapter 2 introduces fundamental notations used throughout the remainder of this work. Fur-
thermore, the targeted device class is discussed, focusing on common memory technologies
found on such devices, SRAM and DRAM in particular.
The concept of Physically Unclonable Functions is introduced and defined in Chapter 3. More-
over, central properties that are used to assess and quantify PUF characteristics are discussed.
Furthermore, basic principles of the three PUF types built from SRAM and DRAM modules are
explained.
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In Chapter 4 we identify a set of device types which are representatives of COTS embedded
devices and which serve as evaluation and implementation platforms throughout this thesis.
Furthermore, a common software-only approach to extract memory-based intrinsic PUF instance
from these devices is presented. Finally, this chapter details the evaluation process of the ex-
tracted PUF instances and discusses its results.
After showing the existence of favorable memory-based intrinsic PUF instances on COTS plat-
forms, Chapter 5 presents a first application which builds on these PUF instances. In particular,
a lightweight secure boot solution is proposed, that protects against firmware extraction on em-
bedded devices by exploiting SRAM-based PUFs.
Subsequently, Chapter 6 extends the secure boot application by introducing a PUF-based so-
lution that focuses on the protection of the firmware integrity. Again, SRAM-based PUF in-
stances are used as a hardware-based trust anchor, which are combined with the technique of
self-checksumming code in order to protect from firmware modifications.
Chapter 7 is dedicated to the task of authenticating a given low-cost device towards a remote
server. As there are numerous existing approaches to device authentication for SRAM-based
PUFs, this section presents the first lightweight authentication protocol that uses the decay-
based DRAM PUF, which was previously introduced in this work.
In Chapter 8 a novel and ultra lightweight remote attestation scheme is presented. As the scheme
relies on memory-based intrinsic PUFs, amongst other hardware primitives, it allows for adoption
to a wide-spread spectrum of COTS and legacy devices.
Finally, this thesis is concluded in Chapter 9, summarizing the contributions and discussing po-
tential future work.
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Chapter 2
Preliminaries
In this chapter we discuss important concepts, which will be used frequently throughoutthis thesis. On the one hand, these concepts will serve as a basis for the evaluation of
Physically Unclonable Function (PUF) instances and are used to infer properties of the
PUF-enabled protocols. On the other hand, concepts introduced in this chapter illustrate the
technical properties of the involved device types and the memory components considered in this
work. Since knowledge of these underlying concepts greatly contributes to the understanding of
the remainder of this thesis, they are discussed in detail.
In particular, we will first introduce basic mathematical and information- theoretic notations,
which will be used extensively during evaluation of the PUF instances in Chapter 4. Next, we
model the targeted device class by identifying common hardware capabilities and general pro-
perties. Lastly, we detail the physical structure of the investigated memory components, namely
Static Random-Access Memory (SRAM) and Dynamic Random-Access Memory (DRAM), in order
to provide an understanding of the involved physical effects that result in PUF behavior.
2.1. Notations
Throughout this thesis the following notation and definitions are used frequently, mainly to
model the characteristics of a PUF or to infer information-theoretical statements about the pri-
vacy or security of PUF-enabled applications.
Variables, Distributions and Sets
Random variables are written in capital letters, such as X . A particular instance of the variable
is written in lowercase, i.e., x . The set of possible instances of X and sets in general are denoted
with a calligraphic symbol X = {x1, x2, . . . , xn}. The probability function of a random, discrete
variable X is defined as
p(x) = Pr(X = x). (2.1)
We denote the process of uniformly randomly sampling from a distribution X as x
$← X.
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2.1.1. Functions and Mappings
We denote a function f that maps elements from X to values of Y as f : X 7→ Y . In cases where
we expect X to consist of bitstrings of length m and elements of Y to be bitstrings of length n,
we write f : Xm 7→ Y n.
2.1.2. Distance and Similarity Metrics
Hamming weight
The Hamming weight HW is a metric that defines the number of non-zero symbols in a sequence
of symbols a = {a1, a2, . . . , an}. In the classical case and in the context of this thesis, a is assumed
to be a bitstring, such that HW depicts the number of non-zero elements of a:
HW(a)
de f
= |{i ∈ {1,2, . . . ,n}|ai 6= 0|. (2.2)
Hamming Distance
The Hamming distance HD between two symbol sequences a = {a1, a2, . . . , an} and b ={b1, b2, . . . , bn} of same length n and generated from the alphabet Σ, denotes the number of
positions at which both symbol sequences differ:
HD(a, b)
de f
= |{i ∈ {1,2, . . . ,n}|ai 6= bi|. (2.3)
Jaccard index
The Jaccard index J(·, ·) is a metric that reflects the similarity of two sample sets A and B. Here,
the sample sets can be of unequal size. It is computed as:
J(A,B)
de f
=
|A∩B|
|A∪B| , with 0≤ J(A,B)≤ 1. (2.4)
The Jaccard index is ‘1’ if the sets A and B are identical. Likewise, the index is ‘0’ if both sets
share no common elements.
2.1.3. Entropy
In order to make statements about the information content, i.e., entropy of a PUF, we introduce
the following notations. The notation ‘log’ refers to the base-2 logarithm.
Shannon entropy
The Shannon entropy [Sha48] H(X ) of a discrete, random variable X is denoted as
H(X ) = −∑
x∈X
p(x) log p(x). (2.5)
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Binary entropy
Suppose that X is a binary random variable, i.e.,
X =
(
Pr(X = 1) = p
Pr(X = 0) = 1− p. (2.6)
The binary entropy function Hb(X ) is written as
Hb(p)
de f
= −p log p− (1− p) log(1− p). (2.7)
Min-entropy
Furthermore, for a binary source X , we define the min-entropy [Rén+61] H∞(X ) as
H∞(X ) = − log
 
max((p(0), p(1))

, (2.8)
where p(0) and p(1) are the probabilities of P(X = 0) and P(X = 1), respectively. Note that the
min-entropy denotes the greatest lower bound on the entropy for X .
Mutual information
The mutual information [CT12] I(X ,X ′) between two discrete variables X and Y is denoted by
I(X ;Y ) =
∑
y∈Y
∑
x∈X
p(x , y) log

p(x , y)
p(x)p(y)

. (2.9)
Informally, it defines the amount of information that can be obtained about a variable X through
a second variable Y . Here, p(x , y) denotes the joint probability function of X and Y .
2.2. Common Capabilities of Low-Cost Devices
2.2.1. Hardware
In the following section, we will define the classes of devices considered throughout this the-
sis, as selected device types of this class will serve as a basis for evaluation of PUF instances.
Furthermore, they will be used as proof-of- concept platforms for the implementation of PUF-
enabled security applications. For this purpose we first outline the capabilities of respective
device types, regarding their computational and memory faculties and subsequently identify
hardware components that are common to devices of this class. At last, we detail the prin-
ciples of SRAM and DRAM, as two widely-used memory technologies on Microcontroller Unit
(MCU)-based platforms.
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Device
Class
Processing Power Volatile Memory
(SRAM)
Non-Volatile Memory
(Flash / EEPROM)
Usage Scenario
Class-0 ≤ 32MHz ≤ 6kB ≤ 32kB home automation, sensor
networks, smart objects
Class-1 32MHz to 120MHz 8 kB to 32 kB 32 kB to 256 kB home automation, indus-
trial environments, net-
working appliances
Class-2 32MHz 32 kB to 512 kB 1MB smart car infotainment,
wearable devices, indus-
trial environments
Table 2.1.: The three classes of embedded devices evaluated in this thesis.
We consider the space of so-called Commercial Off-The-Shelf (COTS) embedded devices, which are
increasingly deployed as important building blocks of the Internet-of-Things (IoT).
The predicate COTS mainly refers to the property that such devices are manufactured in mass
production to yield large quantities. Hence, they are commercially available and are comparably
cheap to obtain. Furthermore, they tend to be adaptable to various applications that share similar
performance requirements.1 Their cost-efficiency as well as their versatility commonly lead to
their high dissemination.
The term embedded devices lacks a rigorous definition and incorporates various device classes
which observe different hardware facilities. The main common characteristic of the device types
considered as embedded devices is the much higher restriction of their (hardware) capabilities,
compared to desktop PCs, laptops, servers and alike. Hence, the embedded attribute suggests
that these devices tend to be single-purpose devices with often the minimum memory required to
meet their intended application, in order to minimize manufacturing cost and power consump-
tion. While these restrictions manifest in constraints on processing resources, available memory,
electrical energy consumption and interconnectivity, the main characteristic of embedded devices
from a security point of view lies in the unavailability of dedicated secure hardware. However,
there are classes of embedded devices that have quite diverse characteristics, i.e., varying pro-
cessing power (i.e., MCUs with up to 32MHz vs. System on Chips (SoCs) running at 1GHz) or
which implement different architectures (4 bit vs. 32 bit).
In order to introduce some structure to this rather undifferentiated pool of embedded devices
and to provide a way of relating the evaluated device types to a set of common hardware capabili-
ties, we introduce three device classes. For this purpose we follow the categorization of [BEK14]
which introduced the notion of constrained devices. The spectrum of embedded devices ex-
tends from the class of ultra low-cost MCU-based class-0 devices (e.g., used in Radio-Frequency
Identification (RFID) tokens) through to conventional MCUs (often deployed in industrial en-
vironments) that belong to class-1, to class-2 devices that resemble sophisticated, complex SoC
platforms (i.e., as part of in-car infotainment systems). Table 2.1 provides an overview of the
characteristics and hardware capabilities associated with each device class. Given the vast va-
riety of device types that observe numerous configurations of processing power, volatile mem-
ory, non-volatile memory (i.e., flash end Electrically Erasable Programmable Read-only Memory
(EEPROM)), the presented numbers do not act as sharp class boundaries but are rather used as
orientation values indicating the capabilities of the corresponding hardware characteristic.
1 In contrast to high-priced hardware, which is made for general purpose usage, most embedded devices are
restricted to a subset of applications, due to their limited hardware capabilities.
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Figure 2.1.: Typical hardware conﬁguration of an embedded MCU.
Although SoC-based device types are more complex in their structure and have better hardware
capabilities compared to class-0 devices, at the core of all embedded devices resides an MCU,
featuring the Central Processing Unit (CPU), memory components, I/O controllers and a debug-
ging interface on a single integrated circuit. Ultimately, the most basic device types belonging
to class-0 entirely consist of a single MCU. In contrast, class-2 device types are usually made up
of several MCUs. The MCU is highly-integrated, implementing SRAM, flash and sometimes EEP-
ROM as part of a single die package, i.e., such components are usually “on-chip” (cf. Figure 2.1).
Although DRAM is currently implemented as an external component, i.e. “off-chip”, we foresee
that due to the fast maturation of embedded DRAM technology, future embedded devices will
also feature DRAM as an on-chip component (cf. Section 2.3). The high level of integration of
key components within a single chip creates an effective protection against attempts to physically
probe, modify or entirely replace such components. Compared to a system which implements
key components as isolated packaged modules (i.e., a laptop or server), an invasive attacker who
wants to tamper with on-chip components of an MCU will be required to put in much more effort
in terms of time and hardware equipment. One of the attacker’s challenges is to de-package the
core chip, keeping the highly interconnected components functional, in order to get access to
the components in the first place. This task is becoming even more challenging if state of the
art circuit packaging technologies such as Package-on-Package (PoP) are used [Yos+06]. In this
case, functional components such as the CPU, SRAM and other on-chip components are vertically
organized in a stacked fashion. Hence, the underlying design principle of MCUs and SoCs of high
integration establishes an innate security boundary against basic physical adversaries.
The majority of MCUs follow the Reduced Instruction Set Computer (RISC) design principle
that allows for less cycles per instruction by using fewer but more general-purpose instructions
instead of a higher number of more complex instructions as in the Complex Instruction Set Com-
puter (CISC) architecture. 2 More sophisticated class-2 SoC platforms, such as the OMAP4460
(cf. Chapter 4.2), even implement multi-core architectures. However, even the simplest class-0
MCUs implement some form of parallelism as most microcontrollers follow a pipelined architec-
ture.
2 Note however, that due the steadily increasing complexity of MCUs, a strict discrimination between both ar-
chitectures is not always possible. For example, ARM processors, being RISC processors, allow for different
instruction sizes by using the ARM Thumb mode, which is a feature of CISC processors.
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2.2.2. Firmware
On the software side, MCUs are often programmed bare-metal, with the Software Development
Kit (SDK) building necessary drivers and libraries into a single application binary (firmware
image). The term firmware usually refers to a fixed piece of software, usually not intended to
be changed by the user [AGS12]. The firmware image consists of a boot loader part and the
application itself, denoted as firmware application.
The boot loader part initializes basic hardware components, i.e., it configures the clock, initial-
izes the main memory and sets up key peripherals. Class-0 and class-1 devices usually rely on
a very compact single-staged boot loader that (after hardware initialization) merely sets up the
stack and calls the firmware application, which usually consists of a main function and a loop
that continuously executes the application logic at its core. In contrast, class-2 device types often
implement a much more complex multi-staged boot loader. Here, the first stage boot loader is
small enough to reside in the on- chip SRAM and, amongst others, sets up the CPU, configures
the main memory subsystem, initializes and synchronizes various timers and finally sets up ex-
ternal peripherals before invoking the second-stage boot loader. This part is too big to fit into
SRAM in its entirety and hence is executed from external DRAM. It is in charge of configuring
higher-level functionalities of the embedded device and configuration of the residual peripher-
als (USB subsystem, networking etc.). One of the most popular multi-staged open source boot
loaders is u-boot [Eng02], which is also the standard boot loader implementation of some of the
evaluated class-2 device types, including the PandaBoard and the Intel Galileo (cf. Section 4.2).
U-boot consists of a first- and a second-stage boot loader. Whilst the first stage initializes core
functionalities, the second stage boot loader configures DRAM and external components and
eventually executes the application part of the firmware.
The application part implements the main functionality and algorithms of the firmware. The
firmware image is stored in Non-Volatile Memory (NVM), usually flash memory or EEPROM.
Conventionally, there are two distinct sections of NVM that are dedicated to either the boot
loader or the application part of the firmware. While the memory range dedicated to the boot
loader is very limited in terms of memory (usually not more then 6 kB to 10 kB on class-1 device
types), the entire remaining NVM address space can be used to store the firmware application.
On most device types both sections can be configured individually regarding their memory access
controls. This is because the boot loader is usually regarded as the Root of Trust (RoT), i.e.,
the trust anchor in order to boot strap the platform from an integer initial state. Accordingly,
the boot loader is usually “locked-down” once it is written to the respective memory region
by disabling write-access to it. The firmware application is therefore typically initialized by
such an immutable firmware boot loader, which additionally reduces the risk of permanently
disabling a device (“bricking”). In order to allow for modification of the boot loader (usually
after exceptional events, such as device recovery), most platforms allow for programming via
low- level interfaces such as Joint Test Action Group (JTAG). Hence, many device types provide
customization of these early stage(s) of boot.
Depending on the underlying platform and application scenario, there are different approaches
regarding the firmware’s architecture. Especially in scenarios that focus on low-power (i.e.,
sensor networks or home automation) or low-cost (i.e., wearables or smart gadgets) mostly
MCU-based class-0 device types are employed. Such devices traditionally implement a single-
threaded firmware application that continuously executes its functionality within a loop. Sys-
tems that operate in time-critical environments (mostly class-1 device types, i.e., as part of
industrial control systems or avionics) often implement more complex kernel-based Real-Time
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Operating System (RTOS), which allow multitasking by means of event-driven scheduling of
multiple tasks [Edi16]. Class-2 SoC-based device types are able to implement an entire rich
operating system.
2.2.3. Security Issues
While embedded COTS devices are significantly restricted regarding their hardware facilities,
which manifest itself in constraints on processing resources, available memory, electrical en-
ergy consumption and interconnectivity, the main characteristic of embedded devices from a
security point of view lies in the unavailability of dedicated secure hardware. More powerful
computing platforms, such as up-to-date tablets, laptops, desktop PCs and servers traditionally
rely on Trusted Platform Modules (TPMs) [Tru11] in order to establish a hardware-based RoT
and to provide a foundation for secure protocols and applications. TPM is based on a trust
anchor in hardware, the TPM-chip, and provides a set of cryptographic functionalities and pro-
tocols. Alternatively, current Intel processors implement the company’s own approach towards a
Trusted Execution Environment (TEE), called Intel Software Guard Extensions (SGX) [Int16b].
Leveraging an extended instruction set, SGX implements so-called enclaves that act as secure
“compartments” used to execute applications in a secure manner. SGX protects the integrity and
confidentiality of code and related data run within the enclave from a potentially malicious oper-
ating system and further. For this purpose SGX allows to remotely attest the state of an enclave,
supports key provisioning and sealing of data communicated with external parties. However,
currently only the most powerful processor types implement Intel SGX, omitting Intel’s embed-
ded product line. Furthermore, as discussed by Costan and Devadas [CD16], Intel’s licensing
model, which is integrated in the SGX architecture by means of the Launch enclave and asso-
ciated patents, suggests that the SGX technology can only be used by a party which maintains
some sort of business relationship with Intel. Furthermore, a series of vulnerabilities that can
lead to key compromises were discovered recently [Sch+17b]. In the mobile world, the pre-
vailing approach of providing a TEE world is ARM’s TrustZone technology [ARM17]. TrustZone
leverages an extended bit line in order to create and distinguish between a normal and a secure
“world”. Using hardware resources, TrustZone provides individual sets of memory, peripheral
components and software states for applications running in both worlds. Secure context switch-
ing guarantees that no data from the secure world is leaked to the normal world’s processes.
However, currently only ARM’s non-lightweight application processors (ARM Cortex) support
TrustZone technology.3
Hence, available embedded devices fail to implement dedicated hardware-based RoTs. Further-
more, already deployed devices cannot be retro-fitted with possible future security mechanisms
once they are available to the market. Given the high dissemination of such devices and the
market force of minimizing costs, their replacement by more secure platforms is highly unlikely.
In order to fill this security gap, we propose to use standard hardware components, existing in
virtually all computing platforms to realize a hardware-based RoT. In particular, we leverage the
manufacturing variabilities of SRAM and DRAM components. Next, we present the principles of
both technologies.
3 ARM recently announced support for a future generation of low-cost architectures, the Cortex-M23 and M33
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(b). The structure of a 6T-SRAM cell in detail (c) and the threshold voltage Vth of
the corresponding transistor (d).
2.3. Memory Technologies Found on Low-Cost Devices
Common on-die memory components that can be found on the majority of low-cost MCUs com-
prise local instruction and data caches, SRAM4, flash memory and EEPROM. Recently, embedded
on-chip DRAM (eDRAM) technology has become part of newer embedded devices generations.
Due to its promising technology and fast improvement [Bar+10; Fre+15; Iye+05; Kal+10;
Pei+14; PTT17], we anticipate that DRAM will most likely become a standard on-die element of
future low-cost MCUs generations.
Below we will provide background information on the physical structure of SRAM and DRAM
technologies, which is necessary to understand the functionality of the PUF types extracted from
both technologies, as introduced in Chapter 3. Although common memory components of low-
cost COTS MCUs also comprise flash memory and EEPROM – both which have been shown to
exhibit PUF-like behavior [Pra+11; Roa+15; Wan+12] – the focus of this work lies on SRAM
and DRAM modules.
2.3.1. Static Random Access Memory
Static Random-Access Memory (SRAM) is a standard volatile memory technology that stores
information for as long as operational voltage is applied. Although SRAM can be constructed in
different ways, the prevailing construction uses six transistors in order to construct a single SRAM
cell (6T-SRAM-cell), based on Complementary Metal–Oxide–Semiconductor (CMOS) technology.
In this design, four transistors are used to store a single bit, whereas two additional transistors
are used to control access to the SRAM cell for reading or writing purposes.
The four storage transistors form two cross-couples inverters (A and B in Figure 2.2), that re-
inforce each other, effectively creating a positive feedback loop. Once the threshold voltage Vth
is attained, the respective transistor starts to conduct. Due to manufacturing variations, usually
there exists a mismatch between the threshold voltages of both cross-coupled inverters. The in-
verter with the smaller Vth conducts first and initiates the feedback loop. There exist two stable
states, used to store a logic zero or one. A third metastable state exists only for a very short
4 On many embedded platforms, CPU caches are implemented using SRAM technology.
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time, after supply voltage is applied (i.e., at start-up of the SRAM module). Minuscule devia-
tions from the metastable state are amplified by the feedback loop, pulling the cell to one of the
stable states, a process also referred to as “ramp-up”. A schematic description of a 6T-SRAM cell
is given in Figure 2.2.
2.3.2. Dynamic Random Access Memory
A single DRAM cell stores a bit charge in a capacitor that can be accessed through a transistor.
DRAM cells are grouped into cell arrays, where each row of the array is connected to a horizontal
word-line and DRAM cells in the same column are connected to the same bit-line. All bit-lines
are coupled to equalizers and sense-amplifiers that amplify voltages on bit-lines to such level
that can be interpreted as logical zeros or ones. The structures of a DRAM cell array and a single
DRAM cell are depicted in Figure 2.3.
DRAM cells are accessed per row, i.e., the process of accessing a single DRAM cell involves
fetching all the neighboring cells that constitute a single DRAM row. In order to access a row, all
the bit-lines that are connected to the respective row are pre-charged to half the supply voltage
VDD/2. Subsequently, the connected word-line is enabled, activating every transistor in that row.
This process allows charges form the capacitors to flow to their associated bit-lines. Depending
on the charge that was stored on the capacitor, the sense amplifier then drives the bit-line to
either VDD or 0V. Each sense amplifier is usually shared by two bit-lines [Kee08], of which only
one can be accessed at the same time. This structure makes the two bit-lines complementary,
which results in two kinds of cells: true-cells and anti-cells. True-cells store the value ‘1’ as VDD
and ‘0’ as 0V on the capacitor, while anti-cells store the value ‘0’ as VDD and ‘1’ as 0V. A schematic
overview of a DRAM array and a single DRAM cell is given in Figure 2.3.
DRAM cells require a periodic refresh of the stored charges, as otherwise the capacitors lose their
charge over time, which is referred to as DRAM cell decay or leakage. The hardware memory
controller takes care of periodic refresh, whose interval is defined by the vendor, and is usually
32ms or 64ms. We will exploit this decay behavior later, in order to realize the decay-based
DRAM PUF in Chapter 3.3.1.
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In the following chapter, we introduce the notion of Physically Unclonable Functions. Themain challenge here is to find a middle ground between a sufficiently precise formal defini-
tion and the ability to exhaustively cover the large variations among different PUFs types.
In particular, the notion should be accurate enough to cover important characteristics of a given
PUF type, which affect privacy or security aspects of constitutive applications and protocols. At
the same time, numerous PUF types have been proposed in the literature, which are based on
diverse physical phenomena and hence can only be modeled individually if the model is re-
quired to cover all involved physical aspects. Thus, the task of defining an accurate, yet all-
embracing definition of a PUF is not trivial [Roe12]. Although different existing works tried to
approach this task [Arm+11; Arm+16], a sound, unified formal description of PUFs has yet to
be found [Mae10; Gan+17].
From an informal perspective, a Physically Unclonable Function (PUF) can be described as a
complex physical structure that can be queried by a stimulus c in order to produce a response r.
The response r corresponds to a noisy PUF measurement X. The PUF measurement X depends
on the challenge c as well as on the micro- or nanoscale physical structure of the underlying
object embedding the PUF. Due to minuscule manufacturing variations during the production
process, the structure of the physical object containing the PUF is unique to each of its instances.
Moreover, as the differences in the physical structure of different PUFs are at a microscopic
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level, which is supposed to be beyond the influence of the current manufacturing technology,
it is assumed that the PUF is unclonable such that it cannot be reproduced, not even by the
manufacturer. The challenge-response behavior of the physical system is complex enough such
that the response to a randomly selected challenge cannot be predicted.
Below, we give a more detailed definition of PUFs and discuss their properties and resulting areas
of applications.
3.1. Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs)
In contrast to existing approaches in the literature that provide an exhaustive formal definition,
this work initially gives an intuitive description of the underlying concept of PUFs and gradually
models a PUF by discussing its main properties. Hence, the definition of PUFs given in this chap-
ter is based on their physical properties, with a strong focus on those characteristics that emerge
from SRAM and DRAM components. The proposed model of a PUF captures those characteristics
that are, in general, common to memory-based PUFs. In this way,s we allow for uniform eval-
uation of PUF characteristics obtained from SRAM- and DRAM-based PUF types. In turn, this
approach allows for making statements about the security and privacy aspects of the protocols
and applications that are enabled by both PUF types and which are presented in the latter part
of this thesis.
A colloquial definition of the concept of PUFs is given by Maes [Roe12], where the authors state
that “a PUF is an object’s fingerprint”. In order to introduce a higher level of precision, we modify
this definition to be: A PUF is a type of function, which is entangled with physical characteristics of
a containing object. Just as traditional, mathematical functions, a PUF fPUF maps input elements
(i.e., challenges) {c1, c2, . . . , ck} of a challenge space ci ∈ C to output elements (i.e., responses){r1, r2, . . . , rl} of a response space r j ∈ R:
fPUF : C
k 7→ Rl . (3.1)
We introduce the following simplified notion:
r ← PUF(c) or PUF(c) = r. (3.2)
3.1.1. Properties
Given the large number of diverse PUF construction that leverage very different physical phe-
nomena, it is a challenging task to find a common subset of properties that allow for a definition
whether a given construction or hardware component implements a PUF instance at which level
of quality. Thus, in the literature different properties were deemed as essential for a PUF, result-
ing in a certain ambiguity regarding this topic.
This thesis approaches the issue by considering those properties that appear most often in the
literature and by further excluding properties that are regarded as “nice-to-have” but which are
hard to verify either formally or by experiment. Below, we list the most basic properties on an
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abstract level and, if appropriate, give details about their peculiarities in the context of SRAM
and DRAM PUFs. More precisely, we discuss the aspects of uniqueness, robustness, unclonability
and unpredictability.
Uniqueness
In contrast to mathematical functions, the mapping function PUF(·) is strongly determined by
the physical characteristics of the containing object. In particular, the response r depends on
the challenge c as well as on the micro- or nanoscale physical structure of the object embedding
the PUF. PUF instances that are drawn from the same distribution P are of the same PUF type.
In particular, P resembles a given manufacturing process. Hence, PUFs that belong to the same
underlying distribution P are the result of the same production technology as well as process and
observe similar PUF characteristics. For example, all SRAM PUFs that are extracted from SRAM
modules of the same product line are drawn from the same PUF distribution P. By challenging
different PUFs that are obtained from the same distribution P with a fixed challenge ck, one
obtains responses that are highly uncorrelated:
∀PUFi,PUF j ∈ P, with i 6= j,PUFi(ck) = ri,PUF j(ck) = r j : d(ri, r j)> ε. (3.3)
In particular, a PUF is said to be unique, if the distance d(ri, r j) > ε is high. Here, d(·, ·) is an
abstract distance metric (cf. Section 4.4 for concrete measures).
Robustness
One peculiarity of PUFs lies in the fact that, although a PUF approximates the properties of
an injective function, it does not do so perfectly: by challenging a given PUF instance PUFid
repeatedly n times with a fixed challenge ci, one obtains a set of responses R = {r1, r2, . . . , rn}
that are similar but not identical, i.e.,
∀ri, r j ∈ R, with i 6= j,PUFk(ci) = ri,PUFk(c j) = r j : d(ri, r j)≤ ε. (3.4)
Here, ε is an upper bound on the dissimilarity of the responses. Usually ε is specific to a set of
PUF instances that are drawn from the same underlying distribution P. This property of limited
robustness emanates from the fact that querying a PUF implies a physical measurement of the
underlying object, which usually implicates a certain amount of noise. A PUF is said to be robust
if ε is small.
In case of SRAM-based PUFs, noise phenomena manifest due to those SRAM cells, whose in-
verters exhibit only a small mismatch in their electrical characteristics. In particular, if the four
transistors that form both inverters are highly symmetrical, i.e., the threshold voltages Vth of
transistors related to inverter A are similar to those related to inverter B (cf. Figure 2.2), the
affected cell has no pronounced preference towards one of the two stable states. Hence, the
start-up value of the cell “fluctuates” across multiple measurements, which is observed as noise
in the PUF measurements. Various techniques to enhance robustness by reducing similarity of
threshold voltages of SRAM cells have been proposed, including the enforcement of Negative
Bias Temperature Instability (NBTI) [GK14], using Hot Carrier Injection (HCI) to increase the
offset of sense amplifiers [BM13] or various approaches that aim at selecting reliable SRAM
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cells [Eir+12; Xia+14; VDP16] in order to minimize noise. Note however, that invasive tech-
niques like HCI are not applicable to COTS devices due to the high integration of the SRAM
module into the MCU die.
In contrast, both DRAM-based PUF constructions, that will be introduced in Section 3.3, leverage
the decay process of the charge stored on the DRAM cell’s capacitor (cf. Section 2.3.2). Here, the
physical phenomena is more complex, as the (stability of the) decay process of a given DRAM cell
is not just determined by the analog components of the respective cell, but further by neighboring
cells and wires (word- and bit-lines). Hence, noise characteristics of a decay-based DRAM PUF
are strongly influenced by the overall physical design of the underlying DRAM module.
Unclonability
PUFs carry the attribute unclonable already as part of their name. However, defining “unclon-
ability” is not a straightforward approach. In the literature physical unclonability refers to the
requirement that it should be hard for anyone, including the manufacturer of the hardware com-
ponents that embeds respective PUF instances, to produce two identical hardware tokens that
implement PUF instances that share an identical function PUF(·). In particular,
∀ri, r j ∈ R, with (PUFi,PUF j) $← P,PUFi(ck) = ri,PUF j(ck) = r j : Pr(ri = r j) is small. (3.5)
However, in certain application-dependent scenarios, such as authentication this property will
not suffice, as some PUF types only possess a small set of challenges C and responses R (cf.
Section 3.1.2). Using such a PUF as part of a straight forward challenge-response-based au-
thentication protocol, enables a network adversary, who observes the communication between
the PUF and a server, to fully model the mapping function PUF(·) after he captured all possible
challenge-response pairs. Thus, a second variation of this property is denoted as “mathematical
unclonability”. Here, the requirement lies in the inability of a malicious user, who has unlimited
access to a PUF instance, to model the entire PUF functionality, either by exhaustively collecting
challenge-response pairs or by successfully simulating the mapping function PUF(·) in software.
Protection against simulating the mapping function is usually guaranteed, as PUFs must ex-
hibit the additional feature of unpredictability. Instead, protection against observing all possible
challenge-response pairs can only be guaranteed by the PUF type itself. Generally, a PUF type
that observes a challenge set C with an exponentially large number of elements, i.e., a strong
PUF, qualifies to be mathematical unclonable (cf. Section 3.1.2). However, for a particular class
of PUFs that observes an exponentially large set C and that relies on race conditions of signals
traversing circuits (especially Arbiter PUFs) (cf. Section 3.1.2) the property of mathematical
unclonability does not seem to hold. Researchers presented modeling attacks based on various
machine-learning approaches that exploit the inherent linearity amongst the elements of this
PUF type [Rüh+10; HMV12; GTS16], in turn allowing for the construction of a mathematical
model of the PUF.
Unpredictability
The unpredictability property refers to a high complexity of the mapping function PUF(·). In
particular, on the basis of a set of valid challenge-response pairs, it should be hard to infer valid
responses from other challenges, without having access to the actual PUF.
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Other Properties
Different works of literature propose additional properties of PUFs, some of them regarded as
crucial aspects in order to evaluate the PUFs behavior of a given hardware component [RSS09;
RBK10; Brz+11; Roe12]. However, this work does not claim to present an exhaustive model for
PUFs. Also, some additional properties such as tamper-evidence are not easy to define or to be
proven experimentally. Instead, the focus is on establishing a common notation that can later be
used for discussing properties of the security protocols and applications, which are constructed
on the basis of the PUFs.
3.1.2. PUF Types
Given the diverse PUFs types proposed during the last years, there exist different classification
systems that distinguish PUFs regarding various criteria, including the nature of the underlying
hardware constructions, the way physical variation is harnessed to obtain a physical measure-
ment or their applicability in security-related protocols. Below, we present the most prevailing
approaches to PUF type classification.
Delay-based vs. memory-based PUFs
One way to classify PUFs is to consider the way physical variation of the underlying hardware
can be extracted such that analog or digital measurements of this variation can be obtained. In
particular for PUF types that are based on silicon chips, i.e., integrated circuits, the two broad
categories delay-based and memory-based PUFs emerged in the literature.
Delay-based PUFs exploit the fact that due to process variation, no two fully identical circuits
can be manufactured. Thus, even for a signal traversing two circuits (paths) that share exactly
the same layout (number, relative location and type of comprising gates), there will be a small
difference in the time it takes both signals to transit the circuits. The resulting time delay of one
of both signals is used to extract a PUF response in Arbiter-PUFs [Lee+04; Lin+10; MKP08],
Ring-Oscillator (RO) PUFs [Gas+02; SD07].
Memory-based PUFs rely on minuscule differences in physical properties of memory cells. Most
of the PUF types that belong to this category exploit metastable states of memory cells that are
caused by a mismatch in the physical structure of the otherwise symmetrically laid-out elements
(cf. Figure 2.2). These PUF types enforce the metastable state of the memory cells, which
eventually settle to one of two possible states that result in an array of logical zeros and ones
that can be interpreted as a digital PUF measurement. While most memory-based PUF types
rely on variations within memory cells, a few memory-based PUFs exploit different physical
aspects, such as data remanence [Hol+12]. In particular, the two novel PUF constructions
presented in this thesis [Xio+16; Sch+17a] are based on the decay process of DRAM cells (cf.
Section 3.3.1). Prominent examples for memory-based PUFs are SRAM PUFs [Gua+07; H+07],
Latch PUFs [SHO07], digital Flip-Flip (DFF) PUFs [MTV08; Van+10], Butterfly PUFs [Kum+08],
Flash PUFs [Pra+11; Wan+12], Buskeeper PUFs [SSL12], DRAM PUFs [Teh+15] and Bitline
PUFs [HF14].
Extrinsic vs. Intrinsic PUFs
Another approach to classify PUF types focuses on the way the PUF behavior is embedded into
a physical object. In the context of PUFs the term intrinsic was first coined by Gassend et
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al. [Gua+07]. It refers to the property that PUF-like behavior is manifested intrinsically du-
ring the manufacturing process of a given hardware component. Thus, no modification of the
manufacturing process and no post-modification of the assembled hardware components is re-
quired to establish a PUF. Later, Maes [Roe12] extended this definition to also require that the
evaluation of the PUF is conducted internally, i.e. the PUF response is produced inside the con-
taining hardware. The advantages of intrinsic PUFs are manifold. As intrinsic PUFs are created
using standard manufacturing processes, they introduce no overhead during production. Since
they can be provided “at zero-cost”, i.e., they are an artifact of the production process, they ex-
hibit high dissemination. Combining both advantages, intrinsic PUFs are particular interesting
for low-cost devices, which are produced under the premise of high profit.
Accordingly, extrinsic PUFs are constructed in a dedicated process as the physical mechanisms
that exhibit PUF behavior require customized hardware layouts that, by definition, are not part
of standard hardware components. Hence, they are either synthesized as Application-Specific
Integrated Circuit (ASIC) or they are implemented on Field-Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs).
Most delay-based PUFs are extrinsic PUFs, including Arbiter-PUFs and RO-PUFs. In accordance
with the definition of Maes [Roe12], extrinsic PUFs further require external equipment (i.e.,
which is not part of the object embedding the PUF) for measuring PUFs responses.
Weak vs. Strong PUFs
From a security point of view, an important discrimination factor for PUFs is the size of their
space of challenges C and responses R. The notion of weak and strong PUFs was first introduced
by Guajardo et al. [Gua+07] and was later improved by Rührmair et al. [RBK10] A strong PUF
exhibits a set of challenges (and responses) with a number of elements that is exponentially large
in the number of hardware components, constituting the PUF. Given this property, an attacker
with access to the PUF for an unlimited time, will not be able to exhaustively query the PUF in
order to create a complete model of the PUF behavior (cf. Section 3.1.1). In turn, weak PUFs are
prone to mathematical clonability of their challenge-response space. In fact, at the time of writing
this thesis, all intrinsic PUFs, including the PUF types considered in this work, are considered as
weak PUFs and hence do not exhibit mathematical unclonability. However, a common approach
to compensate this constraint is to introduce a controlled interface for querying the PUF at system
level and hence to create a so- called controlled PUF [Gas+07]. Strong PUFs are generally
qualified to be used for authentication purposes, whereas due to the small number of challenges,
weak PUFs are usually considered for secure key storage (cf. Section 3.1.3). Nevertheless, in
Chapter 7, we will show how a lightweight secure authentication protocol can be constructed on
the basis of the decay-based DRAM PUF presented in Chapter 3.3.1, which provides a number of
challenge-response-pairs, which is nearly linear in the amount of DRAM cells.
3.1.3. Applications of PUFs
Due to their favorable properties discussed previously, PUFs have been proposed as a hardware-
based security primitive for various security protocols and applications. Below, we will give
an overview of the numerous usage scenarios of PUFs and reference their related work in the
literature.
Secure Key Storage
The interconnection of embedded devices requires the secure identification of the involved plat-
forms, used to exchange potentially sensitive data. Using secure device identification, imper-
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sonation attacks during the communication of the involved devices or hardware counterfeiting
can be thwarted. Commonly, a unique identifier is stored on the respective embedded platform
for the purpose of secure identification. A basic approach is to include a unique serial num-
ber or a shared secret key to the hardware component at manufacturing time [Smi10]. More
advanced devices that provide dedicated secure hardware usually rely on public-key cryptogra-
phy and signatures to establish authenticity and hence to identify a device (cf. Chapter 7). On
embedded devices without such secure facilities, a common approach to device identification
is to embed cryptographic keys in each device by burning them in at manufacturing time, i.e.,
using masked Read-Only Memorys (ROMs). However, this solution comes with potential pitfalls,
such as increased production complexity as well as rather limited protection against key extrac-
tion attempts [Arm+10]. In particular, long-term secrets are vulnerable to key extraction, given
that they permanently exist in digital form and since most NVMs can be attacked by means of
(semi-) invasive attacks [TW11]. From a security perspective, the approach of using traditional
NVM-based key storage becomes even more unattractive, due their high ubiquity and hence the
increased physical attack surface of such embedded platforms.
As an alternative, researchers have proposed PUFs for secret key storage [TŠ06; Tuy+07; SD07],
as they are a lightweight means to provide a device-unique fingerprint. Moreover, by using PUFs
cryptographic keys are of ephemeral nature; they only exist for a limited and usually very short
time. In a PUF-based key storage, a key is created “on-the-fly”, i.e., after the PUF was challenged
for this key. While the PUF-enabled device is turned off, the key is not existent in any form.
This volatile nature of a long-term secret heavily decreases the attack surface and complicates
key extraction attempts. Especially for intrinsic PUF types secure key storage is a preferred use
case, as they provide inherent hardware identities without additional costs and hence avoid the
addition of secure non-volatile key compartments. Furthermore, the process of explicitly burning
keys into NVM is eliminated. Thus, SRAM-based PUFs, belonging to the class of intrinsic PUFs,
are mainly used for secure key storage [Gua+07; Sel+11].
However, PUF measurements always contain a certain amount of noise. In order to extract a
stable output from a noisy PUF measurement X that can be used to derive a cryptographic key
K, a Fuzzy Extractor (FE) construction [DRS04] can be applied. The FE maps the noisy PUF
measurement X to a stable message by compensating the noise, usually by means of Error-
Correcting Codes (ECCs). Commonly, FEs work in two phases, a generation phase FE.Gen()
performed upon enrollment at a trusted party (i.e., the manufacturer or the system integrator)
and a reconstruction phase, conducted by the PUF user, during which a process FE.Rec() is
performed after each PUF measurement. During FE.Gen() a secret key K and a public Helper
Data W are derived from a noisy PUF reference (enrollment) measurement X. The algorithm
FE.Rec() decodes a noisy PUF measurement X' back into the key K, thereby using Helper Data
W. This works as long as X and X' are close enough (e.g., both are two PUF responses to the same
challenge obtained from the same PUF instance). The enrollment and reconstruction processes
are depicted in Figure 3.1.
Hardware-Software Binding
One of the most tempting scenarios is the illegitimate reproduction of embedded systems, where
an adversary reproduces existing devices by copying their firmware to counterfeit, cheaper hard-
ware. By selling those cloned devices, adversaries cause financial loss for the manufacturer of the
original system. As embedded devices usually lack the implementation of trusted hardware such
as TPM, Intel SGX or ARM TrustZone (cf. Chapter 2.2), intrinsic PUFs depict an efficient and
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Figure 3.1.: Illustration of the enrollment and reconstruction phases of a Fuzzy Extractor.
widely-available solution to this problem. Especially SRAM-based PUFs have been considered as
a primitive to bind firmware to the underlying hardware [GMS09; Gua+07; LMA16; LT13].
In this thesis, we present two solutions that address the problem of protecting firmware on
embedded devices against firmware extraction attempts. A first solution presented in Chapter 5
proposes a secure boot scheme that protects the firmware at boot time by leveraging the PUF
characteristics of on-chip SRAM on MCUs [Sch+14] in order to decrypt the firmware prior to
execution. A second solution presented in Chapter 6 protects the subsequent firmware execution
stage by intertwining the execution of a firmware with the underlying hardware [KSK15]. Again,
we rely on an SRAM-based PUF extracted from commercial embedded devices and combine it
with the concept of self-checksumming hashes to provide a hardware-based security anchor.
Secure Authentication
Based on the idea of deriving device-unique identifiers from PUF-enabled hardware compo-
nents, PUFs have been further proposed to be used as building blocks of authentication pro-
tocols [tuyls2006rfid; ÖHS08; SVW10; SD07; Van+12]. Most solutions consider a low-cost
yet PUF-enabled client that is authenticated against a powerful server. A classic approach to-
wards authentication foresees an enrollment procedure that results in a challenge-response-pair
database stored at the server. During the actual authentication process the server challenges the
client to provide a valid response. It is noteworthy that in traditional authentication protocols
only strong PUFs (cf. Section 3.1.2) can be used. This is due to the fact that the numerous
possible challenges mitigate replay attacks (challenge-response pairs cannot be reused).
However, in Chapter 7 we present a novel authentication protocol that also enables authentica-
tion in the presence of a PUF with only a small number of challenge-response pairs. We do this
by exploiting the special decay characteristics of DRAM cells as part of a novel PUF construction
called the decay-based DRAM, which is introduced in this thesis in Chapter 3.3.1.
Device Attestation
A major challenge in computer security is to establish the trustworthiness of remote platforms.
Remote attestation is the most common approach to this challenge. It allows a remote platform
to assess and report its system state in a secure way to a third party. Recently, PUFs have been em-
ployed as a building block in attestation schemes focusing on low-cost and resource-constrained
devices [Koç+11; Kon+14; SSW11].
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Unfortunately, existing attestation solutions either provide low security, as they rely on unrealistic
assumptions, or are not applicable to commodity low-cost and resource-constrained devices, as
they require custom secure hardware extensions that are difficult to adopt across IoT vendors.
In Chapter 8, we propose a novel remote attestation scheme, named Boot Attestation, that is
particularly optimized for low-cost and resource-constrained embedded devices. We achieve a
high coverage of existing commercial devices by relying on standard hardware components, such
as SRAM-based PUFs, in order to support implementation of the Boot Attestation protocol even
on the most low-end IoT platforms available today.
Random Number Generation
Many cryptographic primitives rely on random data to ensure security. The generation of keys,
salts or nonces requires random data to be unpredictable to attackers. Therefore, Random Num-
ber Generators (RNGs) need to be fed with high entropy seeds. In order to generate random
numbers for cryptographic applications, ideally a physical source should be harnessed which
provides true randomness. Such non-deterministic sources derive their randomness from under-
lying physical properties that exhibit unpredictable behavior. However, there are two important
drawbacks to most of these physical RNG constructions. First, they require specific hardware
to extract randomness from the physical entities on the device. Second, the throughput of such
RNGs is often too low for cryptographic applications, where large streams of random bits are
required. Thus, PUF-based RNGs have been proposed, that exploit the noise inherent in a PUF
measurement in order to provide truly random data [HBF09; Lee+12; Van+13].
3.2. SRAM-based PUFs
It has been shown that selected SRAM modules show PUF-like behavior [H+07]. Further
research in this area supports the applicability of SRAM as a Physically Unclonable Func-
tion [MTV09; SL12]. Using SRAM as PUFs exploits manufacturing variations, which manifest
themselves in a bias of SRAM memory cells. During the power-up phase SRAM cells are drawn
from a metastable state to one of their bistable settings, representing either the logical value of
zero or one (cf. Section 2.3.1). The tendency to settle towards a stable state is due to minuscule
deviations from the otherwise symmetrical layout of the transistors that form two cross-coupled
inverters. On a logical level, the inverters establish a positive feedback loop that enforces exigu-
ous differences in the transistors so that the SRAM cell leaves the metastable state, eventually
resulting in a so-called start-up value of one of the logical values. In doing so, most cells show
a stable start-up behavior, i.e., a strong tendency to initialize to a fixed start-up value. An array
of multiple start-up values of SRAM cells creates a start-up pattern, which is evaluated as a PUF
measurement X, which in turn serves as the fingerprint for the SRAM module.
In order to retrieve a measurement from an SRAM-based PUF, it is required to access the unmod-
ified start-up pattern of the SRAM cells. Here, the attribute unmodified is particularly stressed. It
refers to the state of the SRAM array shortly after power-up and before any process performed
a write-access to the memory. Any process of writing to the SRAM would most likely alter the
start-up pattern in such a way that the resulting values are an artifact of the corresponding soft-
ware process, instead of the underlying physical characteristics of the SRAM module. The logic
to query an intrinsic SRAM-based PUF consists of the following steps:
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a) Setting up a communication interface to transmit the start-up values to a host machine, usu-
ally leveraging Univeral Asynchronous Receiver Transmitter (UART).
b) Determining start and size of the memory range to be queried as a PUF. During initial evalua-
tion this region is to be maximized to get an exhaustive characterization of the SRAM module.
After evaluation of the PUF instance however, only a minimal SRAM region will be used, i.e.,
to reconstruct an 128 bit symmetric key, to consume as little SRAM as possible.
c) After determining the PUF size, reading the individual bytes of the corresponding memory
region and sending them over to the host machine for evaluation or as input to a Fuzzy
Extractor construction for key derivation.
d) For security reasons, the start-up pattern of the respective PUF is overwritten after being read,
in order to be inaccessible to other processes.
In case a dedicated SRAM chip can be leveraged for PUF usage [Int17], the entire SRAM is
available for extracting a fingerprint. In this case and depending on the design of the power
supply of the SRAM module, the SRAM can be powered and hence the PUF can be queried at
any given time. However, leveraging intrinsic on-chip SRAM of commercial devices as done in
this thesis imposes several critical limitations that influence not just the means of interfacing the
PUF but also the time at which the PUF can be accessed. In this case of leveraging an SRAM
module that is not exclusively dedicated to PUF usage but primarily serves as the main memory
of the embedding MCU, special care must be taken to make sure that unmodified SRAM start-
up patterns are extracted. In particular, the PUF measurement must be conducted right after
powering the SRAM module, which usually corresponds to an early stage during the boot phase
of the entire device. Furthermore, only a fraction of the SRAM can be used, as the rest must be
kept available for firmware execution, i.e. stack, heap, etc. and hence may have been modified
before PUF measurement.
In order to maximize the fraction of unmodified SRAM start-up values, on some platforms the
interface to the PUF can be implemented leveraging working and configuration registers as stor-
age for variables and pointers, by means of Assembly. In this way, no or little SRAM is consumed
by the PUF interface itself. However, this approach is usually only possible on very low-end plat-
forms, such as 8 bit processors, that exhibit a less complex structure and hence require less effort
to initialize the device. Furthermore, more complex SoC-based platforms implement NAND flash
modules, which in contrast to NOR flash (generally part of low-end MCUs) are not capable of
Execute-In-Place (XIP), i.e., executing code. Hence, on NAND-based platforms the firmware is
usually first copied to SRAM, in turn making large portions of the memory unavailable for PUF-
usage. In order to visualize this issue, Figure 3.2 shows unmodified SRAM on a TI Stellaris MCU
implementing NOR flash. In contrast, Figure 3.3 shows an enrollment of the SRAM values on a
PandaBoard, implementing NAND flash. Here, large portions are unavailable for PUF usage, as
the firmware is copied to SRAM upon boot. In both figures each black pixel represents a zero bit,
whereas white pixels represent bits of value one.
In general, SRAM PUFs resemble a weak, intrinsic memory-based PUF type. Subsequently, the
property of mathematical unclonability does not hold in the presence of a well-equipped invasive
attacker [Hel+13]. Such an attacker is able to retrieve the start-up values of an SRAM chip
in order to create a PUF model and subsequently to clone the PUF. In one attack type, the
attacker does this by first leveraging the side-channel which emerges due to photonic emission,
in order to derive the characteristics of the start-up values of a given SRAM module. In a next
step, a second SRAM module is modified using a focused ion beam laser, in such a way that
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Figure 3.2.: Bitmap of 32 kB SRAM start-up
values extracted from a Texas In-
struments LM4F120H5QR devel-
opment platform.
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Figure 3.3.: Bitmap of 56 kB SRAM start-up
values extracted from a Panda-
Board ES SoC. Only the smaller
left portion exhibits unmodiﬁed
start-up values, whereas the ma-
jor part of the bitmap has been
pre-initialized by ROM code.
corresponding transistors are disabled, to mimic the start-up behavior of the SRAM module to
be cloned. However, it is unclear whether such invasive attacks are successful against modern
SoC platforms that are manufactured using a PoP packaging technology, where functional blocks
of the SoC, including the SRAM module and the CPU are stacked above each other. Due to the
stacked layout, an ion beam laser that is applied from the bottom of the package would first
disable the CPU, in turn destroying the entire SoC and the PUF instance.
3.3. DRAM-based PUFs
The earliest approach to exploit manufacturing variations of DRAM cells for identification and
random number generation was reported in [Ros+13a; Ros+13b], where an embedded DRAM
chip was designed to generate fingerprints to mitigate hardware counterfeiting. In subsequent
work, through a memory controller in FPGA, Keller et al. [Kel+14] proposed to use the de-
cay of external DDR3 modules for extracting random bits as well as unique identifiers. Lui et
al. [Liu+14] evaluated the uniqueness, robustness and min-entropy of external DRAM mod-
ules using a FPGA setup, and proposed a secure key storage scheme based on DRAM modules.
Hashemian et al. [Has+15] designed a circuit exploiting the variation of the write reliability of
DRAM cells, and presented an authentication scheme based on signatures generated. Rehmati
et al. [Rah+15] made use of the error pattern in approximate DRAM as a system fingerprint.
Tehranipoor et. al [Teh+15] used startup values of DRAM cells to create a device signature. In
the previous works, either dedicated circuits were designed or FPGAs were used. In contrast,
the DRAM PUF proposed in the following section is the first intrinsic DRAM PUF that was ex-
tracted from Commercial Off-The-Shelf devices. Furthermore, the decay-based DRAM PUF and
the Rowhammer PUF are the first DRAM-based PUFs that can be challenged during runtime in
commodity hardware.
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3.3.1. The Decay-Based DRAM PUF
As mentioned in Section 2.3.2, DRAM cells require a periodic refresh of the stored charges, as
otherwise the capacitors lose their charge over time which is referred to as DRAM cell decay or
leakage. As depicted in Figure 3.4, charge may leak via neighboring analog components, such as
wires, capacitors, etc. The hardware memory controller takes care of a periodic refresh, whose
interval is defined by the vendor, and is usually between 32ms and 64ms. Without this periodic
refresh, the logical values stored in the cells may flip to their opposite values.
BL0 BL0*
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Figure 3.4.: A single DRAM cell consists
of a capacitor and a transistor,
connected to a word-line (WL)
and a bit-line (BL or BL*).
Red arrows indicate potential
leakage paths for dissipation of
charges that lead to PUF be-
havior.
Figure 3.5.: Decay process of true and anti-
cells. Red cells depict charged
capacitors whereas white cells
are uncharged.
To be precise, if all cells have been initialized to their charged state, logical values of true cells
decay to ‘0’, while anti-cells decay to ‘1’, as shown in Figure 3.5 (cf. Section 2.3.2). Because
of the manufacturing variations among DRAM cells, some cells decay faster than others. The
unique decay characteristics of individual DRAM cells can be exploited for a decay-based DRAM
PUF, as it will be shown in this thesis.
The process of exploiting the unique decay behavior of DRAM cells in order to extract a PUF
measurement X is summarized in Figure 3.6. The starting point (a) comprises the DRAM module
being configured for ordinary use, where the memory controller periodically refreshes the entire
cells’ content. In a first step (b), the PUF memory region, defined by starting address (addr)
and size (size), is reserved so that it does not contain any user-space or Operating System (OS)
programs. This region is depicted as a shaded gray rectangle in the figures. Furthermore, the
refresh for the PUF region is disabled and the initialization value (iv) is written to the region.
Next, (c) for a given decay time (t), the memory region containing the PUF is not accessed to
let the cells decay. After the decay time has expired, (d) the memory content is read in order to
extract the PUF measurement which manifest itself in the unique location of the flipped bits. At
the end, (e) the normal operating condition of the memory is restored and the memory region
is made available to the OS again. Memory regions within a DRAM module that are used for
obtaining PUF measurements are called logical DRAM PUFs. For a particular DRAM, each logical
PUF is determined by the following parameters: (i) addr, the starting address of the logical PUF,
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Figure 3.6.: Process of querying a decay-based DRAM PUF instance.
and (ii) size, its size, as discussed above. A typical DRAM memory module can then be divided
into thousands or more logical PUFs.
Two additional parameters are needed to define a DRAM PUF challenge. First, an initialization
value (iv) needs to be chosen, written to the DRAM cells before any decay process starts. Sec-
ond, the desired decay time (t) has to be specified. After the decay time has expired, enough
charge has leaked from some cells so that their stored logical bits has flipped. As the decay time
and the positions of the flipped bits are unique for individual DRAM regions, the “pattern” of
decayed (flipped) bits, for a given decay time t serves as the PUF response.
In order to derive a cryptographic key from the PUF response using a minimum number of DRAM
PUF cells, the entropy within a logical DRAM PUF response needs to be maximized. The value
stored in a DRAM cell before it decays, iv, plays an important role, as true cells decay to ‘0’
and anti-cells decay to ‘1’. Thus, for example, if a true cell is initialized to ‘0’, the decay effect
cannot be observed. If the physical layout of the DRAM module is known (i.e., the distribution
of true cells and anti-cells, and hence the individual decay directions), it is possible to construct
an initialization value that maximizes the number of observable bit flips in the PUF response.
However, the physical layout is rarely known. Furthermore, the optimal initialization value
would need to be part of the challenge, or it would have to be stored on the device. In the eval-
uation presented in Chapter 4, we use a fixed initialization value iv of ‘0’ for all cells within the
memory being used as PUFs. Thus, the entropy of our measurements can further be improved
if the initialization value is varied so that each cell is initialized with a logical value that corre-
sponds to a state, where charge is stored on the cells’ capacitor (i.e., ‘1’ for true cells, and ‘0’ for
anti-cells).
Overall, the challenge of a DRAM PUF consists of the tuple (PUFid ,t), where PUFid denotes the
logical PUF instance (addr and size) and t denotes the decay time after which the memory
content is read. In our experiments we fixed the value of iv, hence we do not specify the
parameter explicitly.
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3.3.2. The Rowhammer PUF
The Rowhammer PUF is an intrinsic memory-based PUF that relies on DRAM decay character-
istics and leverages the Rowhammer (RH) effect in DRAM modules [Sch+17a]. More precisely,
the Rowhammer PUF induces bit flips in DRAM due to rapid and repeated access of DRAM rows,
whose location creates a device-unique fingerprint.
The Rowhammer effect was first exposed by Kim et al. [Kim+14] by repeatedly and rapidly ac-
cessing DRAM wordlines in order to induce bit flips in adjacent DRAM locations. Using an FPGA
testbed the authors conducted extensive experiments and showed the prevalent existence of dis-
turbance error in various commodity DRAM chips. A recent report demonstrated the existence
of DRAM disturbance errors in recent DDR4 [Lan16] modules as well.
Prior research has mainly focused on Rowhammer-based attacks, to implement various practical
security exploits. In [SD15] and [Vee+16], the authors rely on the Rowhammer effect to gain
root privileges by flipping bits in Page Table Etries (PTE). Xiao et al. [Xia+16] use Rowhammer
in cross-virtual machine settings in order to attack Xen’s paravirtualized memory isolation by em-
ploying Rowhammering from within a malicious virtual machine. In [Raz+16] and [BM16], au-
thors successfully attack RSA by creating bit flips in keys stored in DRAM. The authors of [Aic15]
and [Awe+16] showed that ECC and doubled DRAM refresh rates are not enough to mitigate
the Rowhammer attack.
In contrast, in this thesis the Rowhammer effect is used for the first time in a positive context,
i.e., to design a novel PUF. Leveraging the Rowhammer effect as a promising candidate for a PUF
is motivated by previous work that has shown that the locations of disturbance errors in DRAM
cells are repeatable [Kim+14; Vee+16].
However, the number of bit flips introduced by the Rowhammer effect can be relatively small,
and thus may only provide a limited amount of entropy. We thus introduce three techniques to
help increase entropy without changing the DRAM physical properties.
• First, we disable DRAM refresh for those memory locations where the PUF is located. This
prevents the PUF cells from being recharged, as would happen if normal refresh was on,
and increases the number of bit flips.
• Second, multiple DRAM rows are used together to create an instance of the Rowhammer
PUF that encompasses larger amount of cells.
• Third, hammering time and initial values of the DRAM cells are controlled to induce a
maximum number of bit flips.
There are many parameters that can influence the Rowhammer PUF. In the following section
we describe such parameters that influence the number and location of bit flips, i.e. the general
PUF-behavior, the most. In Section 4, we present an evaluation upon which the most suitable
values among these parameters are selected.
RH type: As presented in the literature [Awe+16; SD15], there are two approaches in order to
induce the Rowhammer effect. If for one row, which will be part of the PUF measurement (the
PUF row) there is only one adjacent row which is repeatedly read to induce bit flips (the hammer
row) we speak of single-sided Rowhammer (SSRH). In contrast, double-sided Rowhammer (DSRH)
involves exposing both neighbors of a particular PUF row as hammer rows. The patterns of
hammer and PUF rows, used to conduct SSRH and DSRH, are shown in Figure 3.7.
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Figure 3.7.: Layout of hammer rows and PUF rows due to the RH type parameter. Left: single-
sided (SSRH). Right: double-sided (DSRH). A row size of 4 kB is assumed.
Hammer row iv: For the memory range that corresponds to addr and RH size, each included
hammer row will be pre-initialized by writing the initial value Hammer row iv to it, before con-
ducting the Rowhammer process.
PUF row iv: Similarly, all the PUF rows that are included in this memory range are initialized
with the initial value PUF row iv prior to the Rowhammer process. Both, Hammer row iv and
PUF row iv are important parameters as disturbance errors are caused by interaction of DRAM
cell charges. Moreover, as discussed in Chapter 2.3.2, DRAM cells represent a particular logic
value using different charge states, resulting in true cells and anti-cells. Consequently, initializing
a true cell with ‘0’ would not allow to observe a bit flip after its charge has leaked. Thus, it is
important to evaluate the effect of different values of PUF row iv and Hammer row iv.
RH time: The Rowhammer time RH time defines the total duration of the PUF measurement,
including disabling the refresh rate and conducting the hammering process. RH time, just as RH
size and RH type, affects how many times each hammer row will be accessed in total.
Given the above parameters, the process of accessing a Rowhammer PUF is depicted in Algo-
rithm 1. Based on PUF address, PUFsize, and RH type, the DRAM region for the Rowhammer
PUF is defined. First, this DRAM region is reserved, so that no other program accesses the same
region. Next, the PUF rows and hammer rows are initialized by Hammer row IV and PUF row
IV, respectively. The PUF query is started by disabling the DRAM auto-refresh in the next step.
This is done by using the same technique as employed in [Xio+16]. Subsequently, the process of
repeated hammering of rows is started. For this purpose, the hammer rows need to be accessed
repeatedly for a certain time. This is achieved by a read operation to the first word of each ham-
mer row. Hence, bits in the PUF rows will start to leak charge and will eventually flip. After RH
time, the process ends and the DRAM refresh is enabled again. Finally, the PUF measurement
can be read from the PUF rows.
Because the Rowhammer PUF is inherently tied to the underlying DRAM, there are three factors
that can influence the operation of the PUF:
Temperature: Prior work has shown that victim cells are not strongly affected by tempera-
ture [Kim+14]. However, the Rowhammer PUF is a joint effect of the Rowhammer effect and
DRAM decay. Thus, we evaluate the temperature effect in Section 4.5.3, which confirms that
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Algorithm 1: Process of the Rowhammer PUF-query.
input : RH type, addr, RH size, Hammer row iv, PUF row iv, RH time
output: PUF measurement X
1 reserveMemory(addr,RH size);
2 initializePUFRows(PUF row iv);
3 initializeHammerRows(Hammer row iv);
4 disableAutorefresh();
5 while t < RH time do
6 for ri ∈ hammer R do
7 read(ri);
end
end
8 enableAutorefresh();
9 X =readPUFRows();
the Rowhammer PUF exhibits increased bit flips and stable noise values at higher operating
temperatures.
Voltage: Prior work has also shown that voltage affects the leakage in DRAM cells [HSS98]. In
commodity, off-the-shelf devices there is currently no interface to control the voltage of DRAM
cells. We assume that for the Rowhammer PUF, the DRAM operates at the factory specified
voltage parameters. Voltage factors will be investigated in future work.
Error-Correcting Code (ECC): ECC can be used in DRAM to protect from rare bit flips. Many
computing platforms, such as the PandaBoard used in this work, do not have ECC implemented.
Even if ECC is present, the authors of [Aic15] showed that ECC is not enough to mitigate the
Rowhammer effect. In order to use the Rowhammer PUF when ECC is used, the PUF size would
have to be increased. Further, ECC registers that indicate rows, which observed bit flips, could
potentially be exploited for PUF measurements. We will explore this in future work. In this thesis
we assume that no ECC is used.
3.4. Chapter Summary
As shown in this chapter, the favorable properties of PUFs are used in manifold security-related
applications. Whilst existing works in the literature mainly dealt with extrinsic PUFs that are
either synthesized in FPGA or ASIC, this work focuses on intrinsic memory based PUFs. Further-
more, three different intrinsic PUF types were introduced, which will be used in the remainder
of this work. In particular, we discussed the functionalities of the SRAM-based PUF and intro-
duced two novel PUF types based on DRAM, the decay-based DRAM PUF and the Rowhammer
PUF. In the next chapter, intrinsic PUF instances that are manifested on low-cost COTS MCUs are
identified, extracted and subsequently evaluated towards their PUF characteristics.
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Empirical Analysis of PUF Instances
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As shown in the previous section, Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs) have favorableproperties that make them an interesting building block for a number of lightweight se-
curity applications. However, in order to make use of them on Commercial Off-The-Shelf
(COTS) Microcontroller Units (MCUs), PUF behavior must be observable on such devices in the
first place. The mere presence of a hardware component that is known to observe PUF-like be-
havior is not a strong guarantee that this component indeed yields a PUF instance1. Hence, a
potential hardware component must be tested towards its property to observe basic PUF-like
behavior at all. Moreover, potential PUF instances must be accessible so that no hardware mod-
ifications are required. Furthermore, any code that implements an interface to an intrinsic PUF
must be compatible with the existing software stack and must meet the rather strict underlying
requirements of the platform. In particular, most low-cost device types limit the size of the boot
loader to be in the range of a few kilobytes. Especially in the case of SRAM-based PUFs, which
rely on the “freshness” of the SRAM start-up values, the PUF interface must hence be part of
the boot loader, which can display an engineering challenge due to strict memory constraints.
Furthermore, the code that interfaces the PUF can render parts of the start-up values useless, as
it is executed from the same SRAM module, which is also leveraged for PUF usage, as shown
in Chapter 3.2.2 Moreover, some device types execute vendor-specific routines as the very first
code after start-up, which pre-initializes, i.e., overwrites the SRAM and hence destroys any en-
tropy, which otherwise could be used to extract a device unique key [VBN15]. Lastly, while the
mere existence of PUF-like behavior is necessary in order to leverage a PUF in security-critical
1 During our evaluation we came across a few embedded systems, whose Static Random-Access Memory (SRAM)
start-up values did not contain any robust SRAM cells that could be used for identification.
2 This situation is the standard setup for the targeted device class that features on-chip memory modules, i.e.,
MCU-based devices, as SRAM modules are not exclusively dedicated to PUF usage.
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scenarios, it must further be guaranteed that it exhibits reliable characteristics, guaranteeing the
security of the overlying protocol, even under changing ambient conditions or long time usage.
In order to obtain statements about the properties of a given PUF instance, exhaustive evaluation
needs to be conducted, prior to its actual deployment.
As we will show in this chapter, various intrinsic memory-based PUF types can indeed be found in
standard memory components of various embedded COTS platforms. After introducing software-
only means to query these PUF instances, this chapter presents empirical evaluation results of the
three PUF instances introduced in Chapter 3, namely the SRAM- and Dynamic Random-Access
Memory (DRAM)-based PUFs, as well as the Rowhammer PUF. For this purpose, we assessed a
wide range of different embedded device classes, ranging from low-end 8 bit MCU-based devices,
such as the PIC16F1825, to more sophisticated System on Chip (SoC) platforms, like the Panda-
Board. We strove for a very diverse set of device types, all of which do not implement dedicated
secure hardware, including platforms that implement ARM, PIC, AVR and x86 cores. In this
way, we are able to validate that a high number of embedded COTS devices feature on-chip
memory modules that can be used to extract instances of respective PUF types. For this purpose,
we evaluated such commodity platforms that exhibit high dissemination in real-life operational
areas and hence are representative, wide-spread device types.
Note, that parts of the evaluation section that discusses results of SRAM-based PUFs (cf. Sec-
tion 4.5.1) consist of results that were obtained during a joint project. Those results have been
published previously as part of the doctoral thesis of Anthony van Herrewege [Van15]. Hence,
the SRAM evaluation results presented in this thesis are an extension of the former publication
and are enhanced by the following content:
• Evaluation of additional device types, namely the STM32F100RB, LM4F120H4QR and the
PandaBoard with respect to SRAM-based PUF instances and
• inter-device min-entropy results and
• Context Tree Weighting (CTW) evaluation results.
Moreover, this chapter also presents evaluation results of the DRAM-based PUF types, which
were introduced in this thesis, i.e., the decay-based DRAM PUF and the Rowhammer PUF.
4.1. Evaluation Goal and Approach
The goal of the evaluation is heavily driven be the applications that build on the PUF instances.
At its core, each PUF-enabled application, which will be presented in the following chapters,
relies on a secret key, derived from an intrinsic memory-based PUF. Therefore, we analyze the
PUFs for their robustness, uniqueness and entropy characteristics (cf. Chapter 3.1). Additional
tests under exceptional ambient conditions, i.e., temperature and time stability, have been con-
ducted to prove the robustness of the PUF instances in varying real-life environments. During
evaluation we excluded tests that vary voltage or voltage-related aspects, i.e., variation of supply-
or threshold-voltages or ramp-up times). This is motivated by the fact that COTS devices usually
do not provide interfaces to alter voltage parameters.
The evaluation results are necessary for enabling PUF-based security protocols and applications
on COTS MCUs under test. We follow an empirical evaluation approach that relies on testing
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Device Type Processor Manufacturer Device Class Memory Size Devices Measurements
SRAM-based PUF
PIC16F1825 PIC Microchip Class-0 1 kB 16 3700
ATMega328p AVR Atmel Class-0 2 kB 16 9695
MSP430F5308 MSP430 Texas Instruments Class-0 6 kB 15 3174
STM32F100R8 ARM Cortex-M3 STMicroelectronics Class-1 8 kB 11 3419
STM32F100RB ARM Cortex-M3 STMicroelectronics Class-1 8 kB 14 1069
LM4F120H5QR ARM Cortex-M4F Texas Instruments Class-1 32 kB 15 1000
PandaBoard (ES) OMAP4460 Texas Instruments Class-2 56 kB 16 1000
DRAM: decay-based PUF
Intel Galileo Intel Quark X1000 Intel Class-2 256MB 5 50
PandaBoard (ES) OMAP4460 Texas Instruments Class-2 1GB 4 50
DRAM: Rowhammer PUF
PandaBoard (ES) OMAP4460 Texas Instruments Class-2 1GB 4 20
Table 4.1.: Device types used for evaluating characteristics of diﬀerent PUF types.
a finite number of devices regarding their PUF characteristics to derive statements about PUF
behavior, in contrast to a modeling-based approach.
4.2. Evaluated Device Types
In order to show the ubiquitous existence of memory-based intrinsic PUF instances, especially in
on-chip components of low-cost COTS MCUs, we evaluated a broad range of diverse platforms,
including low-cost 8 bit MCUs up to more complex SoCs. Furthermore, while the majority of
tested platforms implement an ARM processor, we also included an x86-based platform as part
of the analysis of the decay-based DRAM PUF. Table 4.1 gives an overview of the device types
under test and their hardware properties. Note that the number of measurements taken for
evaluation of the DRAM-based PUF types is significantly smaller. The is due to the nature of the
process of querying these PUF instances: As shown in Section 3.3, both DRAM-based PUF types
leverage a decay-process over time, in order to produce a PUF measurement. Hence, generating
a comprehensive dataset that considers various PUF parameters (size, decay time, initialization
vectors, temperature, etc.) and all combinations thereof is a very time-consuming process and
thus only allows for a limited number of measurements.
PIC16F1825: The PIC16F1825 [Mic15] is an 8 bit low-power microprocessor developed by Mi-
crochip. The microprocessor holds 1 kB of static RAM, 8 kB of flash memory and 256B of Electri-
cally Erasable Programmable Read-only Memory (EEPROM). The MCU was specifically designed
to be used in medical devices, in automotive scenarios or as part of home appliances.
ATmega328P: The ATmega328P [Atm16] is a low-power 8 bit processor produced by Atmel as
part of the megaAVR series. It has 2 kB of SRAM, 32 kB of flash and 1 kB EEPROM on board.
The ATmega328P was designed for applications in highly competitive markets where production
costs have to be very low.
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MSP430F5308: The MSP430F5308 [Tex17a] is a low-energy 16 bit processor produced by Texas
Instruments. The device holds 6 kB of static RAM and 16 kB of flash memory. It is optimized for
low current drain and thus is used in battery-backed devices for energy constrained applications
which require a long service life.
STM32x: The STM32F100Rx series [STM17] is a 32 bit microprocessor equipped with an ARM
Cortex-M3 CPU. We investigated two models of this type: i) The STM32VL-Discovery evaluation
board, which contains a STM32F100RB microprocessor and ii) the stand-alone STM32F100R8
microprocessor.
Both versions hold 8 kB and 64 kB (STM32F100R8) SRAM and 128 kB flash memory (STM32-
F100RB). The evaluation board provides several peripherals and a debugging interface. The
STM32F100 series was developed with focus on industrial-control applications. The embedded
Cortex-M3 is a low-power MCU used in power sensitive and high performance applications.
LM4F120H5QR: The LM4F120H5QR is a 32 bit ARM Cortex-M4F MCU with 32 kB SRAM, 256 kB
flash memory and several programmable interfaces. For our measurements we used the Texas
Instruments EK-LM4F120XL development board [Tex14], which is based on this microprocessor.
The microprocessor is developed for a variety of industrial applications ranging from electronic
point-of-sale machines, and network appliances to factory automation. The Cortex-M4F is con-
ceptually equivalent to the Cortex-M3 but additionally supports instructions for digital signal
processing and features a floating-point unit.
PandaBoard: The PandaBoard is 32 bit OMAP4-based SoC platform [Tex17b]. It integrates
two ARM Cortex-A9 processors as well as two Cortex-M3 co-processors for signal processing.
The PandaBoard is based on a Texas Instruments on an OMAP4460 running at 1.2GHz. The
platform is equipped with 1GB of external DDR2 DRAM from ELPIDA, implemented as Package-
on-Package (PoP), which operates at 1.2 V. The dual-core Cortex-A9 is a high-performance ap-
plication processor for low-power or cost sensitive devices.
Intel Galileo: The Intel Galileo [Int16a] is a 32 bit SoC equipped with an Intel Quark X1000 ap-
plication processor, operating at 400MHz. The platform implements 512 kB SRAM two 128MB
DDR3 DRAM modules from Micron, operating at 1.5 V and 11 kB EEPROM. The two physical
DRAM modules are accessed in parallel and located on the same Printed Circuit Board (PCB) as
the processor.
4.3. Firmware Modiﬁcation
In order to extract PUF instances from the MCUs under test for evaluation, we modified the
firmware running on the devices. This approach of measuring the intrinsic PUFs proved to be an
efficient process regarding the implementation overhead and the process of obtaining repeated
PUF measurements. At the same time this approach is in line with the requirement to create
software-only means to extract PUF instances (cf. Chapter 1.1).
For all three PUF types, we modified the boot loader part of the firmware image to extract
PUF measurements. The rationale behind this approach was initially motivated by the fact that
evaluation started with the SRAM PUFs, whose successful extraction requires this very process.
Thus, in order to retrieve the largest possible fraction of the SRAM start-up values, they must be
read before any interfering process writes to the SRAM, i.e., at the very start of the MCU.
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The same approach turned out to be equally efficient for both DRAM-based PUF types. Note
however, that one of the main advantages of both DRAM PUFs are due to their capability to
be accessed at runtime. For this purpose, novel mechanisms were developed that allow for
interfacing the DRAM PUF at runtime, using a Linux kernel module, as presented in [Xio+16].
4.3.1. SRAM-based PUFs
In order to extract the raw SRAM start-up values we developed a custom firmware, which per-
forms the following steps on power-up:
1. Initialize the serial port using Univeral Asynchronous Receiver Transmitter (UART).
2. Loop over the SRAM region, read every SRAM byte and transmit over UART.
3. Ground the device and idle it for 10 s to 15 s to avoid any remanence effects [Rah+12] of
the SRAM that could disturb subsequent start-up values.
While designing the firmware we had to take into account the important constraint that, if pos-
sible, no SRAM should be used while executing the commands to complete the steps described
above. The reason for this is that any write commands to SRAM remove parts of the start-up val-
ues. This requirement is easily met for most MCUs which possess several working registers that
can be leveraged to store parts of the data used by the firmware modification, i.e. the address of
the current SRAM byte to be read. However, some MCUs, such as those of the Microchip PIC16
family, only have a single working register and we therefore need to store variables in unused
configuration registers to avoid writes to SRAM.
4.3.2. Decay-based DRAM PUFs
The firmware is the first code to be executed upon device start. During the DRAM initialization
phase the firmware itself does not require use of the DRAM, as it is executed from on-chip SRAM.
This makes it ideal for gathering PUF measurements.
In the case of the Galileo platform, we modified the Quark EDKII firmware. The code that
measures the PUF was inserted just before DRAM refresh, comprising the following steps:
1. Writing the initial value (iv) to the specific logical PUF (as defined by addr and size),
2. disabling the DRAM self-refresh mechanism,
3. waiting for the decay time t to elapse,
4. enabling the DRAM self-refresh and
5. reading the logical PUF response and transmitting it via UART.
After the PUF response is retrieved, normal firmware execution and eventual boot of the Oper-
ating System (OS) can resume. The firmware patch consists of about 60 lines of C code, with
the majority of the code implementing initialization of the PUF parameters and accessing the
PUF memory region. On the PandaBoard, the implementation is similar: the DRAM region cor-
responding to the PUF is initialized, the auto-refresh of the memory controller is disabled, and
after decay time t, the memory content is sent via UART to a workstation. Our firmware patch
for the PandaBoard consists of about 50 lines of C code.
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4.3.3. Rowhammer PUFs
We implemented the Rowhammer PUF on the PandaBoard [Tex17b]. Again, our implementation
is purely in software, so no hardware changes are required. The Rowhammer PUF is imple-
mented in the u-boot boot loader. Since the DRAM is idle during u-boot runtime, queries to
the Rowhammer PUF can be conducted without affecting other functions of the platform. In u-
boot, one can control the DRAM refresh cycle. Further, one can access physical DRAM addresses
without caching3. The reference manuals provide the physical address mapping of the DRAM.
We allocate hammer rows and PUF rows and make them adjacent, as shown in Figure 3.7. To
perform Rowhammer, the hammer rows need to be activated repeatedly for a certain time. In
our implementation this is achieved by a read operation to the first word of each hammer row.
The implementation consists of approximately 200 lines of C code. Note that it is also possible
to access the Rowhammer PUF in a kernel module to achieve runtime access. Like in u-boot,
the DRAM refresh can be disabled from kernel space. Moreover, caching can be disabled if the
platform does not support the CLFLUSH instruction.
4.4. Evaluation Metrics
As introduced in Chapter 3.1.1, PUFs can be characterized by a number of properties. For iden-
tification purposes a PUF instance should enable a robust repeated identification of single de-
vices (robustness) and generate a unique pattern among a pool of similar devices (uniqueness).
Furthermore, we evaluate the entropy of the PUF measurements, as in this work secret key
generation is the main use case.
This set of properties seems to be the most reasonable, as it omits any physical phenomena that
are specific to only a subset of the PUF types (i.e., stable state bias of SRAM PUFs vs. charge
decay of DRAM PUFs) and thus makes a comparison of evaluation results practical.
However, evaluating PUF types that rely on different memory technologies (SRAM vs. DRAM)
leads to differences that cannot be fully abstracted by considering a common set of PUF proper-
ties. Instead, we have to rely on different metrics regarding the properties to properly capture
the characteristics of the different PUF types. In this way the comparison of PUF behavior of both
memory technologies is possible. We rely on Hamming distance-based metrics as used in the lit-
erature [H+07; CLB11; Sel+11] as the standard measures for SRAM-based PUFs. In contrast,
we employ metrics that are based on the Jaccard index for the evaluation of both DRAM-based
PUFs in order to deal with the inherent high bias of the two DRAM-based PUFs as shown in the
following section. We further employ fractional metrics to make a comparison of results across
different device types easier. Fractional metrics are normalized by the considered PUF size. In
particular the metric mfrac is divided by the number of input PUF bits N :
mfrac =
m
N
. (4.1)
3 The PandaBoard implements an ARM processor that does not provide the CLFLUSH instruction, so caching is
disabled during Rowhammer PUF access.
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Using fractional metrics provides more meaningful results, in face of highly varying memory
sizes of the different device types. Throughout this thesis we will use fractional results and their
percental representation synonymously, i.e., mfrac = 0.814 Ò= 81.4%.
4.4.1. Metrics Based on Hamming Distances
A PUF measurement X obtained from an SRAM-based PUF is regarded as a bit array of zeros and
ones. Standard metrics proposed in the literature to evaluate SRAM-based PUFs are based on
the Hamming distance HD(Xi,Xj) computed between pairs of measurements (Xi,X j).
The Hamming weight (HW) of individual measurements from the same device indicates whether
the start-up values are biased towards the value zero or one. This metric gives a first indication
regarding the randomness of the start-up values. The ideal Hamming weight follows a Gaussian
distribution with a mean of 50%, indicating no bias in the start-up values.
The intra-Hamming distance (HDintra) reflects the stability of repeated PUF measurements for a
single device, when queried by a fixed challenge. Robustness of the start-up values is required
to reliably identify a given device and subsequently reconstruct the corresponding cryptographic
key. HDintra is a normalized count of bits which differ between subsequent PUF measurements
and thus is a rational number between zero and one. An optimal value for the intra-Hamming
distance is close to zero. However, most PUF measurements exhibit a certain amount of noise.
In case of the SRAM-based PUF this is due to cells that have a rather symmetric layout of the
transistors that reflect in flipping start-up values over multiple trials.
The inter-Hamming distance (HDinter) expresses whether the start-up values at the same bit posi-
tions are diverse enough across different devices of the same type. This metric indicates whether
start-up values can be used for identification without enabling adversaries to predict a measure-
ment for a second device on the basis of measurements of the first device. In the optimal case,
the inter-Hamming distance follows a Gaussian distribution with a mean of 50%. If this is true,
then the start-up values are most likely independent. Devices with an optimal value of 50%
exhibit a maximum distinguishability regarding their PUF responses.
4.4.2. Metrics Based on the Jaccard Index
The characteristics of PUFs that are based on the DRAM are different compared to SRAM PUFs. In
case of the SRAM-based PUF, ideally the number of zero and one bits in the PUF measurements is
equal and hence no bias towards one of the values exists. However, measurements obtained from
the two DRAM-based PUF types only show a small number bit flips. This is caused by the fact that
the majority of DRAM cells does not decay within typical timescales of PUF challenges. Hence,
there is a strong bias towards the initialization value. Subsequently, standard metrics commonly
used to evaluate memory-based PUFs, i.e., fractional Hamming distances, are not suitable for the
DRAM case due to the high bias. This is particularly noticeable when evaluating uniqueness. In
SRAM PUFs the fractional Hamming distance between the startup arrays of two different PUFs
is large, whereas for DRAM PUFs the distance is small, even if PUFs are highly unique. Thus, we
propose metrics based on the Jaccard index to evaluate DRAM PUF characteristics that ignore
the “uninteresting” majority of cells, i.e., those cells that did not decay.
38
4.4.3. Metrics Used for Entropy Estimation
Since the main scenario of the investigated intrinsic PUF instances is the extraction of a device-
unique cryptographic key, an important requirement of the PUF measurements is to exhibit
enough randomness, which is reflected in the entropy of the derived key. A typical recom-
mendation in symmetric key scenarios is to use Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) with a
minimum key size of 128 bit [Bar16].
In order to evaluate the entropy that is inherent to PUF measurements, we consider the inter
entropy, i.e., the estimated entropy across measurements obtained from different devices. Ob-
viously, it is desired to observe a high inter entropy, so that a derived symmetric key with the
recommended key size can be constructed from a PUF measurement that is as small as possible.
In contrast, to generate random numbers, one would evaluate the intra entropy obtained from a
single PUF instance, which is comparably small [Van+13].
In order to estimate the inter-device entropy, we employ different metrics, depending on the PUF
type and hence on the underlying memory technology, namely:
• min-Entropy for SRAM-based PUFs to provide a lower bound on the entropy,
• the Context Tree Weighting (CTW) method, also applied to SRAM-based PUFs, in order to
provide a less pessimistic entropy estimation that is not based on independence assump-
tions and the
• Shannon Entropy for DRAM-based PUFs, in order to consider the inherent bias of the PUF
responses.
The Shannon entropy H(X ) provides a measure regarding the amount of information that can
be extracted from observing a variable X . In other words, the Shannon entropy provides an
estimate on the uncertainty of a given variable and is usually expressed in bits.
The min-entropyH∞(X ) is the standard metric used in the literature to quantify entropy of SRAM
PUF measurements [Lee+12]. This method is based on the NIST specification [BK12] that de-
fines min-entropy as the worst-case metric of disorder of a random variable. The min-entropy
is based on the assumption that start-up bits are independent from each other. Although this
assumption is commonly accepted in the literature with respect to SRAM PUF instances [VSL13;
CLB11; SSL12] exceptions are possible as can be seen in the following section. While the Shan-
non entropy provides a weighted average of the information content of a variable X , min-entropy
is the greatest lower bound, only considering the most likely outcomes of a random process.
Hence, relying on the approach of min-entropy, one is guaranteed to always exhibit its result as
the minimum entropy of a random process. Hence, it holds that H∞(X ) ≤H(X ).
In order to provide a less pessimistic approach to estimate the entropy of SRAM PUF measure-
ments and at the same time to detach the evaluation from the assumption that start-up bits
are independent, we estimated entropy based on the CTW. This method is an optimal compres-
sion algorithm that provides an estimate on the upper bound entropy in the PUF responses.
Using CTW to estimate the creation entropy of measurements of different PUFs is a well ac-
cepted approach [Ign+06; Van+10; CLB11; SL12]. Given a measurement Xo of size lo and its
CTW-compressed version Xc with respective size lc, the compression ratio can be computed as:
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rCTW =
lc
lo
. (4.2)
The intuition behind this approach is due to the fact that if no compression is possible, all bits
must be random. Hence, by using CTW one estimates entropy on the basis of the length of the
compressed measurement. In particular, a compression ratio below 100% indicates that some
bits of the start-up values exhibit a linear dependency. However, the compression could also re-
sult from the biases of the cells, since the CTW is only a weak indicator for correlation [VSL13].
4.5. Evaluation Results
In the following section, we present the evaluation results for the three PUF types investigated.
For each PUF type, we evaluate uniqueness, robustness and entropy. Furthermore, we present
evaluation results obtained under different ambient conditions, mainly extreme temperatures
and measurements obtained after long-term periods of usage. Note that an analysis of the PUF
types under non-nominal voltage conditions is usually not possible as most COTS devices usually
have no interface that allows for changes to the input voltage.
4.5.1. SRAM-based PUF Results
In this section we present the results of our analysis of the SRAM start-up values obtained from
different device types. All devices have been tested at room temperature of approximately 20 ◦C.
For all devices the first measurement at room temperature has been used for enrollment. All
other measurements are compared to the enrollment measurement. The odd numbers of mea-
surements are due to the fact that during the experiment some erroneous measurements were
obtained, which have been removed from the data set before analysis.
For specific devices, we also conducted measurements in a climate chamber at different (ex-
treme) temperatures: −30 ◦C, 20 ◦C and 85 ◦C to 90 ◦C. However, not for all device types temper-
ature test results are provided. The STM32F100RB returned false temperature measurements
with misaligned bytes at random positions that made evaluation impossible as correct bit-wise
alignment of repeated measurements is crucial for analysis. This was most probably caused by
the USB-to-UART converter, needed to transfer measurements from the evaluation platform to
the workstation. The converter introduced or even suppressed bytes randomly at extreme tem-
peratures. Also, the PandaBoard was not exposed to extreme temperatures as it features an LC
display and other hardware elements which would be destroyed inside the climate chamber.
For each metric presented in Chapter 4.4.1 we present plots showing the averaged characteristics
of different device types to allow for comparison between them. The averaged values were
obtained by first creating all possible pair-wise combinations of measurements for every device.
Subsequently, for each measurement pair the corresponding metric was calculated. In order
to compare metrics of different device types, the averaged data was further averaged over the
individual devices to get a value that represents the entire device type. In addition, we present
worst-case values of uniqueness and robustness metrics, i.e., respective minimum or maximum
values, in Table 4.2. Again, those values were obtained by aggregating the respective minimum
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Device Type Nbi ts HW (min ; max) HDintra (max.) HDinter (avg.)
−30 ◦C 20 ◦C ≈ 85 ◦C −30 ◦C 20 ◦C ≈ 85 ◦C 20 ◦C
PIC16F721 8192 0.432 ;0.503 0.457 ;0.515 0.483 ;0.515 0.106 0.020 0.079 0.213
ATMega328p 16384 0.701 ;0.762 0.644 ;0.686 0.584 ;0.628 0.123 0.026 0.071 0.443
MSP430F5308 49152 0.571 ;0.676 0.600 ;0.665 0.586 ;0.664 0.116 0.046 0.069 0.463
STM32F100R8 65536 0.491 ;0.499 0.492 ;0.498 0.492 ;0.497 0.080 0.057 0.106 0.477
STM32F100RB 65536 −− 0.494 ;0.499 −− −− 0.093 −− 0.472
LM4F120H5QR 262144 0.442 ;0.589 0.433 ;0.537 0.425 ;0.513 0.053 0.053 0.065 0.493
PandaBoard (ES) 12288 −− 0.452 ;0.509 −− −− 0.043 −− 0.499
Table 4.2.: Evaluation results of bias, uniqueness and robustness for SRAM-based PUF instances
extracted from various device types under diﬀerent ambient temperatures.
or maximum values for single devices and further calculating the minimum or maximum values
respectively for the entire device type.
Hamming weight
In the following paragraph, we present the results of the Hamming weight (HW) characteristics
of the measured devices. Figure 4.1 compares the average Hamming weight per device type. For
each individual MCU the corresponding whisker boxes display the HW results. Detailed numbers
of the average Hamming weights can be seen in Table 4.2. The values shown are the minimum
and maximum values from the averaged HW results of each individual MCU instance.
The results for the PUF responses of the STM32F100R8, the STM32F100RB and the PandaBoard
exhibit properties that are close to the desired distribution, indicating that the start-up values
contain almost the same proportion of zeros and ones. Especially, the HW values of the STM32-
F100R8 gather nicely close to the optimal value of 50% with almost no differences between the
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Figure 4.1.: Hamming weight (HW) values of SRAM start-up measurements obtained from device
types at diﬀerent ambient temperatures (optimum: 0.5).
41
Bit
20 40 60 80 100 120
B
it
10
20
30
40
50
60
Figure 4.2.: Repeating patterns in the 8 kB
SRAM start-up values from an
PIC16F721 MCU.
different temperature measurements, showing almost perfect HW characteristics. The HW for
the LM4F120H5QR shows reasonable HW results with a worst-case Hamming weight of 43.29%
at 85 ◦C. This reveals that there is a certain correlation among the start-up values of similar
devices, which decreases randomness. Hence, the required portion of SRAM to derive a unique
fingerprint and eventually a cryptographic key with full entropy increases [Van+10]. In partic-
ular, due to the slight bias towards zero, the secrecy rate decreases, which in turn requires a
higher amount of SRAM start-up bits in the privacy amplification phase of the Fuzzy Extractor.
For details regarding the relation between potential correlation in start-up values, the secrecy
rate metric and the resulting number of SRAM bits required by a Fuzzy Extractor construction,
we refer to [Ign+06]. The Hamming weight of the start-up values generated by the ATmega328P
as well as the MSP430F5308 are significantly higher than 50% at any of the tested temperatures.
This indicates a higher portion of ones than zeros in the PUF responses. The PIC16F1825’s frac-
tional Hamming weight is close to 50%, which at first glance represents desired characteristics.
However, a visual examination of the PUF responses reveal a repeating pattern (cf. Figure 4.2),
which will be discussed later in this section.
The temperature dependency of the Hamming weight values differ among the tested device
types. Some types, including the MSP430F5308 and the STM32F100RB, are very stable also at
extreme ambient temperatures. The evaluation results of other types, including the ATMega328p
and the LM4F120H5QR, suggest that at low temperatures more SRAM cells initialize to one,
whereas at high temperatures more zero bits constitute the start-up patterns. Lastly, for the
PIC16F1825 devices, merely low temperatures seem to influence, i.e., to decrease the Hamming
weight values, while at higher temperatures no significant changes are observable. Given this
heterogeneous behavior, we refer temperature characteristics to the low-level physical structures
of the implemented SRAM cells and their interconnection via word- and bit-lines. Unfortunately,
such low-level information is not available, especially in the case of COTS devices, as it is re-
garded as intellectual property of the vendor. Hence, no further reliable statements with respect
to the relationship between temperature conditions and PUF characteristics can be made.
The HW numbers for all devices suggest that their SRAM start-up values are suitable inputs for
commonly known Fuzzy Extractors, even for those devices with a Hamming weight that cannot
be regarded as optimal, due to bias. These inferior characteristics will lead to an increased PUF
response size as input to a Fuzzy Extractor algorithm to reliably extract a unique identifier.
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Figure 4.3.: Uniqueness values (HDinter) of SRAM start-up measurements obtained from device
types at diﬀerent ambient temperatures (optimum: 0.5).
Uniqueness
Figure 4.3 compares the average inter-Hamming distances (HDinter) to each other. An overview
of averaged HDinter values is given in Table 4.2. Whilst some device types exhibit near-perfect
between-class Hamming distances with a mean of 50% (e.g., the PandaBoard), this is not the
case for all measured devices. The PIC16F1825 is especially deficient in this regard, having
a maximum measured HDinter of only 24.54%, making it unsuitable for unique identification.
The HDinter of the PIC16F1825 is much lower than required for a PUF implementation. PUF
measurements of this device type fit a Gaussian distribution with a mean value of 21.29%.
This low mean value indicates that for the PIC16F1825 there is a very high correlation between
the PUF responses from different devices. This assumption becomes even more apparent when
considering the min-entropy data of the PIC16F1825. Especially the repetitive pattern in the
start-up values (cf. Figure 4.2) causes PUF responses obtained from different devices to share
more similar start-up bits compared to the other devices. This makes them unsuitable for usage
as part of cryptographic algorithms.
The PUF responses of the other device types exhibit an inter-Hamming distance which is close
to the optimal 50%. They can be uniquely identified as the HDinter between different devices is
much higher than the noise measured for each individual device (i.e., the HDintra). Especially
the HDinter of the LM4F120H5QR and the PandaBoard are remarkable, since they are close to
the optimum. These numbers guarantee to provide a unique fingerprint for individual devices
among a pool of devices of the same type.
Note that the measurements at extreme temperatures are omitted as the HDinter values are com-
puted on enrollment data. In the scenario of extracting a device fingerprint the keys are derived
at room temperature. During reconstruction, the keys are merely recreated. Thus, the unique-
ness of the key – and subsequently the SRAM start-up values – must be guaranteed at the time
of enrollment. Given that enrollment data was measured at room temperature it is not useful to
compare it to measurements at other temperatures.
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Figure 4.4.: Robustness values (HDintra) of SRAM start-up measurements obtained from device
types at diﬀerent ambient temperatures (theoretical optimum: 0).
Robustness
The results of the averaged intra-Hamming distance (HDintra) of the analyzed MCUs can be seen
in Figure 4.4. Since the HDintra refers to the noise exhibited in the SRAM start-up values of a
given device across multiple activation operations, it is desired to have HDintra values as low as
possible. The existing noise needs to be eliminated using an error correcting scheme. For this
purpose, commonly a Fuzzy Extractor is used. A reference Fuzzy Extractor design presented
in [Bös+08] can correct up to 15% noise. Thus, besides the requirement of the HDintra to be as
low as possible, it should not exceed this threshold. Detailed intra-Hamming distance results can
be found in Table 4.2. We only list the recorded maximum values here, since that is what matters
when selecting appropriate parameters for error correction algorithms. Again, the listed values
are the maximum results from the averaged HDintra values of each measured MCU instance.
The maximum HDintra value at room temperature for the PIC16F1825 and the ATmega828P is
below 3%, indicating nearly perfect characteristics so that noise can be easily corrected using
commonly known Fuzzy Extractors. The MSP430F5308, the STM32F100R8, the LM4F120H5QR
and the PandaBoard show good robustness properties at room temperature with noise levels
from 4% to 6%. In contrast, the STM32F100RB exhibits reasonable robustness characteristics
with a noise level of 9% already at room temperature. The temperature measurements of the
ATmega328P, PIC16F1825 and the MSP430F5308 exhibit a significant increase of the HDintra
values at low temperatures for all tested devices, which indicates that deviation from the nominal
operational (room) temperature, leads to less stable PUF measurements.
Gathered robustness values for all the tested devices are well below the critical threshold of
15% so that the inherent noise can be corrected using a common Fuzzy Extractor. However, in
consideration of the relative differences between room temperature and extreme temperature of
some device types, it is obvious that MCUs need to be tested thoroughly with regard to ambient
conditions if they are supposed to be used in security-related applications.
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Device Type min-entropy (min.) CTW
−30 ◦C 20 ◦C ≈ 85 ◦C −30 ◦C 20 ◦C ≈ 85 ◦C
PIC16F721 0.215 0.191 0.174 0.536 0.615 0.591
ATMega328p 0.459 0.579 0.668 0.843 0.922 0.969
MSP430F5308 0.432 0.629 0.640 0.951 0.948 0.956
STM32F100R8 0.613 0.637 0.684 0.993 0.998 1.000
STM32F100RB −− 0.651 −− −− 0.871 −−
LM4F120H5QR 0.684 0.720 0.685 0.985 0.990 0.987
PandaBoard −− 0.633 −− −− 1.000 −−
Table 4.3.: Entropy results of SRAM-based PUF measurements extracted from various device
types under diﬀerent ambient temperatures.
Entropy
Table 4.3 shows the inter-device min-entropy results for the tested devices. We list the minimum
measured min-entropy, since this is the value to take into account when determining how much
SRAM is required to derive a cryptographic key. In general, all the tested device types exhibit less
min-entropy than SRAM-based PUF instances evaluated in previous works, that usually show min
entropy values of 0.7 to 0.9 [Kat+12; Koe+14a]. Presumably this is due to the type of SRAM
we investigated, which is on-chip, i.e., intrinsically part of the embedding MCU. In contrast, pre-
vious min-entropy results of SRAM-based PUFs were obtained from either Application-Specific
Integrated Circuit (ASIC) or Field-Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) implementations as well as
off-chip modules. Furthermore, the min-entropy results show that there are significant differ-
ences between individual device types. Whilst most of the devices show good results when it
comes to deriving a unique key from the SRAM start-up patterns, the PIC16F1825 MCUs are not
suitable for this purpose. As explained during the uniqueness analysis, the PUF measurements
of this device type exhibit repetitive structures. In particular, the bits of every alternating byte
have a common preference to start-up either as a zero or one. This pattern is present in every
PIC16F1825 device we measured. It is also reflected in the low min-entropy values of this device
type. One possible reason for such patterns are (analog) components connected to the power
supply, which distort the ramp-up on the SRAM. Microchip does not provide information about
their silicon implementation, which makes it impossible for us to investigate what is happening
inside the devices.
It is noteworthy that the min-entropy results for almost all tested device types are relatively
stable under different thermal conditions. Nevertheless, the min-entropy results suggest that
lower temperatures slightly decrease the min-entropy results, while increased temperatures lead
to higher values. This suggests that at lower temperatures, the start-up values extracted from
device instances of the same device type observe a higher similarity. One possible explanation
is that at lower temperatures the influence of the physical layout of the SRAM cells becomes
more significant on the start-up values. In particular, for some cells it seems that the mismatch
between the threshold voltages of the corresponding cross-couples inverters increases at lower
temperatures. This increased mismatch seems to align with the physical layout that underlies
all instances of a given device type. The opposite behavior might explain increased min-entropy
values at higher temperatures. In general, all the device types except for the PIC16F1825 show
fairly good entropy results, sufficient to extract enough entropy for a cryptographic key. For
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example, the STM32F100R8 devices exhibit a minimum amount of 61.3% min-entropy in every
thermal condition. In order to extract a robust 128 bit key one needs approximately 27B of
SRAM start-up values (not considering the entropy required to compensate leakage due to Helper
Data exposure), which is a comparably small fraction of the total available 8 kBSRAM.
Table 4.3 further lists the results of the CTW compression tests. In particular, single PUF measure-
ments from different devices were concatenated and the CTW compression algorithm [WST95]
was applied. Subsequently, the compression ratio rCTW was calculated according to Equa-
tion (4.2). Both STM-based MCUs, the LM4F120H5QR and the PandaBoard exhibit almost
maximum rCTW values, indicating high independence between the SRAM start-up bits. While
the MSP430F5308 and the ATMega328p show reasonable characteristics, which are mostly due
to the stronger bias towards 1, the PIC16F1825 again features poor compression results. Given
that there is no strong bias observable in the PIC16F1825 start-up values, we attribute this to the
byte-wise repeating structures in the SRAM measurements (cf. Figure 4.2).
4.5.2. Decay-Based DRAM PUF Results
We measured DRAM PUF instances on the Intel Galileo and PandaBoard, as described in Chap-
ter 3.3.1. We performed measurements using four different PandaBoards and five Intel Galileo
devices. Furthermore, given the large amount of memory present, we measured two logical PUFs
on each device, resulting in eight different logical PUFs for the PandaBoard as well as ten logical
PUFs for the Intel Galileo. Each logical PUF was measured at different decay times, with 50
measurements each. We used two groups of configurations. One group consists of decay times
T2 = {120s,180s,240s, 300s, 360s} and a smaller PUF size of 32 kB. The other group uses de-
cay times T1 = {10s,20 s, 30 s, 40 s, 50 s, 60 s}, which are up to six times faster and further covers
a larger PUF size of 16MB. Based on these measurements we evaluated robustness, uniqueness,
randomness, time and temperature dependency, as well as stability of the DRAM PUFs. In order
to present a realistic scenario, we tested our devices under conditions that naturally vary over
time, in order to resemble ambient properties during real-world usage. The evaluation results
are listed in Table 4.4.
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T1 = {10s,20 s, 30 s, 40 s, 50 s, 60 s}, size = 16MB
decay
times T1
device type min.
Jint ra
max.
Jinter
H (bits) avg. number
decayed cells
10 s
PandaBoard 6.870× 10−1 0.000 7.062× 103 5.250× 102
IntelGalileo 3.850× 10−1 0.000 3.810× 102 2.300× 101
20 s
PandaBoard 7.120× 10−1 3.000× 10−4 6.741× 104 6.132× 103
IntelGalileo 4.750× 10−1 0.000 3.837× 103 2.720× 102
30 s
PandaBoard 7.260× 10−1 1.000× 10−3 2.294× 105 2.380× 104
IntelGalileo 4.650× 10−1 1.000× 10−3 1.508× 104 1.194× 103
40 s
PandaBoard 7.380× 10−1 1.000× 10−3 5.099× 105 5.835× 104
IntelGalileo 5.140× 10−1 4.000× 10−4 4.266× 104 3.711× 103
50 s
PandaBoard 7.620× 10−1 2.000× 10−3 8.973× 105 1.108× 105
IntelGalileo 5.500× 10−1 2.000× 10−4 8.658× 104 8.078× 103
60 s
PandaBoard 7.690× 10−1 3.000× 10−3 1.374× 106 1.805× 105
IntelGalileo 5.880× 10−1 4.000× 10−4 1.478× 105 1.459× 104
T2 = {120s,180s,240 s,300s, 360s}, size = 32kB
decay
times T2
device type min.
Jint ra
max.
Jinter
H (bits) avg. number
decayed cells
120 s
PandaBoard 4.630× 10−1 1.000× 10−2 1.362× 104 1.069× 103
IntelGalileo 7.710× 10−1 4.000× 10−3 3.382× 103 2.450× 102
180 s
PandaBoard 4.380× 10−1 1.700× 10−2 3.163× 104 2.675× 103
IntelGalileo 8.360× 10−1 4.000× 10−3 8.482× 103 6.400× 102
240 s
PandaBoard 4.090× 10−1 2.600× 10−2 4.736× 104 4.161× 103
IntelGalileo 6.260× 10−1 5.000× 10−3 1.381× 104 1.085× 103
300 s
PandaBoard 4.220× 10−1 4.100× 10−2 5.911× 104 5.307× 103
IntelGalileo 7.940× 10−1 6.000× 10−3 1.960× 104 1.588× 103
360 s
PandaBoard 3.480× 10−1 3.400× 10−2 6.738× 104 6.129× 103
IntelGalileo 8.280× 10−1 7.000× 10−3 2.912× 104 2.444× 103
Table 4.4.: Evaluation results for logical decay-based DRAM PUF instances measured at diﬀerent
decay times T1 and T2 as well as for diﬀerent PUF sizes. Top: results for decay times
T1 = {10s,20 s, 30 s, 40 s, 50 s, 60 s} and size = 16MB. Bottom: results for decay
times T2 = {120s,180s, 240s, 300s, 360s} and size = 32kB.
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Uniqueness
Consider two DRAM PUFs, PUFid1 and PUFid2 , which are given time t to decay. Let s1(t) be the
set of addresses of the decayed cells in PUFid1 and similarly s2(t) for PUFid2 . Let N be the total
number of DRAM cells. The similarity between PUFid1 and PUFid2 is expressed as
J1,2inter(t) =
J(s1(t), s2(t))
N
. (4.3)
A small value of J1,2inter indicates high uniqueness. As shown in Table 4.4, our DRAM PUFs exhibit
almost perfect behavior, with Jinter values for decay times up to 60 s that do not exceed 0.001
for the Intel Galileo and 0.003 for the PandaBoard. At higher decay times, up to 6 minutes, Intel
Galileo exhibits a maximum of Jinter = 0.007 at t = 360s. The PandaBoard shows larger values
with a maximum of 0.041 at t = 300s, which is still close to the optimal value of zero. Those
comparably low values at shorter decay times are due to the fact that much less DRAM cells
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Figure 4.5.: Histograms of Jint ra and Jinter values for the PandaBoard and the Intel Galileo, with
T1 = {10s,20 s, 30 s, 40 s, 50 s, 60 s} and T2 = {120s,180s, 240s, 300s, 360s} and
two diﬀerent PUF sizes.
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have had the chance to decay within these short time periods (cf. Figure 4.6). The values for
both configurations suggest that both device types exhibit high uniqueness, with the Intel Galileo
showing inherently smaller Jinter values compared to the PandaBoard.
Robustness
Consider again the experiment where a decay-based DRAM PUF is given time t to decay. Let s(t)
be the set of addresses of decayed cells in one run of this experiment, and s′(t) in a subsequent
run of the experiment on the same PUFid . We characterize the robustness of the PUF as:
Jint ra(t) =
J(s(t), s′(t))
N
. (4.4)
Large values of Jint ra indicate high robustness. Figure 4.5 shows the distributions of Jint ra and
Jinter for different decay times. A wide gap between the two distributions indicates that individ-
ual devices can be distinguished perfectly. Note that at shorter decay times we observe minimum
Jint ra values of 0.385 for the Intel Galileo, whereas for the PandaBoard noise levels are smaller
with the minimal Jint ra value 0.687 at t = 10s. Using longer decay times, noise levels increase
for both device types. While the minimum Jint ra value for the Intel Galileo is 0.626 at t = 240s,
the PandaBoard exhibits the most noise at t = 360s with 0.348 (cf. Table 4.4). The differences
in the Jint ra values among the two groups of configurations reflect variations of ambient condi-
tions (i.e., temperature) over time. Nevertheless, we note that in both cases, the Jint ra values are
high enough to robustly separate from Jinter , in turn allowing the devices to be used successfully
for robust identification purposes. We can therefore conclude that our devices constitute robust
PUF behavior in a realistic usage scenario, where ambient conditions, such as temperature, are
expected to naturally differ.
Entropy
We estimate the entropy of DRAM PUFs in the following manner. We again consider the observed
set s(t) of indices of DRAM cells that have decayed by time t. The cardinality of s(t) is denoted
as lt = |s(t)|, and N is the total number of DRAM cells. We assume that each DRAM cell inde-
pendently has a probability p(t) of having a decay time smaller than t (so that it usually decays
in time less than t). We estimate p(t) as lt/N . The PUF entropy associated with time t is given
by
H= Nh(p(t))≈ Nh(lt/N), (4.5)
where h(p) = p log 1p +(1− p) log 11−p is the binary entropy function. A single observation of s(t)
may not be sufficient for determining p(t) because of short-term noise. Thus, we are estimating
p(t) by averaging 50 measurements of lt. Table 4.4 lists the entropy H(X ) as bits per measured
logical PUF (i.e., 16MB and 32 kB). We observe that the entropy is significantly higher on the
PandaBoard, correlating with the higher number of bit flips of this device type. This is most
likely due to the different technologies used to implement DRAM cells. In particular, the results
show that the minimum entropy of the PandaBoard can be up to one order of magnitude larger
compared to the Intel Galileo: For example at t = 360s the PandaBoard provides 25949 bit per
32 kB of DRAM, versus 9692 bit for the Intel Galileo. At larger t more DRAM cells get a chance
to decay, increasing lt and hence the entropy. However, large values of t make PUF handling too
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Figure 4.6.: Time-dependency of the decay DRAM cells on the PandaBoard and the Intel Galileo
for T1 and T2, as well as size = 16MB and 32 kB. Possible challenges are indicated
by vertical lines.
slow to be practical. Regarding the fractional entropy, the values of the proposed DRAM PUF are
orders of magnitude smaller, compared to SRAM PUFs, which usually have 0.7 bit to 0.9 bit of
entropy per cell. However, DRAM usually provides significantly more memory cells than SRAM,
and thus exhibits enough entropy in total.
Decay dependency on time and temperature
Figure 4.6 shows the average proportion of decayed cells, lt/N , as a function of time t. All
measurements were taken at (ambient) room temperature with DRAM chips operating at around
40 ◦C. Every point in the plot represents an average taken over all logical PUFs. We see that the
number of decayed cells significantly increases over time.
This plot allows us to estimate the number of time-dependent challenges that a logical PUF
can support. In order to allow for unique identification at different decay times, the set of
decay times T = { t1, t2, ..., tn} must be chosen so that the corresponding measurements taken
50
Temperature (/C)
40 60 80
A
ve
ra
ge
pr
op
or
tio
n
of
de
ca
ye
d
ce
lls
0
0.005
0.01
0.015
0.02
0.025
t1 = 10s
t2 = 20s
t3 = 30s
t4 = 40s
t5 = 50s
t6 = 60s
PandaBoard results, obtained at T1, using
size = 16MB.
Temperature (/C)
40 60 80
A
ve
ra
ge
pr
op
or
tio
n
of
de
ca
ye
d
ce
lls
0
0.005
0.01
0.015
0.02
0.025
t1 = 10s
t2 = 20s
t3 = 30s
t4 = 40s
t5 = 50s
t6 = 60s
Intel Galileo results, obtained at T1, using
size = 16MB.
Temperature (/C)
40 60 80
A
ve
ra
ge
pr
op
or
tio
n
of
de
ca
ye
d
ce
lls
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
t1 = 120s
t2 = 180s
t3 = 240s
t4 = 300s
t5 = 360s
PandaBoard results, obtained at T2, using
size = 32kB.
Temperature (/C)
40 60 80
A
ve
ra
ge
pr
op
or
tio
n
of
de
ca
ye
d
ce
lls
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
t1 = 120s
t2 = 180s
t3 = 240s
t4 = 300s
t5 = 360s
Intel Galileo results, obtained at T2, using
size = 32kB.
Figure 4.7.: Proportion of decayed DRAM cells as a function of temperature for the PandaBoard
and the Intel Galileo for diﬀerent decay times T1 and T2 and values of PUF size
parameter.
at decay time tx+1 show a minimum number of new bit flips εtx = ltx+1 − ltx , with respect to
the previous one tx , which must be greater than the inherent noise. Given the noise values and
εt, the set of viable decay times and thus the challenges of a logical PUF can be determined
accordingly. We computed a conservative, minimum number of possible challenges per logical
PUF, by using the maximum noise (i.e., minimum Jint ra value) and the minimum number of bit
flips, previously observed at each decay time t. We experimentally determined the maximum
number of challenges for decay times T1 and a PUF size of 16MB to be n= 5 for the Intel Galileo
and n = 6 for the PandaBoard, as well as n = 7 and n = 2, respectively for T2 and a PUF size of
32 kB. Possible challenges are indicated by vertical red lines in Figure 4.6
A second factor influencing the number of decayed DRAM cells is temperature. Figure 4.7 shows
the proportion of decayed cells as a function of temperature. The temperature was controlled
using a heater circuit. We observed that heating DRAM affects all cells in the same way: the
decay is accelerated by the same factor. At temperature T ′ > T it is possible to find decay
time t′ < t so that s(t′)T ′ = s(t)T , i.e., from a heated DRAM, operating at temperature T ′,
the same response can be obtained in time t ′ as from a cooler DRAM in time t. Figure 4.8
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Figure 4.8.: Jint ra values (i.e., similarity) of enrollment measurements taken at room temperature
and measurements at higher temperatures T ′ = {40 ◦C,50 ◦C,60 ◦C}, with adjusted
decay times t ′ for the PandaBoard (top) and Intel Galileo (bottom).
shows the Jaccard index Jint ra between measurements s(t)T at room temperature T = 40 ◦C and
measurements s(t′)T ′ performed on the same PUF, with adjusted t′ for different temperatures T ′.
We used t = {120s,180s, 240s, 300s, 360s} and T ′ = {40 ◦C,50 ◦C,60 ◦C}. For all measurements
obtained from both device types, Jint ra lies within the usual noise level. This confirms that
differences in temperature can effectively be accommodated by adjusting t accordingly and that
the PUF behavior at different temperatures can be predicted. The adapted decay time t′ at
an increased temperature T ′ that results in a similar decay behavior as using decay time t at
temperature T (with T ′ > T), can be modeled as:
t
′
T ′ = t · e−α(T ′−T ). (4.6)
52
Jaccard index
0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
Pr
ob
ab
ili
ty
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
Jaccard index
0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
P
ro
ba
bi
lit
y
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
Figure 4.9.: Distribution of Jint ra values computed between measurements pairs, taken at enroll-
ment and reconstruction from the same logical PUF instances, roughly 16 months
apart. Values are shown for the PandaBoard (left) and Intel Galileo (right).
Based on our measurements, we estimated α to be 0.066 for the Intel Galileo platform and 0.068
for the PandaBoard. The estimation of both models is given for a confidence interval of 0.95.
Stability over time
During the extended lifetime of devices, DRAM aging effects will begin to take place. Existing
work on SRAM PUFs has explored aging effects. [ML14; Mae+12; SŠK15; Sel+11] We are only
aware of limited work on aging-related effects in DRAM cells with regard to security [SPW09].
Figure 4.9 shows the histogram of Jint ra values for measurements of both evaluation boards,
taken roughly 16 month apart. Note that the measurements also include the noise introduced by
temperature changes in our lab. The values for the Intel Galileo and the Galileo are similar to the
Jint ra results shown in Table 4.7, suggesting sufficient stability of DRAM PUFs over a long-term
usage time period.
4.5.3. Rowhammer PUF Results
The evaluation of the Rowhammer PUF follows a two-staged process. First, the main goal is to
maximize the number of bit flips, i.e., the entropy of the puf measurements, based on differ-
ent parameter settings. Therefore, we will first discuss how different values of the parameters
presented in Section 3.3.2 affect the number of observed bit flips. Secondly, we evaluate the
Rowhammer PUF on the basis of the parameter configuration that maximizes the number of bit
flips, regarding uniqueness, robustness and entropy. Lastly, we discuss varying ambient temper-
ature conditions that could influence the Rowhammer PUF.
We will follow an explorative approach, which involves assessment of a subset of all potential
parameter values. Due to the lack of information about the distribution of true- and anti-cells4, it
is necessary to explore the correlation between parameter values and PUF behavior experimen-
tally, by testing various parameter settings. One approach to retrieve the layout of true cells (and
anti-cells) is to initialize the DRAM with ‘0xFF’ (‘0x00’), disable DRAM refresh and read-back the
memory contents after a period of several hours or days, i.e. the end of the decay process.
4 Usually this is the case when dealing with COTS devices as most vendors treat such fine-grained implementation
details regarding their hardware components as intellectual property and thus will not disclose details.
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Parameter Evaluated Values
RH type single-sided (SSRH), double-sided (DSRH)
RH size 4 kB, 32 kB, 128 kB
Hammer row iv ‘0x00’, ‘0x55’, ‘0xAA’, ‘ 0xFF’
PUF row iv ‘0x00’, ‘0x55’, ‘0xAA’, ‘ 0xFF’
RH time 60 s, 120 s
Table 4.5.: Parameters used during evaluation of the Rowhammer PUF characteristics and their
corresponding set of values.
In our evaluation, three different memory regions, each located on one individual PandaBoard,
are measured.5 For all the measurements, the PUF address was fixed. For each parameter
combination, 20 measurements were taken.
The bit flips we observe in the Rowhammer PUF measurements are due to
I. the hammering process, as well as the
II. DRAM cell decay that emerges after DRAM refresh is disabled (cf. Section 4.3.3).
In order to confirm that Rowhammer adds a significant number of extra flips, we measured the
number of bit flips, which are solely caused by the decay process, and compared it to the total
number of bit flips which we observed in the Rowhammer PUF measurements. Compared to the
bit flips caused by DRAM decay, the Rowhammer PUF introduces 2.4 times bit flips in 60 s and
about twice the number of bit flips in 120 s. Further, the set of bits that flip (i.e., their locations in
the measurements) obtained from the Rowhammer PUF partially overlap with the set of bit flips
induced by the DRAM decay process, even for longer decay times (i.e., without the influence of
the Rowhammer effect). Thus, the Rowhammer PUF induces new bit flips, which are at different
locations compared to the DRAM decay process.
In order to extract the maximum possible entropy from PUF measurements, we primarily strive
to maximize the number of bit flips. For this purpose, we first identify those parameters that
have the largest effects on the amount of bit flips. In the following paragraphs, we will discuss
the parameters listed in Table 4.5, in the context of their impact on observable bit flips.
RH type: Initially, we expected the RH type parameter to have a strong influence on the number
of flipped bits. In Figure 4.10, we present the fractional number of bit flips as a percentage of the
absolute number of bits available (RH size). Contrary to our expectations, applying DSRH (right)
instead of SSRH (left), does not lead to a highly increased number of flips, despite hammering
both rows adjacent to respective PUF rows. Instead, compared to SSRH, using DSRH only leads to
approximately 9% more bit flips in 60 s and about 15% in 120 s on average.
RH size: The RH size influences the total time required to execute a single iteration of hammer-
ing the DRAM. In our implementation, each hammer row is accessed roughly every 6 µs when
hammering 2 rows (4 kB PUF) and every 8 µs when hammering 17 rows (128 kB PUF) in the
SSRH setting. Further, Figure 4.10 shows the number of bit flips relative to RH size. The number
of bit flips does not change significantly for different values of RH size, i.e., the fraction of bit
flips for different memory ranges stays stable.
5 Hereafter, we denote such a memory region as a PUF instance.
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Figure 4.10.: Fractional number of bit ﬂips, given in percent relative to RH size, using PUF row
iv =`0xAA'. Number of bit ﬂips using SSRH (top) and using DSRH (bottom).
Hammer row iv and PUF row iv: Given that DRAM arrays consist of true-cells and anti-cells, the
initial value (IV) of the hammer rows as well as the PUF rows is expected to play an important
role regarding the number of observable bit flips. Depending on the type of cell, a bit flip in
a PUF row can be observed only if the cell is initialized with the logic value that corresponds
to its charge state. Similarly, due to the physical interaction of charged analog elements in the
hammer and PUF rows (i.e., wires and capacitors) and the resulting charge interaction paths,
different IVs of the hammer rows influence the number of bit flips as well. Thus, the values
of both parameters must be chosen carefully, in order to maximize bit flips. As can be seen in
Table 4.6, different configurations of Hammer row iv and PUF row iv lead to measurements that
exhibit different bit flips. In general, it can be inferred from the experiments that the number
of bit flips on the PandaBoard can be maximized, if PUF rows are pre-initialized in such a way
that keeps true-cells and anti-cells in the charged state, whereas cells of the adjacent hammer
rows are kept in an uncharged state. In particular, the measurements show that most bit flips
can be observed, if PUF rows are initialized with ‘0xAA’, which depicts a bit-wise checkerboard
pattern with a leading ‘1’. Instead, adjacent hammer rows are set up using the complementary
pattern, starting with a ‘0’ bit (‘0x55’). In contrast, no bit flips can be observed when initializing
55
Hammer row iv
PUF row iv ‘0x00’ ‘0x55’ ‘0xAA’ ‘ 0xFF’
’0x00’ 7405 / 8032 17558 / 20358 7391 / 7200 17288 / 20152
’0x55’ 0 / 0 0 / 0 0/0 0 / 0
’0xAA’ 22547 / 24480 32904 / 37548 14218 / 14243 24479 / 28268
’0xFF’ 15633 / 17798 15402/15402 6132 / 6479 6095 / 6416
Table 4.6.: Overview of the average number of observable bit ﬂips, depending on combinations
of Hammer row iv and PUF row iv. Conﬁguration used: RH size = 128KB and RH
time = 120s (SSRH/DSRH).
PUF rows with ’0x55’. We hence reason that in this case cells of the PUF rows are initialized in
correspondence with their uncharged states.
Optimal Parameter Configuration: The parameters Hammer row iv and PUF row iv have a
predominant influence on the number of bit flips, which we strive to maximize. We therefore
first fix their values as follows: Hammer row iv =‘0x55’ and PUF row iv =‘0xAA’. We further set
RH type to SSRH, as the number of introduced bit flips is in the same order of magnitude as DSRH.
Instead, SSRH requires≈ 55% less memory and involves less memory accesses compared to DSRH.
Further, we will use RH time = 120s, as we achieve ≈ 400% more bit flips as for 60s. Although
the resulting PUF readout time is similar to existing runtime accessible DRAM PUFs, we will look
at improving the time in future work.
PUF Characteristics
In order to assess the applicability of the set of flipped bits as a PUF, we validated uniqueness,
robustness and entropy of the Rowhammer PUF measurements, using the parameter configura-
tion identified above. Similar to the evaluation of the decay-based DRAM PUF, we utilize metrics
based on the Jaccard index (cf. Section 4.4.2), instead of the Hamming distance. This again is
motivated by the fact that DRAM-based PUFs show different characteristics compared to classic
PUFs (such as SRAM-based PUFs). In particular, measurements from DRAM modules draw their
PUF characteristics from the location of the flipped bits. This fact (uniqueness of indices) is not
properly reflected in Hamming distance-based measures.
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Decay Times T RH type min.
Jint ra
max.
Jinter
Ht (bits) avg. Number
Bit Flips
T = {60s,120s}, Hammer row iv =‘0x55’, PUF row iv =‘0xAA’, RH size = 4kB
60 s
SSRH 0.796 0.003 0.045 162
DSRH 0.871 0.011 0.087 359
120 s
SSRH 0.900 0.009 0.154 730
DSRH 0.891 0.030 0.234 1256
T = {60s,120s}, Hammer row iv =‘0x55’, PUF row iv =‘0xAA’, RH size = 32kB
60 s
SSRH 0.939 0.008 0.075 2405
DSRH 0.943 0.010 0.104 3581
120 s
SSRH 0.972 0.025 0.208 8583
DSRH 0.975 0.032 0.279 12679
T = {60s,120s}, Hammer row iv =‘0x55’, PUF row iv =‘0xAA’, RH size = 128kB
60 s
SSRH 0.945 0.008 0.068 8537
DSRH 0.947 0.005 0.066 8259
120 s
SSRH 0.966 0.025 0.201 32904
DSRH 0.965 0.020 0.223 37548
Table 4.7.: Evaluation results of the Rowhammer PUF using ﬁxed initialization values Hammer
row iv =` 0x55' and PUF row iv =` 0xAA. Results are given for RH time T =
{60s,120s}, RH size = {4kB,32kB,128kB}, and both variants of RH type.
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Figure 4.11.: Histograms of Jinter (left) and Jint ra (right) values for three PUF instances using
20 measurements with PUF row iv =`0xAA', Hammer row iv =`0x55', RH size =
128kB and RH type set to SSRH.
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Uniqueness and Robustness
Figure 4.11 shows the histograms for values obtained for uniqueness and robustness metrics,
using the optimal configuration set and RH size = 128kB. Clearly, both histograms separate,
indicating that Rowhammer PUF instances can be robustly and uniquely identified. With a min-
imum Jint ra value of 0.9454 at 60 s, and a maximum noise of ≈ 3% at 120 s, Rowhammer PUF
measurements show high uniqueness that allow for discriminating between different PUF in-
stances, and a high robustness, so that standard Fuzzy Extractor constructions [DRS04] can be
applied for reliable key reconstruction.
Entropy
PUF measurements should exhibit sufficient entropy in order to derive a cryptographic key. We
estimated the Shannon entropy H(X ) of the PUF measurements, similarly to the decay-based
PUF. Denoting the total number of bits contained in a PUF measurement (i.e., RH size) as N ,
l as the cardinality of sx and assuming that the bits flip independently from each other, the
Shannon entropy can be calculated as follows:
H= log

N
l

. (4.7)
Using the minimum number of bit flips (l = 30994) observed in the measurements, based on
the optimized parameter setting identified above (N = 1048576 =ˆ 128kB), the lower bound for
the fractional Shannon entropy (i.e., the entropy per cell), is 0.192. Given the vast amount of
available cells, the PUF measurements show sufficient entropy to derive cryptographic keys. For
example, the derivation of a 128 bit key, given a fractional entropy of 0.192, requires approxi-
mately 85B, while the PUF is already 128 kB (excluding entropy required to compensate leakage
due to Helper Data).
Temperature Dependency
The behavior of DRAM bit flips can be influenced by the operating temperature. In order to
validate usage of the Rowhammer PUF in several operating temperatures, we evaluated the PUF
at temperatures of 40 ◦C (working temperature of DRAM on PandaBoard), 50 ◦C and 60 ◦C. We
computed the number of bit flips and Jint ra values for measurements taken at these respective
temperatures. Table 4.8 shows the average number of bit flips as well as the minimum Jint ra
(i.e., maximum noise). The temperature evaluation shows that, while bit flips increase at higher
temperatures, the noise level stays constant for each temperature. Thus, the Rowhammer PUF
exhibits sufficient stability to be used at higher temperatures.
Metric
Operational Temperature
40 ◦C 50 ◦C 60 ◦C
avg. bit flips 32904 65431 132450
min. Jint ra 0.966 0.981 0.985
Table 4.8.: Comparison of the average number of bit ﬂips and minimum Jint ra values at operating
temperatures of 40 ◦C, 50 ◦C and 60 ◦C using the optimal parameter conﬁguration.
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4.6. Chapter Summary
SRAM-based PUF
The most important conclusion that can be drawn from the evaluation results is that PUF behav-
ior can be found in the SRAM modules of many commercially available MCU platforms. Most of
the SRAMs that have been measured show promising results and therefore are suitable for use
in PUF implementations. However, the amount of pre-processing required on the data will vary
between the platforms. In order to give advice on the usability of an SRAM module in a PUF sce-
nario one must also take into account the available SRAM size. This is due to the fact that during
the pre- processing steps usually a certain amount of entropy is lost due to biases of the start-up
values, the level of noise as well as the so-called Helper Data stored publicly. Thus, although a
device type might have good PUF characteristics with respect to the individual metrics, it might
not be useful as a PUF instance since the SRAM size available is not enough to compensate for
entropy loss exhibited during pre-processing. Furthermore, in many application scenarios it is
desired to save as much as possible left-over SRAM, which is not used for PUF usage (i.e., key
reconstruction). This is due to the fact that the actual code for reading the SRAM start-up val-
ues and reconstructing the key also requires space on the SRAM. Thus, the total available size
of the SRAM has an influence on the applicability of the on-chip SRAM of a given device type.
Finally, the results of the aging experiments show that aging indeed causes drifting of the PUF
measurements over time. In particular, our study of experimental data confirms the existence
of asymmetric (data-dependent) drift in SRAMs PUFs. This drift must be considered if the PUF
is designed for long-term usage. Further, systematic drift can invoke issues in the context of
privacy-preserving protocols. Therefore, an exhaustive aging analysis of a given SRAMs PUF
instance is fundamental, especially in the context of privacy-related applications.
DRAM-based PUF
The evaluation of the DRAM PUFs found on unmodified, commodity devices, in particular the
PandaBoard and Intel Galileo, showed their high robustness, uniqueness and randomness. Using
the approach of adaptive decay times, it is further possible to use the decay-based DRAM PUFs
in different ambient temperature conditions. Time stability results further suggests that a given
platform implementing this PUF type can be robustly used over longer periods. Our intrinsic
DRAM PUFs overcome two limitations of the popular intrinsic SRAM PUFs: they have the ability
to be accessed at runtime, and have an expanded challenge-response space due to the use of a
decay time t that is part of the challenge. Consequently, our work presents a new alternative for
device authentication by leveraging DRAM in commodity devices.
Rowhammer PUF
Similarly to the decay-based DRAM-based PUF, the Rowhammer PUF also shows favorable PUF
characteristics. Almost perfect robustness and uniqueness results allow for reliable extraction
of device-unique cryptographic keys from the dram bit flip patterns. Furthermore, given good
entropy results and the large amount of DRAM available on many present and future low-cost
MCUs, allows for extraction of a high number of different keys. Temperature and time stability
measurements suggest that this novel PUF type can be robustly used over larger periods of time
and at higher operational temperatures. Unlike the majority of work that has used the Rowham-
mer effect to trigger a security exploit, this novel PUF type displays the first positive usage of
the Rowhammer effect. Further, the Rowhammer PUF is one of the few intrinsic memory-based
PUFs (next to the DRAM-based PUF) that can be challenged at runtime.
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This section showed that standard memory components, i.e., SRAM and DRAM, which are im-
plemented on COTS MCUs, exhibit manufacturing variations that can be used for device identi-
fication. On the basis of an empirical analysis of various wide-spread device types, it was shown
that these variations can be successfully extracted and leveraged for PUFs usage, in order to
provide a robust and reliable hardware-based trust-anchor. In the following chapter we build
on these intrinsic PUF-based trust-anchors to design various lightweight security protocols and
applications.
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Most of the commercially available embedded devices lack the implementation of dedicated se-
curity mechanisms such as a Trusted Execution Environment (TEE), as shown in Chapter 2.2.1.
Despite the poor or often non-existing security features found in embedded devices, they are nev-
ertheless used frequently to process sensitive data, i.e., as part of industrial automation [SWW15]
or as part of safety-critical environments such as car-2-x scenarios [Ger+14; NJ16]. Due to the
combination of low security levels of such devices at best and the fact that many are used to store
and compute information that are valuable assets to many cyber-criminals, they have become a
worthwhile target of adversaries.
A malicious party has multiple incentives to attack deployed embedded devices. A highly prof-
itable motive is to extract intellectual property (IP) stored on a device in the form of the firmware
application and related secret assets such as cryptographic keys or sensitive data. After success-
ful extraction the attacker is able to deploy the IP on counterfeit devices. Alternatively, he could
deploy an alternative firmware application which was not intended for execution on the given
device. In particular, the attacker might want to circumvent the vendor’s licensing model by
manipulating the firmware application. To evade licensing restrictions the attacker could try to
downgrade to a previous firmware version, to exploit design flaws and consequently escalate
privileges on the system. Another motivation to alter the firmware application is to capture valu-
able user data like passwords, credentials and usage data. Furthermore, the attacker might be
able to actively manipulate output data, as for example in the case of smart metering devices,
in order to report fake consumption data. While the integrated design of today’s Microcon-
troller Units (MCUs) can protect firmware, stored in on-chip Non-Volatile Memory (NVM) from
read-out attempts, some commercial platforms implement their NVM instances off-chip (i.e., the
PandaBoard) and hence expose firmware to rogue extraction. Moreover, hardware developers
often release embedded devices without disabling debugging ports, such as Joint Test Action
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Group (JTAG). Usually this is done on purpose to trade security in for firmware reconfigurabil-
ity (i.e., to upgrade firmware versions). However, access to debugging ports effectively allows
adversaries to extract or replace firmware images, even from on-chip NVM [Goo09; RK10].
To overcome the issue of malign extraction of the firmware application, we propose a lightweight
solution to securely boot an encrypted firmware application from within a trusted immutable
boot loader. By requiring the decryption of the application using a device-dependent key prior
to its execution, our solution effectively protects from attempts to extract the firmware appli-
cation from NVM and realizes strict hardware-software binding between the application and
the underlying embedded platform at the same time. For this purpose the scheme relies on a
hardware-based anchor of trust in terms of Physically Unclonable Function (PUF) instance. It
uses intrinsic memory-based PUFs extracted from the on-chip Static Random-Access Memory
(SRAM) module, in order to derive a hardware fingerprint, which is unique for individual de-
vices. The fingerprint is further processed during an early boot stage to generate an ephemeral
cryptographic key and to subsequently decrypt the firmware. Our scheme establishes trust in
the on-chip hardware and in the firmware application executed on the device by linking both
instances. We achieve protection against firmware IP extraction or its replacement on embedded
devices without dedicated security mechanisms. As we will show in Section 5.4, the solution is
compatible with off-the-shelf commodity MCUs and System on Chips (SoCs).
In the following sections, we describe the considered threat model, present the proposed se-
curity architecture and explain the course of usage. Lastly, we describe details related to the
implementation of the proof-of-concept that prove the applicability of our scheme.
5.1. Threat Model
We consider an economically-driven, simple hardware adversary A, who is able to inspect or
replace any peripherals, i.e., such hardware components, that are off-chip and hence outside the
MCU security boundary (cf. Figure 2.1). We disregard any invasive or other advanced physical
attacks as such attacks generally require expensive equipment or laborious engineering efforts to
reverse engineer the hardware layout [Sko12], which quickly renders such attempts uneconomic
in the case of low-cost embedded devices. The attacker hence can read out the contents of the
external memory (usually Dynamic Random-Access Memory (DRAM) or Electrically Erasable
Programmable Read-only Memory (EEPROM)) as it is highly exposed to external accesses. Thus,
we imply that A can read out and subsequently change the firmware that is stored on external
memory. We further consider A to have access to active interfaces to the MCU itself, i.e., by
means of enabled debugging ports. A is thus able to extract or replace the firmware image, even
in case it is stored on on-chip NVM. In addition, A is able to inspect and modify on-chip memory
values with software of his choice after the boot process. For the attacker to achieve one of the
mentioned goals we consider A to have the following abilities. The attacker has physical access
to the device due to its ubiquitous availability or because the attacker possesses the device as a
legitimate user.
Besides these capabilities, we assume that the attacker cannot perform one of the following
actions. The attacker is not able to change the code of the boot loader as it is stored in a Read-
Only Memory (ROM), which is under control of the manufacturer. Furthermore, we consider
an attacker not to be able to replace the ROM chip with a second one of his choice, containing
boot code under his control. Especially in the case of SoC platforms on-chip memory is highly
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integrated and a replacement of a memory module is beyond the means of the average-skilled
attacker. Lastly, the attacker is not able to read out the start-up values of the on-chip SRAM
during start-up. The start-up values are protected by the boot loader and are erased shortly
after the device gets out of reset. As soon as the device is powered the boot loader reads the
start-up values and immediately overwrites them before the firmware is called. The boot loader
is assumed to be trusted and cannot be replaced. Hence, the first possibility for the attacker to
execute code of his choice is after the boot loader finished execution.
We are aware of the fact that a physical attacker in possession of sufficient resources in terms of
time and money can circumvent virtually any security mechanism. Nevertheless, if the attacker
would succeed to extract the SRAM start-up values, i.e. the cryptographic key, he would only be
able to attack this individual device and has to perform the same attack for any other device.
5.2. Architecture
The proposed anti-counterfeiting solution is designed for implementation on a variety of com-
modity hardware without on-board security facilities ranging from low-cost devices to more
complex SoC platforms (cf. Chapter 2.2.1). To be compatible with commercially available em-
bedded devices and hence to be in line with the research goals of this thesis, our solution merely
employs hardware components which are already present in virtually any computing device.
In particular, we require the devices to be equipped with a programmable ROM to guarantee
immutability of the customized boot loader, the processor containing the MCU itself, on-board
SRAM (which is the source of the PUF instance) and external memory to store the encrypted
firmware and so-called Helper Data as explained in Chapter 5.3. Furthermore, we assume that
the manufacturer can modify the boot loader in order to modify the standard boot loader to
implement the PUF interface, i.e., key extraction and decryption functionality of the firmware.
Differences in the boot loader architecture of class-0 as well as class-1 device types and more
complex SoCs-based class-2 platforms (cf. Chapter 2.2.2) require slight modifications of the
architecture of our proposed solution.
Generally, in order to preserve integrity of the boot loader, it needs to be immutable and thus
must be stored ROM. Integrity of the boot loader must be provided as it queries the PUF by
reading the SRAM start-up values and implements functionality to derive the cryptographic key.
The key derived from the PUF measurement is used to decrypt the firmware application, stored
in NVM, usually flash memory. In the case of more complex SoCs that leverage multi-staged
boot loaders, the proposed architecture is slightly modified in the following way. Similar to the
MCU case, the 1st -stage boot loader is customized to implement the PUF interface, key extraction
and decryption routines and hence must be immutably stored in ROM, in order to preserve its
integrity. However, in the SoC case, the derived key will be used to decrypt the 2nd -stage boot
loader, instead of the firmware in the MCU scenario. Once the 2nd -stage boot loader is decrypted
and executed, it derives a second key, which is subsequently employed to decrypt the kernel
image file. Eventually, the decrypted kernel can be executed, starting the operating system.
Figure 5.1 illustrates the two cases.
The following paragraph explains the architecture for the SoC case in more detail as we used
an SoC for our prototype implementation. In this scenario, the integrity of the 1st -stage boot
loader is guaranteed by programming it to a ROM module. It is executed as the first code after
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Figure 5.1.: Secure boot architecture for low-end MCU- and more complex SoC-based device
types.
the device start-up1. It queries the SRAM PUF, deriving the device-dependent key K. The key
exists in on-chip memory only for the period of the following two steps. K is used to decrypt the
2nd -stage boot loader, stored in non-volatile memory (e.g., flash memory or DRAM).
After successful decryption of the 2nd -stage boot loader, a second key K' is derived by hashing
the concatenation of K and a salt value N: K' = H(K,N ). Key K' is subsequently used to decrypt
the compressed kernel file that also resides in NVM. The second key K' is derived to impede the
reconstruction of K in case an attacker captures K'. If the attacker is able to capture K', a new
version of the 2nd -stage boot loader, including a new salt Nnew, must be deployed which will
generate a different N'new. Furthermore, a new version of the firmware, encrypted under a new
key K′new must be distributed to regain a secure state. This design assures that only a 2nd -stage
boot loader can be executed that was encrypted by the correct device-depended cryptographic
key K. Since the second key K' is derived from K also only such firmware can be properly loaded
and executed, which was encrypted by the correct key as well. Thus, the operating system only
boots properly, if the correct combination of hardware and software is in place.
5.3. Usage Process
The usage of the proposed secure boot architecture involves two phases, which align with the
execution sequence of the underlying Fuzzy Extractor construction (cf.Section 3.1.3: i) the en-
1 More precisely, on our implementation board the first code executed is a vendor-specific initialization code,
which cannot be disabled and leads to a pre-initialized part of the level-3 on-chip SRAM on the PandaBoard
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rollment phase of the SRAM PUF instance, performed by a trusted party, i.e., the manufacturer;
and ii) the reconstruction phase which is conducted every time the user boots the embedded
device. During both phases a Fuzzy Extractor algorithm operates on the SRAM start-up values,
i.e., the PUF measurement, by executing FE.Gen() and FE.Rec() accordingly, in order to extract
a reliable key.
5.3.1. Enrollment
The enrollment process is carried out by the manufacturer or system integrator and is performed
once for each device. It serves two main purposes: the derivation of device-specific key K and
the generation of so-called Helper Data W. The cryptographic key K is derived from a randomly
chosen secret S, which is fed as input to a cryptographically secure hash function H(·): K← H(S).
The secret S is predefined by the manufacturer and must be unique for every device.
The Helper Data W will be used later during the reconstruction phase to reconstruct the secret S
and subsequently to derive the key K, given a noisy SRAM measurement X'. W is stored in exter-
nal memory as it does not leak information about S. Furthermore, to protect the Helper Data from
tampering several methods can be applied, such as the approach described by Boyen [Boy04].
5.3.2. Reconstruction
The reconstruction process is performed at the user’s side and is executed every time the user
boots the corresponding device. After powering the device, the 1st -stage boot loader reads and
stores the noisy SRAM start-up values X' and immediately overwrites the start-up values to make
them inaccessible to a physical attacker. In a second step the boot loader reads the Helper Data
W from external memory. The Fuzzy Extractor XORs X' with W and decodes the output using
the concatenated decoders to construct the secret S'. The generated secret S' will only be equal to
the correct secret S if the Helper Data corresponds to the respective device having SRAM start-up
values X' that are similar to the enrollment measurement: HD(X,X') < ε. Next, the key K is
derived by hashing secret S', which in turn is used to decrypt the firmware or the 2nd -stage boot
loader, depending on the scenario.
5.4. Proof of Concept
We implemented the proposed anti-counterfeiting architecture on the SoC-based PandaBoard.
We chose an SoC platform for the following reasons. Primarily, we wanted to prove the feasibility
to robustly extract a unique fingerprint also from more complex platforms. Furthermore, the boot
process is more complicated compared to lightweight devices. Our intention was to show that the
proposed solution can be implemented into existing boot loaders. Lastly, the size of the memory
available on the SoC for implementing the Fuzzy Extractor logic is comparable to MCU-based
device types as shown in Table 4.1. Hence, the requirements regarding memory footprint are
equal to those of MCU-based devices. Thus, a successful implementation on SoCs proves the
feasibility to implement the architecture on MCUs as well.
We used u-boot [Eng02], one of the most widely deployed boot loaders. It integrates a first-
stage boot loader (also called Memory Locator — MLO) and a larger second-stage boot loader
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(u-boot.img). In the unmodified version of u-boot, the MLO performs minor hardware initial-
ization as well as the setup of external DRAM. Afterwards it calls u-boot.img that is copied to
DRAM memory. It initializes further hardware components and eventually calls the operating
system kernel (uImage).
5.4.1. Enrollment
According to Section 5.3.1, the Helper Data W is derived from a randomly chosen secret S and
a reference measurement X using a Fuzzy Extractor during the enrollment phase. The Fuzzy
Extractor design is based on the construction presented by Bösch et. al [Bös+08] and will be
explained in more detail in Section 5.4.3. We decided to set the size of the secret S to be
32B. During the enrollment the key K is also generated by hashing the secret S with the SHA-3
hash function to a 256 bit key so that it can be used in the next step as input for the Advanced
Encryption Standard (AES) implementation, configured to work with 256 bit keys. Following
this, K is used to encrypt the u-boot.img using the AES-256 in CBC mode. The second key K'
is used to encrypt the kernel image file (uImage). Eventually, the Helper Data as well as the
encrypted files are stored in non-volatile memory.
5.4.2. Reconstruction
The main part of the reconstruction logic is implemented in the MLO, being one of the first pieces
of code to be executed. As described in Section 5.3.2 the MLO reverses the flow of the enrollment
phase by first extracting the on-chip memory chip’s fingerprint X' and by processing it using the
Fuzzy Extractor construction to derive the device-dependent key K. Subsequently, K is used to
decrypt u-boot.img. Within the second-stage boot loader S' is computed, which is further used
to decrypt the compressed Linux kernel file uImage that is executed eventually. More precisely,
256B chunks of the decrypted u-boot.img are read into on-chip memory sequentially, get de-
crypted and are written back to external memory. After the successful decryption of u-boot.img
is completed, it is executed. In case a false key K was generated a fault handler routine is called,
displaying a warning message and canceling the boot process.
5.4.3. Fuzzy Extractor Design
To reproduce the secret key S from various noisy measurements error-correction is required.
Following the suggestions of [Bös+08] we decided to implement a concatenated code compris-
ing two linear codes – a Golay code and a repetition code – to reconstruct the 32B secret. In
particular, we are using a binary Golay-(23,12,7) code in combination with a repetition code
with 15 repetitions. Based on the model of a binary symmetric channel (BAC), the probability of
observing a bit error is denoted as pb. In contrast, the probability of receiving the originally sent
bit without errors is 1− pb. According to [Gua+07], the probability that a bit string of length n,
applied to the BAC model, observes more then t errors can be computed as:
Ptotal =
n∑
i=t+1
pib(1− pb)n−i

n
i

= 1−
t∑
i=t0
pib(1− pb)n−i

n
i

. (5.1)
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Let s be the number of repetitions, ε be the average HDintra and g be the number of Golay code
words needed for decoding (g = |S|/12). Hence, the error probability of the repetition code Prep
is calculated as:
Prep =
s∑
i=ds/2e
εi(1− ε)s−i

s
i

. (5.2)
Similarly, the error probability of the Golay code can be computed as:
PGolay =
23∑
i=4
P irep(1− Prep)23−i

23
i

. (5.3)
Accordingly and following the lines of [Bös+08], the bit error rate of the concatenated code,
which resembles the False Rejection Rate (FRR) of the key construction process, can be calculated
given the following equation:
Ptotal1− (1− PGolay)g . (5.4)
With the construction at hand, we achieve a false rejection rate of 10−8 given an average HDintra
of 15% as commonly used in literature [Bös+08]. The false rejection rate of the PandaBoard
devices will be even lower since the measured HDintra is well below the reference value of 15%
used in the calculations. Thus, the Fuzzy Extractor Design is suitable to reliably reconstruct a
cryptographic key given several noisy SRAM PUF measurements for individual devices.
5.4.4. Evaluation
The overhead imposed by implementing the proposed scheme can be validated by considering
the added code size and increased runtime during the boot stage. We measured the implementa-
tion used during reconstruction (cf. Section 5.4.2) as this functionality is employed at user side.
Furthermore, the reconstruction implementation is slightly bigger compared to the enrollment
logic. Table 5.1 lists the implementation overhead in terms of code size (Bytes) and runtime (mil-
liseconds) of the respective functional blocks that compose the reconstruction implementation.
In particular, during the reconstruction of our scheme, the following functions are sequentially
processed: i) readMeasurement, which reads the SRAM start-up values as the PUF measurement
and stores it in an array. The function readHelperData reads in the Helper Data. iii) the XORing
of the PUF measurement and the Helper data is done in measurementXOR. iv) The repetition
decoding, which is implemented as a majority voting scheme is handled by decodeRepetition,
as well as v) decodeGolay that handles decoding of the Golay code. vi) The key S is created by
means of SHA-3 hash function in createKey. Finally, vii) u-boot.img is decrypted and executed
in decryptUboot.
Note that for evaluating runtime performance, we omitted overhead that is accounted to accesses
to the SD card, which is the main NVM storage of the PandaBoard leading to disproportionately
high I/O latencies that falsify runtime results. In fact, this approach of implementing flash mem-
ory is rather exotic, as most embedded platforms feature NVM either as part of the chip or as
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Component Runtime (ms) Size (Bytes)
Base ROM 371 45477
readMeasurement < 1 116
readHelperData < 1 236
measurementXOR 1 160
decodeRepetition 3 342
decodeGolay < 1 704
createKey 2 1140
decryptUboot 6944 1702
total 6951 4400
Table 5.1.: Implementation overhead with respect to runtime in milliseconds (left) and memory
overhead in Bytes (right) for the PandaBoard.
peripheral memory, i.e., off-chip, for which accesses are orders of magnitude faster. In partic-
ular, we excluded timing results that are due to SD card accesses from readHelperData and
decryptUboot functions.
5.4.5. Memory
In order to quantify memory consumption, we considered the static code segments (.text) and
read-only data (.rodata) of our implementation. The results of Table 5.1 show that the main
portion of the memory overhead accounts for the cryptographic functions, including the AES and
Keccak implementations. The AES implementation, which is used during the decryption of the
u-boot.img, requires 1702 kB on the ARM platform. To the best of our knowledge, we used one
the currently most compact AES implementation, which is freely available [kok17]. The Keccak
implementation requires roughly 1 kB and is based on the implementation of [Mar17]. A second
contributor to memory overhead is the implementation for decoding the repetition and the Golay
code words. Together they occupy approximately 1 kB. Besides cryptographic primitives, the
decoding steps of the Fuzzy Extractor implementation, i.e., the Golay decoding claiming 704B
and the repetition decoder contribute to the memory footprint, requiring approximately 1 kB.
The overall implementation requires only about 5 kB or 10% of the stock base ROM size (44 kB).
In our experiments, we were able to alter the memory layout so that it allows the customized
boot loader to be up to 53 kB, without breaking the boot phase. Hence, the memory footprint
of our scheme is within the limitations imposed by the PandaBoard platform. In addition, the
generated Helper Data is 982B in total, which is stored in off-chip NVM. The Fuzzy Extractor
uses 982B of SRAM start-up values to create a stable key, which constitute approximately 2% of
the available on-chip SRAM of the PandaBoard.
5.4.6. Runtime
The runtime results listed in Table 5.1 clearly show that decryption of the u-boot.img is the
most time-consuming part of our scheme, taking about 7 s. While this overhead seems very large,
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note however, that for smaller device classes (i.e., class-1 device types), the image, which is to
be encrypted typically is orders of magnitude smaller compared to the u-boot implementation
used in our scenario. Furthermore, even in the test case at hand, several seconds can be an
acceptable runtime overhead during boot, as for many embedded devices, especially those used
in industrial settings, reboots are issued only rarely. Moreover, several lightweight block ciphers
were proposed that observe better runtime performance compared to AES [EK07], particularly
HIGHT [Hon+06] and XTEA [NW97].
5.5. Chapter Summary
In this chapter we proposed an anti-counterfeiting architecture and implementation for low-cost
devices, which securely bootstraps a given firmware binary if the underlying hardware platform
is legit. In particular, the presented solutions rely on intrinsic memory-based PUF instances ex-
tracted from on-chip SRAM modules, which can be found on Commercial Off-The-Shelf (COTS)
MCUs. By deriving a device-specific cryptographic key from the PUF instance, using a modified
boot loader, in order to decrypt the subsequent firmware application, we can effectively bind the
firmware to a particular device.
Using standard hardware components to establish a hardware-based trust anchor that is used for
key derivation, our approach does not require additional hardware and thus displays a software-
only solution that meets the main goals of this thesis. Hence, our secure boot scheme and can
be implemented leveraging the on-chip SRAM memory as a PUFs and modifying the boot loader
to extract a device-specific cryptographic key to decrypt the firmware with the device-specific
key. Furthermore, our solution merely requires an ephemeral key, which is physically existent
only for a short period during boot time, which greatly improves resilience against key extraction
attempts, compared to traditional approaches to store long-term keys in non-volatile memory.
In this chapter we showed that commercial boot loader implementations of embedded platforms,
especially the PandaBoard, can be customized in such a way that makes measurement of the
intrinsic SRAM-based PUF feasible. We further proved the applicability of the proposed secure
boot scheme to embedded devices. While this solution protects the firmware application from
extraction or downgrading and the initial phase of loading it, an approach to protect the integrity
of the firmware application during its execution, taking a more powerful adversary into account,
is presented in the following chapter.
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Chapter 6
Hardware-Software Binding
• Florian Kohnhäuser, André Schaller, and Stefan Katzenbeisser. PUF-Based Software Pro-
tection for Low-End Embedded Devices. In: Trust and Trustworthy Computing. 2015, pp.
3–21.
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Protecting firmware applications on embedded platforms is an elaborate challenge due tothe omnipresence of those devices and hence their physical exposure, also towards ma-
licious parties. Moreover, the absence of secure hardware on most of such devices as
shown in Chapter 2.2.3 leaves many of the deployed devices without any security facilities at all.
In the previous chapter, a solution was presented that protects the static firmware application
from extraction, and thus from a potentially malicious access to stored secrets and intellectual
property, as well as its replacement. However, in order to provide a more holistic approach to
establish trust in the firmware and hence the entire embedded device, the firmware execution
must be protected as well.
Accordingly, a more powerful attacker must be considered, which is able to interfere with the
firmware in a more dynamic way, namely during its execution on the device. The adversary’s
motivation remains fundamentally similar to those presented in Chapter 5, i.e., illegitimate re-
production of embedded systems, where an adversary reproduces existing devices by copying
their firmware to counterfeit, cheaper hardware. This time however and given him extended
rogue capabilities, the adversary may also pursue more advanced objectives. As an example, the
attacker’s mobile device may contain an application which requires a license. Instead of purchas-
ing a license, the attacker bypasses the license check by manipulating the software. A further
scenario is the play-back of Digital Rights Management (DRM) protected media on hardware
media players, such as TV streaming devices. An attacker might insert code in the decryption
function of the DRM player to intercept and extract the decrypted media. A famous example is
the bypass of the DVD DRM encryption system CSS [Wik17].
In order to protect against such elaborate attacks, the execution of the software must both be tied
to a particular device and be secured against manipulations. To realize an effective hardware-
software binding, hardware support is required. With hardware support, the security of a pro-
tected program rests on a secret, e.g., a cryptographic key or a piece of code implemented in a
physical module. Prominent examples are the Trusted Platform Module (TPM), USB dongles, and
cryptographic co-processors. Nevertheless, integrated circuits dedicated to security are complex
in their design, provoke deployment issues, occupy additional space on the underlying board,
and lead to higher production costs. For this reason, especially legacy or low-end embedded
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devices lack hardware security mechanisms. However, as these devices are widely deployed and
increasingly become the target of attacks [Sch14a], there is the need for a security solution that
requires no specifically designed hardware.
In this chapter we explore a novel software protection approach, which is particularly suited
for embedded devices. Our approach combines and extends a self-checksumming code tech-
nique [Hor+02] with Static Random-Access Memory (SRAM) Physically Unclonable Functions
(PUFs) in commodity hardware to protect a firmware application against modifications and to
tie its execution to a dedicated device. The integrity of the firmware is monitored by a so-called
check function that computes hash values of sections of the firmware’s text segment. A sec-
ond check function verifies against the correctness of the PUF-based bitstream values and hence
authenticates the underlying device. In turn, if response functions act on potential firmware
modifications and initiate erroneous firmware behavior to prevent the firmware from further
execution. Due to the usage of an intrinsic PUF as a secure key storage, our approach does
not require any hardware modifications and thus can be easily retrofitted to already deployed
devices. Furthermore, relying on a PUF significantly decreases the attack surface, as the secret
is stored involving the PUF’s physical properties. This makes physical attacks much more com-
plicated compared to solutions based on non-volatile memory [Arm+10]. Moreover, common
hardware requirements, in particular the on-chip SRAM PUF, which are the same ones discussed
in Chapter 5, make this solution compatible to the secure boot scheme. Hence, it can be seen
as an extension to the secure boot solution. In order to explore the applicability of our solution,
we implemented the proposed scheme on a class-1 ARM Cortex microcontroller. Various security
parameters allow for a balancing between security and performance. Finally, a security and per-
formance evaluation reveals that we achieve a substantial level of security with a performance
penalty of 10%.
6.1. Architecture
Our software protection solution consists of four basic mechanisms: two check and two response
functions. Leveraging two different check functions, we achieve the twofold goal of protecting
the firmware integrity and binding it to a given device simultaneously. Regarding the check
functions, we propose two instantiations. However, check functions can be instantiated in various
other ways, depending on the firmware characteristics and the underlying hardware. Check
functions measure the authenticity of the device and the integrity of the program. Response
functions read these measurements, decide whether they indicate a healthy or a manipulated
state, and initiate a program misbehavior if a manipulation has been detected. In order to
protect a software with our protection scheme, both functions are repeatedly integrated into the
software’s program code.
In more detail, the first check function measures the integrity of the software by hashing its
native program code (cf. Section 6.2). The second check function computes a unique bitstream
on the basis of a device-dependent SRAMs PUF response to measure the authenticity of the
device (cf. Section 6.3). If those two measurements indicate a manipulated state, the first
response function redirects branches to random locations in the program text segment and the
second response function corrupts the program’s execution stack (cf. Section 6.4). Hence, if the
program or the execution environment has been manipulated, both response functions cause a
malfunction of the program.
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6.2. Code Integrity Checks
The integrity of the executable is measured by multiple self-checksumming code segments at
runtime. Each segment consists of a hash function which computes a hash value over a prede-
fined section in the program’s text segment. The hash value represents the integrity status of
the checked section. It is later used by response functions to decide whether the program has
been tampered with. Depending on the spatial separation of the hash function and the response
function, a hash value is either stored in a register or on the stack.
In order to provide a high level of firmware protection, our proposed solution relies on both,
security at the core of the architecture as well as added methods for software obfuscation [NC09].
In order to realize obfuscation and security, each hash function is inlined in the code, preferably
with some spatial separation from other hash functions, and gets executed as the control flow
passes the code location where the hash function is inserted. It is desirable that each inserted
hash function is executed at least once at runtime, but not so frequently that the protected
program suffers from a huge runtime overhead. In practice, profiling tools can be utilized to
identify suitable code locations. We propose to let multiple hash functions measure a contiguous
and relatively small part of the program. Thus, each integrity measurement only consumes little
time. In addition, the effort for an attacker to remove the software protection increases.
In order to increase the effort even more, each code segment is measured multiple times by dif-
ferent hash functions. The so-called overlap factor indicates how often a code section is checked
by different hash functions. Its value must be well-chosen to achieve a balance between security
and performance according to the application scenario. To avoid that hash functions suspiciously
measure large parts of the program, we recommend to split the program code in sections of equal
size. These code regions are then uniformly assigned to hash functions till the overlap factor for
each code region is saturated.
The design of our hash function is based on the work by Horne et al. [Hor+02]. With d =
{d1, ..., dn} being data in a code section which is protected by a hash function H(·), c being an
odd multiplier constant, and hi(d) being the hash value in iteration i, our hash function can
formally be defined as:
hi(d) =
(
0, i = 1
hi−1(d) + c · di. 1< i ≤ n . (6.1)
We deviated from Horne’s approach by not multiplying hi−1(d) with c in each iteration. This
allows us to construct arbitrary complex mutually checking code regions (cf. Section 6.5). One
reason we build on the code integrity check by Horne et al. is the hash function’s size and
speed. A large and slow hash function would fairly expand program size as well as runtime
overhead, since the hash function is inlined frequently into the original program. However,
the most important reason is stealth. An attacker who can locate all hash functions is able to
break the code integrity check, for instance, by overwriting hash functions with code that always
writes the respective expected hash value in memory. In order to mitigate this attack vector,
the proposed hash function is constructed to neither contain any suspicious operations nor to
provide any characteristic pattern as shown below. In addition, its implementation in native
program code can easily be diversified. Thus, each hash function can be customized, leaving the
attacker with no weak point for pattern matching attacks (cf. Section 6.7.1).
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In order to customize hash functions, the odd constant c can be randomized, the addition can be
replaced by a subtraction or an XOR operation, or a further constant can be added or subtracted
after the multiplication with c. In addition, the hash function’s implementation in native pro-
gram code can be diversified, among others, by permuting the instruction order, permuting the
assignment of variables to CPU registers, or diversifying particular instructions. A further pos-
sibility is to split the hash function code into multiple segments which are inserted with spatial
separation in the original program code. With these techniques it is straightforward to generate
multiple million different variations of the hash function.
Another attack vector is the code read operation performed by the hash function. It allows an
attacker to find the location of hash functions by searching the code for addresses within the text
segment, or by observing if and where certain registers obtain values within the text segment at
runtime. To mitigate this threat, we propose to implement Horne’s memory access obfuscation
approach [Hor+02] which uses an additional offset when addressing data in the program text
segment (e.g., with the instruction LDR Rd, [Rn, Rm] on ARM-based platforms). In this way,
text section addresses neither appear in the code nor in a register at runtime.
6.3. Device Authenticity Check
In the device authenticity check mechanism, we leverage the microcontroller’s SRAM PUF start-
up values to compute a device-dependent bitstream. Since the SRAM PUF is unique and highly
integrated in the microcontroller, the bitstream is unique for each embedded device. Hence,
we utilize the PUF-generated bitstream in our response functions to authenticate the device at
runtime.
The code for the bitstream generation is inserted into the device’s boot loader. Hence, the bit-
stream is generated each time the device starts up. In particular, a Pseudo-Random Number
Generator (PRNG) is applied to allow for a variable bitstream length. In this way, a trade-off
between performance and security can be achieved. A larger bitstream takes more time to com-
pute at device start-up but provides more unique values that can later be verified by response
functions. Alternatively, it would be possible to gradually create the bitstream during program
execution. However, as this further increases the execution overhead, we decided to pre-compute
the entire bitstream in advance.
6.3.1. PRNG Bitstream Generation
Generating the PRNG bitstream comprises an enrollment and a reconstruction phase (cf. Chap-
ter 3.1.3). The enrollment phase is performed at a trusted site, e.g., by the software integrator,
and involves taking a reference PUFs measurement and equipping the device’s boot loader with
code and Helper Data to reconstruct a unique and reliable bitstream. During reconstruction,
which is performed after deployment at user side and during device start-up, the equipped boot
loader initializes our proposed scheme to protect the firmware during its execution. Thus, the
actual bitstream is generated using the PUFs start-up values and additional error correction meth-
ods. To correct the raw PUFs start-up values from noise, they are processed by error correction
mechanisms. For this purpose, we integrate a Fuzzy Extractor (FE) in the boot loader. The FE is
based on the design by Bösch et al. [Bös+08] and is similar to the construction employed as part
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of the secure boot solution presented in Chapter 5.4.3. Hence, the techniques employed in this
chapter to restore a predefined secret from SRAMs cells are based on this FE implementation.
The enrollment phase is performed during the deployment of our software protection scheme
once for each device. Initially, a unique random secret S is chosen. Using the FE with a reference
PUFs measurement X and the secret S as input, so-called Helper Data is generated and stored
on the device. The Helper Data is required in the reconstruction phase to retrieve S from a
single noisy PUFs measurement. Afterwards, the length for the PRNG bitstream is set, balancing
security, speed, and storage consumption for the particular device and use case. At last, it is set
at which location the bitstream is stored in memory during the reconstruction phase.
The reconstruction phase is executed each time the device is started. Initially, the boot loader
measures and stores the noisy SRAM PUFs values X'. Next, the FE reconstructs a secret S' using
the current PUF measurement X' and the stored Helper Data as input. If the PUFs measurement
X' corresponds to the respective Helper Data, the reconstructed secret S' will match the original
secret S. S' is then used to initialize the PRNG which finally generates a PRNG bitstream of the
predefined length in memory.
6.4. Response Functions
Before a response function is inserted into the code, it is randomly selected whether the response
function verifies a hash value, a value of the PRNG bitstream or both values at once. If a response
function verifies a hash value, it uses the hash value of the nearest preceding hash function. This
ensures that hash values are verified shortly after they are measured, thwarting code manipu-
lations promptly after they have been detected. If a response function verifies a value of the
PRNG bitstream, it uses a random preferably nonrecurring bitstream value. The basic idea is
to use a unique address in each PRNG bitstream access. Thus, a single address cannot be used
as an attack vector for pattern matching attacks or as a watchpoint in dynamic analyses. How-
ever, if there are fewer PRNG bitstream values than deployed response functions available, some
addresses must be used multiple times.
The overall goal of our two response functions is to provoke a malfunction of the protected
program if the measured code integrity or device authenticity values are invalid. We would like
to point out that a malfunction of the program may lead to a damage of the machine that is
controlled by the program. However, the alternative to perform a deterministic action (e.g., a
controlled program shutdown) would provide an easy attack vector for the adversary. In this
scenario, the adversary could simply observe where the program shutdown is initiated to locate
the response functions in the code.
6.4.1. Indirect Branch Response
The indirect branch response is applicable to any branch in the program. When applied, an
original branch is converted to an indirect branch whose target address is dependent on the
verified values, i.e., either on a hash value, on a value of the PRNG bitstream or on both values.
The exact target address of the indirect branch is determined by a computation which meets the
following requirements.
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The output of the computation must equal the target address of the replaced original branch
if the verified values correspond to their expected values. If at least one of the verified values
is corrupted, the outcome of the computation must be a random address that lies within the
program text segment. The latter requirement ensures that the computed target address is always
a valid instruction that can be executed. If the computation of the target address would not
generate a valid address in the text segment, program manipulations would immediately cause
memory access violations. This would be very suspicious and allows the attacker to easily locate
the response function with backtraces.
In practice, the behavior of the indirect branch tamper response is highly dependent on the pro-
gram size and the structure of the program code (e.g., the number of functions in the program).
We observed, on average, about two function calls until a memory access violation occurred after
the indirect branch response was executed.
As an additional requirement, the computation of the target address must be simple. In order to
improve stealth, its implementation should be short and should not contain unusual instructions.
To improve stealth even more, each deployment of the indirect branch response function should
be customized, for instance, with the techniques presented in Chapter 6.2.
6.4.2. Stack Manipulation Response
In contrast to the indirect branch response, the stack manipulation response can be deployed at
arbitrary locations in the program code. The idea behind the stack manipulation response is to
corrupt the execution stack if the verified values are invalid. Hence, in case of an unauthorized
modification, local variables, function arguments, register copies, return addresses and other
data that lies on the stack, are altered. As a result, the program continues its execution with
incorrect values.
A simple way to accomplish a modification of all values on the stack is to shift the stack pointer.
Shifting the stack pointer has two benefits. First, it mixes up stack frames, which complicates
backtracing the program. Second, it modifies the return address and thus provokes a program
crash when the currently executed function returns. If an eventual program crash as a tamper-
response is not desirable, we propose to alter values on the stack directly.
6.5. Mutually Checking Code Regions
Since the presented protection mechanisms secure the entire program code and at the same
time are also part of the program code, they secure each other against modifications as well.
Although this enhances the security of a protected software, it comes at the cost of emerging
circular dependencies in the deployment process. These mutual dependencies occur because
at some point code protection measures, consisting of a hash function and a response function
which verifies the hash function’s value, circularly check each other.
In the work by Horne et al. [Hor+02], code regions are assigned to hash functions in a left-to-
right pass which generates no mutual dependencies. However, with this approach, the overlap
factor is comparatively low at the beginning and the end of the program code. In fact, their
overlap factor goes down to a factor of one in the first and last few bytes of the program code.
By contrast, we propose a uniform assignment of hash functions to code regions and a subsequent
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solving of the upcoming circular dependencies. Thus, we can ensure a consistent overlap factor
throughout the entire program code.
In order to solve circular dependencies, the first step is to transform mutually checking code
regions into an equation system. For this purpose, we initially deploy all protection mechanisms
into the software and build a temporary protected binary. The protected binary contains the
final code, except for the response functions’ reference values and additional placeholder values.
We propose to insert one freely selectable 32 bit placeholder value per code integrity measure to
facilitate solving the equation system. Let d = {d1, . . . , dn} be a list of n 32 bit words in of a code
section, which are protected by a hash function H(·). Hence, the hash function computes to:
H(d)≡
n∑
i
c · di. (6.2)
Considering the fact that d contains two unknown components, being the reference values and
the placeholder values, we change d to d = {d1, . . . , dr , . . . , dp, . . . , dn}, with dr being the ref-
erence value and dp being the placeholder value. Next, we utilize the fact that the final hash
values can be written as the sum of multiple data values. This allows us to construct a sum that
consists of a variable term which comprises both variable values dp and dr and a fixed term that
comprises the fixed, known code words d1, . . . , dn, i.e. without dr and dp. Let further c be the
hash function’s multiplier constant, H(·) can be written as:
H(d)≡ c · dr + c · dp︸ ︷︷ ︸
l
+
n∑
i 6=ri 6=p
c · di︸ ︷︷ ︸
r
(mod 232) . (6.3)
In this way, hash values are divided in a variable part l, containing the reference value dr and
the additional placeholder value dp which are to be solved, and a fixed part r, containing the
rest of the code segment. Since the code data di and the multiplier constant c are fixed after
deployment, r can easily be computed. Next, reference values must be expressed in relation
to hash values and PRNG bitstream values. The exact dependence between PRNG, hash, and
reference value is given by the response function in which the reference value is used. Finally,
these relations are combined to one linear Diophantine equation system which is then solved
according to the approach of Lazebnik [Laz96]. In the next section we show that the equation
system is always solvable, no matter how interdependent mutually checking code regions are.
6.6. On the Solvability of Mutually Checking Code Regions
In this section, the approach of handling mutually checking code regions (cf. Section 6.5) always
provides a solution.
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6.6.1. Assumptions
The approach is based on the assumption that the protected program text segment is segmented
in disjoint parts, so-called code regions. Each code region contains one hash function and one
response function which verifies the hash function’s hash value. This assumption imposes no
restrictions, as the the integrity protection uses a uniform deployment of hash functions in the
program code segment and a prompt verification of hash values (cf. Section 6.1). In addition,
we assume that all hash functions that measure a certain code region use the same computa-
tion to generate their hash value. This assumption causes no relevant degradation of stealth,
as we stated many other ways to diversify the code of a hash function in Chapter 6.2. Fur-
thermore, for convenience, we expect that each response function only verifies one hash value.
For this purpose, the response function uses one reference value which is compared to the ver-
ified hash value directly to reveal a code manipulation (e.g., if H(code_region) 6= ref_value)
initiate_response(); ). If, in practice, the reference value should also be used to verify a value of
the PRNG bitstream, to calculate the target address for an indirect branch, or to compute a stack
pointer movement, a slightly more complex computation is required to calculate the reference
value. However, this computation consists of just a few extra additions or subtractions and thus
presents no obstacle.
6.6.2. Proof Sketch
First, we show that the additional placeholder value in each code region (cf. Section 6.5) can
be used to let each code region hash to a specific hash value. With 32 bit as the target platform
register length, let d = [d1, ..., dr , ..., dp, ..., dn] be a list of n 32 bit words in a code section to be
hashed. Let further dr be a reference value, dp an unknown placeholder value, and c be an odd
multiplier constant. Applying the partitioning of the summed hash values into a variable and a
fixed term (cf. Equation (6.3)), the hash value of the code section can formally be written as:
H(code_region)≡ c · dr +
n∑
i 6=r
i 6=p
c · di
︸ ︷︷ ︸
ﬁxed
+c · dp (mod 232) . (6.4)
For simplicity, we now assume that we already decided for an odd constant c and somehow know
the correct reference value dr . Thus, f i xed can be pre-computed and we get:
c · dp ≡ H(code_region)− fixed (mod 232) . (6.5)
In general, a modular linear equation ax ≡ b (mod n) is solvable if g|b, where g = gcd(a,n) =
ax ′ + ny ′ [Cor09]. If g|b, then the equation has g solutions:
x0 = x ′(b/g) mod n
x i = x0 + i(n/g), where i = 1,2, ..., g − 1. (6.6)
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Applied to Equation (6.5), there exists a solution for dp, if g|ﬁxed, where g = gcd(c, 232). Since
c is odd, g is always 1 and the equation is solvable for an arbitrary value ﬁxed. This implies that
the placeholder value can be used to adjust the hash value of a code region to take any value.
Since we required all hash functions which measure the same code region to use the very same
computation to generate their hash value, all present hash functions calculate the same specified
value for the adjusted code region.
We can exploit this fact to establish correct reference values. A simple solution is to set all refer-
ence values to zero and adjust all placeholder values in a way that they let their respective code
regions hash to zero. Now we can make use of the hash function’s property of being summariz-
able and commutative. Thus, as each code region hashes to zero, an arbitrary concatenation of
different code regions also hashes to zero. This corresponds to the set reference value of zero.
We arrive at the conclusion that the reference values match the measured hash values no matter
how interdependent mutually checking code regions are.
However, in order to not always generate the same hash value in mutually checking code regions,
it may be reasonable to refuse the simple solution. Instead, with the approach described in
Chapter 6.5, it is also possible for many mutual dependencies to solve the equation system with
a non-zero reference value.
6.7. Security Evaluation
Information security mechanisms like cryptographic primitives or secure protocols are commonly
designed to be secure in the black-box model. However, we assume a much more challenging
scenario where the attacker is in possession of the endpoint devices and thus has access to the
implementation and power over the execution environment. This security model is referred to
as white-box model [Her+09]. Taking the white-box model as a basis, we specify two attacker
models, the static attacker and the dynamic attacker. We generally expect both attackers to be
familiar with our software protection model, albeit we assume that they do not know the partic-
ular deployed protection code, the location of the protection code and aspects of our protection
scheme which are randomized at deployment. The following sections specify the attacker models
and evaluate the security of our software protection scheme against the respective model.
6.7.1. Static Attacker Model
Specification
A static attacker has the ability to perform a static analysis on a device in his possession, i.e.,
he can read and modify all the data stored on the device. For instance, the attacker can read
and modify the content of the external memory, like the flash memory or the Dynamic Random-
Access Memory (DRAM), or the internal memory, including the software with its hard-coded
secrets and cryptographic keys. In addition, we presume that the static attacker can run the
program and observe its input-output behavior.
The static attacker model is a reasonable assumption for an experienced attacker who lacks the
ability to debug the protected program. This may be the case due to the employment of anti-
debugging techniques implemented in software (e.g., the exhaustion of breakpoint registers, or
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the use of API functions to check if a debugger is present) or in hardware (e.g., the physical
removal of debugging ports).
Evaluation
Using a disassembler, a static attacker can analyze native program code and reverse engineer the
protected program. In the worst case, the attacker would comprehend the complete code and
thereby know how he can circumvent our protection mechanisms. In practice, though, this task
is highly laborious, as even a small program consists of a few thousand lines of machine code.
One possibility to accelerate the analysis process is to look for outstanding instructions or spe-
cific patterns in the code. In a pattern matching attack, the attacker reveals the location of the
protection code by extracting a pattern from found protection mechanisms and then searching
the entire program code for that pattern. Therefore, we specifically avoided the use of suspicious
operations by performing short and common computations only. The implementation of our hash
function requires approximately 30B (48B with code access obfuscation) and the response func-
tion between 12B to 18B. Additionally, we demonstrated in Section 6.1 that both mechanisms
can easily be diversified repeatedly.
By using another technique called collusion or differential attack, an adversary compares multi-
ple versions of a protected program to spot the location of the inserted protection mechanisms
by means of their differences. The underlying idea is that different firmware instances share
major common code segments. In contrast, our protection scheme likely differs between differ-
ent firmware instances (due to random constants c), and hence reveals its location. In order to
protect against this attack, we leverage diversification of the entire firmware application during
the deployment process [Lar+14].
A very common technique applied during a static analysis is the examination of the program’s
execution flow. With the deployment of the indirect branch response function, branches are
replaced with indirect branches whose target addresses are dependent on hash values and values
of the PRNG bitstream. As both values are not known to a static analysis tool, our approach can
significantly reduce the amount of useful information that an attacker can extract from a control
flow analysis.
The unpredictability of the PUF-dependent PRNG bitstream in off-line attacks has an additional
advantage. Since both response functions occasionally utilize a value of the PRNG bitstream
for their operation, their exact behavior cannot be predicted with static analysis techniques,
which are lacking knowledge about the PUF values. Thus, static analysis methods might lead
to uncovering the location of the hash function which belong to a tamper-response function.
However, a static attacker will not know the required PUF value, leaving him guessing the target
address. This, however, is an unpromising task, especially in larger programs. As a result, it is
hardly possible for a static attacker to remove the hardware-software binding.
6.7.2. Dynamic Attacker Model
Specification
A dynamic attacker inherits all abilities from the static attacker. Furthermore, the dynamic at-
tacker has the ability to read and modify all the data on a device at runtime. With these abilities,
the attacker can interrupt a program at any time, single-step through the program code, and
inspect or modify memory values at runtime. Moreover, the attacker has the capability to modify
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a program’s execution environment. He might force the program to use bogus dynamic libraries,
modified operating system functionalities, or run the program in a virtual machine.
We are aware that an attacker with the stated abilities and enough resources in time and money
is capable of breaking any software security mechanism. Therefore, our goal is to increase the
effort for a successful attack to a level where an attack becomes uneconomical.
Evaluation
One of the most powerful debugging features when analyzing a protected program is watch-
points. Watchpoints are used to halt the execution whenever the program accesses predefined
memory locations. A dynamic attacker can use this technique to locate a large fraction of all
response functions by recurrently setting watchpoints on values of the PRNG bitstream while ex-
ecuting the program with various input. In addition, by setting watchpoints on addresses within
the program text segment, the attacker can locate hash functions. A subsequent tracing of the
hash functions’ hash values can reveal the location of all remaining response functions. Hav-
ing located all response functions, the attacker can remove the verification of hash and PRNG
bitstream values and thus disable our software protection. Although the described approach is
eventually successful, it requires a significant amount of effort from an attacker. Furthermore,
the effort can be arbitrarily augmented by increasing the number of hash functions, setting a
higher overlap factor, or obfuscating access on hash values and values of the PRNG bitstream.
Another common dynamic analysis technique is tracing. Tracing a program involves logging in-
formation during the program’s execution, such as the execution path, memory values, or register
values. A dynamic attacker may trace back program crashes or abnormal program behavior to
localize response functions. During the design of our response functions, we ensured that there
is a large spatial and temporal separation between the execution of the response function and its
impact on the program, i.e., a program crash or a program misbehavior. Thus, the attacker has
to examine a large portion of the trace back to finally localize a single response function.
Profiling is an additional dynamic analysis technique which involves measuring particular run-
time performance values. In general, our protection mechanisms do not consume an extraor-
dinary amount of CPU time or memory. But yet, profiling a protected program may reveal
the location of deployed hash functions when the execution of a hash function takes an ex-
ceptionally long time compared to the execution time of the original program. Anyhow, profiling
requires nearly the same effort as the above described approach with watchpoints, as the pro-
tected program must be examined multiple times with a different input. On top of that, the
profiling approach is less reliable than the watchpoint approach, because the code that is often
run through does not need to be part of a hash function.
Emulation is a further dynamic analysis technique. An emulator is a software which simulates
the behavior of a particular hardware platform. With emulation, an adversary can bypass the
hardware-software binding by emulating particular PUF start-up values. In addition, an adver-
sary can redirect data access to the unmodified version and code access to the modified version
of a protected program, to bypass our code integrity protection. Nevertheless, emulation attacks
are unpractical, because the software has to run in an emulator and cannot run directly on the
hardware of an embedded system. In addition, the performance is slower, an emulator is hard
to implement, and the protected programs PRNG bitstream must be extracted.
With temporary modifications or on-the-fly writes in memory, the attacker modifies a code re-
gion before its execution and recovers it to its original form afterwards. If an adversary inserts
his modification just before it is executed and restores the original code immediately after the
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modified code has been executed, we cannot protect against this attack. However, this requires
the attacker to permanently attach a debugger to the program, to write a debugger script which
performs the attack without manual intervention, and to accept a loss in performance because
of multiple code manipulations at runtime.
6.8. Proof of Concept
In order to explore the applicability of our software protection scheme, we implemented and
evaluated it on the Stellaris LM4F120H5QR microcontroller (cf. Section 4.2). During de-
ployment, the protection mechanisms are inserted into the source code of the program to be
protected. Subsequently, the LLVM compiler framework [LA14] with Clang front-end [LLV07]
is used to compile the equipped source code to the final protected binary. For this purpose, we
wrote a Python script which controls LLVM, Clang, and additional external tools and libraries
to automatically build the protected program. In the following sections we give details on the
implementation of the protection scheme and the performance of our implementation.
Before using a SRAM PUF instance in security critical applications, it is crucial to characterize the
SRAM start-up values for constructing an efficient Fuzzy Extractor and extracting a secret key
with full entropy. We refer to Section 4.5.1 for the evaluation results of the PUF characteristics
of the LM4F120H5QR platform.
6.8.1. Implemented Protection Mechanisms
Hash Function
In Chapter 6.1 we stated that it is vital for the security of our protection scheme to deploy
syntactically different hash functions. In order to have precise control over the hash function’s
native program code, we inline hash functions as ARM assembler code in the program source
code. To avoid the usage of unusual instructions in our ARM assembler version of the hash
function, we implemented the hash function in C and compiled it to get an assembly language
prototype. An ARM assembly prototype generated in such a way is shown in Algorithm 2. It
hashes a code region from address 0x26c to 0x2ac with the multiplier constant c = 3:
Algorithm 2: ARM assembly implementation of the hash function.
1 movs r1, #0 // hash = 0
2 movw r2, 0x26c // start = 0x26c
3 movw r3, 0x2ac // end = 0x2ac
loop:
4 ldr r4, [r2], 4 // tmp = data[i], start++
5 add r4, r4, r4, LSL#1 // tmp = 3*tmp
6 add r1, r4 // hash = hash + 3*tmp
7 cmp r2, r3 // if (start < end)
8 blt loop // then goto loop
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PRNG Bitstream Generation
During deployment, we substitute the pre-existing Stellaris boot loader with a modified version
that contains our PRNG bitstream generation code. Besides the standard initialization code, the
modified boot loader contains code for the extraction of the PUF start-up values, a FE based
on the design by Bösch et al. [Bös+08], Helper Data to reconstruct a predefined secret, and a
PRNG based on the Keccak (SHA-3) implementation of Herrewege et al. [HV14]. At first, the
boot loader extracts 240B of PUF start-up values. In a next step the original code is resumed,
relocating the firmware to SRAM and executing it. Next, the FE reconstructs a predefined 128 bit
secret using the PUFs start-up values and the Helper Data. Here, we reuse Keccak in the privacy
amplification phase of the FE. The reconstructed secret is used to initialize the PRNG. We use
Keccak as a PRNG, primarily because of its compact size and speed on ARM devices. For the
length of the bitstream, we suggest to use 2× 1017 bit bits, which provides 4096 unique values
and consumes 16 kB of memory at runtime. Nevertheless, the bitstream length can be set to an
arbitrary value, for instance, to consume less storage.
Indirect Branch Response Function
During deployment, existing branches in the original source code are overwritten with the code
of the indirect branch response function. The target address of the indirect branch is computed
by the sum of the verified values and a specific offset, modulo a unique value, plus another
unique value. The following code snippet in C syntax illustrates an indirect branch to a function,
which takes no argument and returns void (e.g., void foo(void)):
Algorithm 3: C implementation of the indirect branch function.
void (∗foo)(void);
foo = ((*hash_value + *puf_prng_value + *offset);
foo();
If the hash value and the PRNG value match their expected values, offset, modulo, and shift adjust
the indirect branch to match the original target address. In order to provide no constant value as
an attack vector for pattern matching attacks, modulo and shift are randomized between certain
bounds in each deployment of the indirect branch response function.
Stack Manipulation Response Function
We insert each stack manipulation response function randomly between the location of the cor-
responding hash function and the subsequently executed hash function. Our implemented stack
manipulation response function either increments or decrements the stack pointer by a random
value between 4 and 24B in case the check function indicates a modification of the firmware.
6.8.2. Performance Evaluation
Due to the lack of open source applications for the Stellaris platform, we developed our own
evaluation program. The evaluation program encrypts and decrypts a 16B string using AES
128 bit, sends the plaintext and the ciphertext to the Univeral Asynchronous Receiver Transmitter
(UART) port, and measures the amount of CPU cycles consumed from the start to the end of the
main function.
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with varying bitstream size.
For the deployment of our software protection scheme, we used the following security settings.
We inserted one code integrity check mechanism in each function of the evaluation program.
As 9 of the 11 deployed functions are executed at runtime, we generate a coverage of 82%
This is a realistic scenario, as a real application will certainly contain functions that are not
always executed at runtime (e.g., whose execution depends on specific user input). In addition,
we used a PRNG bitstream length of 2× 1017 bit, which corresponds to a size of 16 kB. For
the deployment of the response functions, we inserted the stack manipulation response in each
circular dependent code region and the indirect branch response in the remaining code.
Runtime Performance
In our runtime evaluation, we deployed the evaluation program with the above mentioned se-
curity settings and a variable overlap factor. Figure 6.1 illustrates the relative runtime overhead
for various overlap factor preferences averaged over 10 measurements per overlap factor. The
runtime of the original unprotected program is represented with an overlap factor of zero and
an overhead factor of one. As the overlap defines how many times a code region is checked
by different hash functions, an increasing overlap factor increments the amount of code lines
that each hash function has to check. In our experiments using an overlap factor of nine, each
hash function almost checks the complete text segment, which generates an overhead of approx-
imately half of the original runtime. It is evident that such an overhead is not acceptable in most
applications. On the other hand, even when each code region is checked by three different hash
functions, the runtime overhead is below 5%. As this slow-down will only be noticed by sensitive
users, we can easily recommend an overlap factor of three for conservative usage.
Another performance overhead originates from the generation of the PRNG bitstream at device
start-up. Figure 6.2 depicts the amount of CPU cycles that is required to compute a bitstream
of a specific length. For comparison, the original program consumes roughly 1.8 million CPU
cycles (horizontal plot at the bottom). The figure illustrates that there is almost a proportional
relationship between the size of the PRNG bitstream and the amount of CPU cycles. Thus,
compared with the calculation of the pseudo-random values, the extraction of the PUFs start-
up values and the execution of the Fuzzy Extractor barely uses any CPU time. The figure also
shows that the generation of the PRNG bitstream consumes much more CPU resources than the
execution of the actual program. However, it must be considered that the PRNG bitstream is only
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generated at device start-up. Assuming the embedded devices are clocked at 50MHz, a bitstream
size of 16 kB delays the start of the device by 1.5 s seconds which is likely to be acceptable for
most applications.
Storage Consumption
The program size overhead of a protected program is dependent on the number of inserted hash
functions, the choice of the response function and the number of inserted response functions.
For evaluation, we deployed our protection mechanisms using the previously mentioned security
settings. In this way, we obtained a protected program which was on average 63% larger than
the equivalent unprotected program. Another storage overhead arises at runtime due to the
execution of both check mechanisms. However, the memory consumption of the hash functions
is negligible, as each value resides just a short time in memory and only occupies 4B of storage.
In contrast, the values of the PRNG bitstream are kept in memory permanently, and they consume
16 kB of memory for our proposed bitstream length. Nevertheless, by setting another bitstream
length, the runtime memory overhead can be adjusted as required.
6.9. Chapter Summary
In this chapter, we explored a novel hardware-assisted software protection approach, which
combines existing software-based techniques with PUFs. Using a microcontroller’s SRAM as a
PUF instance, we overcome the drawbacks of traditional hardware tamper-proofing solutions.
The proposed software protection scheme ties the execution of a software instance to a specific
device, protects its program code against manipulations and can easily be retrofitted to already
deployed devices. To demonstrate our approach, we implemented it on a low-cost ARM-based
microcontroller. By adjusting certain security parameters, it is possible to balance security with
performance. We showed that our software protection scheme offers a high level of security
against a static adversary and demonstrated that a dynamic adversary requires a considerable
amount of resources to perform a successful attack. A further performance evaluation showed
that an extensive level of security is achievable with an acceptable performance degradation of
ten percent.
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Chapter 7
Authentication
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One of the fundamental means that establish trust in remote, interconnected entities isauthentication. Classical authentication scenarios usually involve a two-party setting,1
where a verifier V wants to get assurance about the identity of a remote prover P, hence
mitigating a possible impersonation of P. Extending this setting so that authentication of the
verifier towards the prover is required as well, leads to the notion of mutual authentication,
which establishes trust in the authenticity of both parties, hence additionally ruling out the exis-
tence of a malicious verifier. The authors of [MVV96] distinguish three fundamental approaches
to authentication, including password-based methods, protocols that rely on challenge-response
mechanisms, custom constructions and zero-knowledge protocols. Hereafter, we focus on such
authentication protocols that leverage an underlying challenge-response procedure.
While the focus of authentication protocols is put on proving the verifier’s authentication, there
are differences in the actual assurances that various authentication schemes provide. Whereas
some constructions allow for authenticating individual users of a given system, others establish
trust in the underlying hardware platforms. Moreover, some authentication protocols guarantee
the integrity of data, which was generated by the party that is to be authenticated. There are even
more subtle differences regarding the authentication guarantees among different constructions.
Authentication guarantees may focus on the origin of data generation, the time of generation
or the “freshness” of the received data at verifier side. Beside authenticity, some authentication
protocols [NT94] also provide confidentiality of the data communicated during the protocol runs.
In this way, such authentication protocols mitigate the threat of eavesdroppers intercepting the
communication between prover and verifier, which is one of the major weaknesses of naive
password-based authentication.
In the literature there are numerous works that present approaches to traditional authentication
solutions [BAN89; BP92; NT94]. Such approaches rely on classical cryptography, i.e., symmetric
or public-key cryptography and most of them are based on a challenge-response protocol that
comprises a verifier V and a prover P, as mentioned above. Such authentication protocols gen-
erally require the underlying hardware to possess enough computational resources to execute
1 Some constructions require a trusted third party, which will not be considered in this chapter.
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primitives of the involved cryptographic scheme and to implement secure hardware or trusted
execution environments that allow for secure processing of the involved assets, such as keys,
nonces and hashes.
With the emergence of low-cost devices in the context of the Radio-Frequency Identification
(RFID) and Electronic Product Code (EPC) technologies however, device authentication again
became a technological challenge to be solved. Such platforms mainly belong to low-cost class-0
device types and hence are highly resource-constrained. Accordingly, these hardware constraints
impede the application of traditional application schemes on such devices, in fact rendering
them impossible [V+03; Jue+04; Lee+05]. In order to tackle this issue, so-called lightweight
authentication protocols were proposed, that try to avoid the usage of cryptographic primitives
and instead leverage more lightweight approaches.
7.1. Existing Authentication Solutions
Initial efforts to lightweight authentication, which simultaneously aim at providing privacy, in-
volved the usage of pseudonyms. Juels [Jue+04] suggested that each device should store a list
of multiple, random-looking pseudonyms and to use a different one during each authentication
run. The main drawback of this approach is that a Man In The Middle (MITM) attacker is able to
gather all pseudonyms, at some point he is able to undermine authenticity as well as privacy at
once. A different approach that involves computing hashes over keys is denoted as “hash-lock”
authentication [SWE02]. Here, the prover computes a hash over a device-unique key before
exposing its ID to the verifier. This hash-based approach led to a series of similar authentica-
tion schemes, including the Randomized Hash Lock [Wei+04] and the hash-based ID variation
scheme [HM04]. While most of these protocols provide data privacy during authentication, all
of them suffer from not being trivially implementable on resource-constrained devices. The us-
age of a cryptographic hash function that is a fundamental principle of these protocols, impedes
their straight forward application on class-0 RFID devices. Even more computationally expensive
cryptographic primitives are used by authentication protocols that rely on re-encryption [JP03;
SRS04]. The basic idea here is to periodically re-encrypt the already encrypted information,
stored on the device. Although they provide stronger security as these methods predominantly
rely on public-key cryptography2, it is obvious that they are not usable on low-cost devices, given
their rigorous hardware restrictions. A supposedly more lightweight approach to authentication
was proposed by Hopper and Blum, who facilitated human-computer authentication by exploit-
ing the hardness of the learning parity with noise problem [HB01]. This approach led to a series
of derivatives, which resembles the so-called family of HB protocols [J+05; BCD06; MP07]. One
central drawback of the HB protocols is their susceptibility to MITM attacks. In particular, the
original HB protocol [HB01], as well sits predecessor HB+ are not secure in the active adver-
sary model, as was shown in [GRS05]. Various attempts to mitigate the central problem of
vulnerability against MITM attacks and efforts to further improve efficiency lead to a series of
derivatives. The intent of HB++ [BCD06] was to be secure in the active adversary model. Simi-
larly, HB-MP [MP07] tried to achieve the same goal and to achieve increased performance at the
same time. However, the authors of [GRS08] have proven its insecurity for certain MITM attacks.
Moreover, Armknecht [AHM14] challenged the efficiency claims of the HB protocol family, which
were designed to be applicable to highly resource-constrained platforms in the first place. Identi-
fying realistic constraints of highly resource-constrained RFID tokens, Armknecht concluded that
2 Some of them leverage symmetric cryptography, which however, leads to expensive multiple decryption rounds.
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none of the existing lightweight HB authentication protocols, which rely on the LPN problem,
are applicable to those devices. Subsequently, protocols have been proposed that allow for mu-
tual authentication, which are tailored to usage on highly resource-constrained devices and were
hence dubbed ultra lightweight mutual authentication protocols (UMAP) [Per+06a; Per+06b;
Chi07]. With the emergence of Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs), the need for lightweight
attestation was once again stimulated as PUF-enabled devices usually exhibit constraints similar
to the class of RFID token, with respect to their hardware capabilities. However, the additional
and implicit need for error-correction of PUF-based protocols led to a series of new authentication
protocols specifically tailored to PUFs usage [Gas+02; BR07; ÖHS08; SVW10; Kat+11].
7.2. Mutual Authentication Protocol
In this chapter, we present a novel lightweight protocol that allows for mutual device authen-
tication between two remote parties. In particular, we assume the prover P to be a resource-
constrained device that implements the decay-based Dynamic Random-Access Memory (DRAM)
PUF, presented in Section 3.3.1, whereas the second party possesses more computational ca-
pabilities. The protocol is tailored to the characteristics of the decay-based DRAM PUF and is
particularly lightweight as it does not require the usage of costly error-correcting codes as part
of Fuzzy Extractor constructions.
If a device supports the computation of Helper Data, i.e., by applying a Fuzzy Extractor, it can
immediately provide stable PUF keys for use in symmetric or asymmetric cryptographic protocols.
However, in this chapter we consider the case of a highly resource-constrained device which does
implement DRAM, but which does not possess the processing power to run the key reconstruction
phase of the Helper Data System. Especially the FE.Rec() function is computation-intensive as it
either requires a large number of gates or results in long execution times [Van+12].
In this lightweight scenario, the PUF device is also unable to perform any cryptographic oper-
ation. Hence, if we want to construct an authentication scheme based on PUF responses, then
the parties will inevitably have to transmit information about PUF responses in plaintext. This
makes most lightweight protocols susceptible to MITM attacks. Nevertheless, the development
and implementation of lightweight authentication is a meaningful task, as it presents a cost-
effective hurdle against ‘casual’ attacks. Such attacks resemble the main attack vector in the face
of low-cost devices that usually implement no security protocols whatsoever. Respective attacks
are covered by the Dolev-Yao model, where the adversary can eavesdrop, inject, alter or suppress
messages sent over the communication channel [DY83].
In order to challenge such casual threats, we present a lightweight PUF-based mutual authenti-
cation protocol for this scenario. Here, a prover device P needs access to some resource offered
by a verifier V, and has to prove that it possesses a specific logical PUF PUFid . Furthermore, P
trusts the resource only if V too knows the responses of PUFid . In particular, the protocol is based
on the mutual comparison of sets sx which contain indices of decayed DRAM cells at increasing
time scales of decay times tx . The prover P, in possession of the PUF, reveals the set sx to the
verifier V, which is randomly contaminated with indices pointing to undecayed DRAM cells. The
verifier V, which stores a priori PUF measurements, in turn demonstrates its ability to identify
which indices belong to sx , therefore realizing mutual authentication of P and V.
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7.2.1. Threat Model
The attacker model considers an adversaryA who is able to observe the communication between
P and V, and also to engage in a protocol exchange with either P or V. However, MITM attacks
or message modifications are out of scope of the model, as such attacks are generally hard
to mitigate in the context of lightweight protocols as shown above. Moreover, the protocol is
publicly known, including all the system parameters.
Consider an active adversary whose aim is to obtain PUF responses by pretending to be one of
the parties. The proposed scheme is built so that it displays the following two main properties:
i) If the attacker impersonates the PUF device P, the protocol should force him to be the first
party to provide information about the PUF response. Thus, the attacker does not easily get
access to the resources that V is protecting; i.e., the attacker first needs to learn PUF responses.
ii) Secondly, if on the other hand the attacker impersonates V, it should not be easy for him to
quickly extract all the PUF responses from P. In order to satisfy this requirement, we make sure
that the initiative to start the protocol lies with P. In this way the attacker has to wait until P
initiates contact.
7.2.2. System Setup
Let ltx denote the number of flipped bits at decay time tx , i.e., ltx = |s(tx)|. At the verifier side,
a set of enrollment times Tenrol l = {te0, te1, ..., ten} is chosen to evaluate the bit error rates of the
given DRAM PUF, which are used to set system parameters ∆1 and ∆2 accordingly. In particular,
both thresholds are set as ∆1 = BER1 and ∆2 =max (BER1, BER2). Both bit error rates BER1 and
BER2 are calculated according to Equation (7.1) and (7.2), which are explained in more detail
in Section 7.3.
Similarly, the prover carefully choses a vector T = {t0, t1, ..., tn} of decay times (with t0 < t1 <
... < tn) so that ∀x ltx+1 − ltx = εtx , i.e., at every time step the number of newly decayed
cells always equals the security parameter εt (cf. Section 4.5.2). For the sake of clarity, we set
ltx+1 − ltx = εtx . However, in practice, the number of newly decayed cells does not have to be
exactly εt but can be similar. Due to the high number of available DRAM cells, this does not
affect the security of the protocols.
7.2.3. Enrollment Phase
Enrollment is conducted by a trusted party SYS, such as a manufacturer or a system integrator.
SYS queries the PUF at decay times Tenrol l and gets a set of measurements for each PUFid :
Mid = {side (t0), side (t1), . . . , side (tn)}. For each PUFid the prover device initializes the counter cid to
zero, and the verifier initializes the counter c′id to zero.
7.2.4. Authentication Phase
Algorithm 4 specifies the authentication phase of the protocol. In step 2 the process of identifi-
cation is conducted by sending a public identifier id to V, which is usually stored in Non-Volatile
Memory (NVM) on P. After measuring the DRAM PUF in step 3, P computes a set B in step 4.
The selection of the random set B ensures that the protocol is not hindered by the potentially
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Algorithm 4: Mutual Authentication
Let Nid denote the set of the entire addresses of all the DRAM cells in PUFid .
1 P initiates contact.
2 V sends id to P.
P performs the following actions:
3 Set x = cid and perform a measurement of PUFid at decay time tx , resulting in a set of
addresses sid(tx) of decayed DRAM cells.
4 Randomly select DRAM cell addresses into a set B ⊂Nid \ sid(tx) of size
|B|= 2εt(x + 1)− l idtx .
5 Construct a vector z by randomly permuting sid(tx)∪B.
6 Construct a bitstring a ∈ {0,1}2εt(x+1) such that ai = 1 if zi ∈ sid(tx) and ai = 0
otherwise.
7 Increase cid and send x , z to V.
V performs the following actions:
8 Continue only if x ≥ c′id and z has length 2εt(x + 1); else abort.
9 Construct a′ ∈ {0,1}2εt(x+1) such that a′i = 1 if zi ∈ side (tx).
10 If the fractional Hamming weight of a′ is larger than 12(1−∆1), P is authenticated, set
c′id = x + 1 and send a′; else abort.
P performs the following actions:
11 P checks if the fractional Hamming distance between a and a′ is smaller than ∆2. If so,
V is authenticated; if not, P aborts.
large number of erroneous bit flips. Although the probability of such an error per cell can be
small for certain DRAM PUF instances, such as the PandaBoard (cf. Section 7.3), the huge num-
ber of involved DRAM cells in a logical PUF may drive up the total number of bit errors. Note
that P adjusts the size of B so that the bitstring z, which is computed subsequently, has size
2εt(x + 1).
In step 5 of the authentication phase, the prover constructs said address vector z from the ad-
dresses sid(tx) of decayed DRAM cells and a random setB of addresses that have not yet decayed.
The random permutation in step 5 ensures that attackers cannot derive sid(tx), i.e., the actual
PUF measurement, from z. Due to the tuning of the string length, the string a, computed in step
6, is balanced, i.e., it contains approximately as many ‘0’s as ‘1’s, ensuring large entropy of the
bitstring a given z. Given that P has knowledge of the temperature behavior of his DRAM PUF,
he can use a temperature-scaled decay time t′ (cf. Equation 4.6) in order to retrieve z.
Letting multiple instances of the protocol run, we assume that the attacker knows the locations
of flipped bits at previous decay times. In particular, an eavesdropper Eve knows l idtx−1 ≈ εt · x
addresses that also appear in sid(tx). Hence, the number of addresses unknown to Eve is ≈ εt.
The entropy of a given z is then the entropy of εt positions out of (x+1)2εt−xεt, i.e., log
 (x+2)εt
εt

,
which can be approximated as εt(x + 2)h(
1
x+2)≥ εt.
Note that P keeps track of cid , otherwise an attacker could impersonate a verifier and learn the
complete memory state for each id, tx by communicating with P many times. Furthermore, V
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Prover P
(PUFid , cid)
Verifier V
(c′id , {side (t0), . . . , side (tn)})
x = cid
sid(tx) = PUFid(tx)
Random B ⊂Nid \ sid(tx)
z = perm(sid(tx)∪B)
Increase cid
a : ai = 1 if zi ∈ sid(tx)
Check if a′ ≈ a
Abort if x < c′id
Check length of z
a′ : a′i = 1 if zi ∈ side (tx)
Check Hamming weight of a′
c′id = x + 1
-hi there
ﬀ id
-x , z
ﬀ a
′
Figure 7.1.: The lightweight mutual authentication protocol.
also has to keep track of c′id , otherwise an attacker could replay a z from the past. The check
if x ≤ c′id is meant to detect replays. In step 10 the verifier performs a check on the Hamming
weight of a′. This verifies if P is authentic. If z is sent by an impostor, then with a very high
probability z will not contain εt(1−∆1) addresses that are also in the enrollment side (tx).
The prover device P uses every challenge (PUFid ,tx) (cf. Section 3.3.1) only once. As soon as P
sends a string z, it increases its counter cid . This is independent of the a vs. a
′ verification at the
verifier side. Note that an attacker can pretend to be P and make many attempts to authenticate
to V without affecting c′id .
Note that there is a straightforward denial of service attack. The attacker can repeatedly pretend
to be a verifier and abort at step 8 of the protocol. With each aborted run, P is forced to
increase the counter x . Subsequently, PUFid will be exhausted at some point. However, given
the vast amount of DRAM cells typically available (e.g., 1GB on the PandaBoard), it is possible to
instantiate thousands of logical PUF instances (cf. Section 4.5.2) on a single device. Furthermore,
as P is the party that initiates the protocol, the attacker cannot set the pace of his denial of
service attack. Lastly, P can be programmed to (temporarily) stop communicating if it observes
consecutive failures. A sequence diagram of the protocol is depicted in Figure 7.1.
7.3. Experimental Validation
In order to find realistic reference values for the threshold parameters ∆1 and ∆2, which are
used during the setup phase of the authentication protocol, we analyzed measurements obtained
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from the two device types, employed as platforms to evaluate the decay-based DRAM PUF (cf.
Section 4.5.2), i.e., the PandaBoard and the Intel Galileo. In particular, we estimated the noise,
by means of computing two fractional Bit Error Rates (BER) as shown below.
As discussed in Section 7.2.2, the authentication protocol uses two sets of decay times, namely
Tenrol l = {te0, te1, ..., ten} set by the verifier and T = {t0, t1, ..., tn} chosen by the prover accordingly.
During the authentication phase the prover P measures the PUF using the next unused decay
time tx ∈ T, according to counter cid . The verifier V uses the corresponding enrollment decay
time tex ∈ Tenrol l based on c′id , in order to verify the prover’s authenticity. Given the two set of
measurements taken by the prover and verifier respectively, bit errors might occur, even in the
case that both sets of decay times are identical, i.e., Tenrol l = T. In particular, the following two
bit errors have to be considered.
The first error rate BER1 depicts the proportion of cells, which decayed during the authentication
phase at decay time tx but not at the corresponding enrollment decay time t
e
x , normalized by the
total amount of cells, which decayed until tx :
BER1 =
|s(tx) \ s(tex)|
ltx
. (7.1)
In contrast, BER2 represents the proportion of such DRAM cells, which decayed at a given en-
rollment decay time tex but did not decay during the authentication phase at the corresponding
decay time tx , normalized by the number of all the cells that comprise a measurement, except
those flipped at tx . BER2 is computed as:
BER2 =
|s(tex) \ s(tx)|
N− ltx
. (7.2)
Hence, BER2 depicts the error of falsely identifying cells as not flipped during authentication, in
order to construct B, although they have been identified to be flipped during enrollment.
For evaluation, we considered the case of Tenrol l = T and compared pairs of measurements,
computing both bit error rates. In particular, we set Tenrol l = T = {10s,20 s, 30 s, 40 s, 50 s, 60 s}
and size = 16MB as done during the initial evaluation of the DRAM PUF (cf. Section 4.5.2).
Figures 7.2 show the fractional bit error rates of both device types as boxplots. The figures
indicate that the BER1 dominates the overall bit error rate. They show a maximum of ≈ 0.12
for the PandaBoard and 0.55 for the Intel Galileo. Obviously, the maximum BER2 is negligible,
as only about 0.0016 bits erroneously flip on the PandaBoard and less then 0.0001 on the Intel
Galileo. While the BER1 bit error rates of the PandaBoard are comparably small, the BERs of the
Intel Galileo are up to 5 times higher.
Overall, the BERs, which are used as threshold parameters to determine authenticity of P and V,
are below the noise levels of both device types (cf. Chapter 4.5.2). Hence, the limited erroneous
characteristics allow for constructing and incorporating set B3 of random, undecayed DRAM
cells to construct z. Thus, by using more DRAM cells as input to the protocol (i.e., undecayed
cells that constitute B), the influence of bit errors can be reduced by a factor of two, as a and
a′ consist of approximately the same number of decayed and undecayed cells. Given the vast
3 Note that the size of B is determined by εt, which in turn is linked to the noise levels.
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Figure 7.2.: Bit error rates BER1 and BER2 of the PandaBoard (top) and Intel Galileo (bottom).
number of available DRAM cells, even in the presence of high bit error rates, it is possible to find
useful thresholds that allow for robust authentication of the protocol.
7.4. Chapter Summary
In this chapter we presented a novel and lightweight mutual authentication protocol that ex-
ploits the decay-based DRAM PUF, which was presented in Chapter 3.3.1. The protocol is ultra
lightweight in the sense that it does not require expensive error-correction, which usually is
done during the reconstruction phase of the Fuzzy Extractor, to establish a secret key. Instead,
the protocol relies on the comparison of sets of indices of decayed DRAM cells and corresponding
threshold values in order to authenticate both the prover and the verifier.
In this way, robust authentication can be implemented on today’s DRAM-enabled System on
Chip (SoC) devices and further on future low-cost MCU-based platforms, which we anticipate to
implement embedded DRAM modules.
Having shown that robust authentication can be realized even on highly resource constrained
devices, we will dedicate the next chapter to another important means to establish trust in remote
computing entities. In particular, in the next chapter we will propose a lightweight attestation
scheme, that allows devices to recover from potential attacks into a secure stage and to prove
their trustworthiness towards a remote verifier.
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Chapter 8
Remote Attestation
• Steffen Schulz, André Schaller, Florian Kohnhäuser, and Stefan Katzenbeisser. Boot
Attestation: Secure Remote Reporting with Off-The-Shelf IoT Sensors. In: European
Symposium on Research in Computer Security. 2017, pp. 437–455.
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A major challenge in computer security is about establishing the trustworthiness of remoteplatforms. The need for remotely establishing trust in computing platforms is existent
even in scenarios where devices are not connected to the Internet or where they are
not intended to receive firmware updates at all. For instance, SD-cards and USB sticks that are
exchanged with third parties can be infected or replaced by malicious hardware in order to attack
the host [b313; NL14]. Bluetooth devices may offer an even larger attack surface, since typically
employed security mechanisms were shown to be insufficient [Rya13; SW05]. Remote attestation
is a key security capability in this context, as it allows a third party to identify a remote device
and verify its software integrity.
Unfortunately, existing attestation solutions either provide low security, as they rely on unrealistic
assumptions, or are not applicable to commodity low-cost and resource-constrained devices, as
they require custom secure hardware extensions that are difficult to adopt across Internet-of-
Things (IoT) vendors. In this chapter, we propose a novel remote attestation scheme, named Boot
Attestation, that is particularly optimized for low-cost resource-constrained embedded devices.
In Boot Attestation, software integrity measurements are immediately committed to during boot,
thus relaxing the traditional requirement for secure storage and reporting. Our scheme is very
light on cryptographic requirements and storage, allowing efficient implementations, even on
the most low-end IoT platforms available today. As we will show in Section 8.5, our scheme is
supported by off-the-shelf devices. To this end, we review the hardware protection capabilities
for an ARM-based commercially available platform and present implementation results.
8.1. Existing Attestation Solutions
Previous work on attestation addresses hardware-based or timing-based attestation, scalable at-
testation for groups of devices, and secure code updates. Hardware-based attestation schemes rely
on secure hardware, such as Intel SGX or a Trusted Platform Module (TPM) [Ana+13; Tru11],
that is installed on the prover. Since such secure hardware is typically too expensive and com-
plex to be integrated in low-cost embedded devices, recent works focused on the advancement
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of new minimalist security architectures [Eld+12; HLN17; Koe+14b; Noo+13; Fra+14], which
enable hardware-based remote attestation capabilities for small embedded devices. However,
these lightweight architectures have not yet reached the market, and hence are not available in
commodity low-end embedded devices. Furthermore, even when they are available, there is still
the need to secure old systems.
By contrast, timing-based attestation schemes do not require secure hardware and thus are appli-
cable to legacy systems [Kov+12; LMP11; Ses+05; Ses+04]. However, they rely on assumptions
that have proven to be hard to achieve in practice [Arm+13; Cas+09; Li+15]. Such assumptions
include an optimal implementation and execution of the protocol, exact time measurements, and
an adversary who is passive during attestation.
Recent works address a scalable attestation of groups of devices (i.e., device swarms) that are
interconnected in large mesh networks [Amb+16; Aso+15; Car+17]. The basic idea is that
neighboring devices mutually attest each other in order to distribute the attestation burden
across the entire network. Since these works rely on hardware-based attestation schemes,
such as [Bra+15; Eld+12; Koe+14b], they could leverage our Boot Attestation scheme to be
applicable to a broader range of embedded devices.
The field of secure code updates specifically addresses the challenge of verifying the integrity
firmware after it has been updated. Initial approaches employ software-based attestation tech-
niques [Ses+06], and hence inherit their characteristics, mentioned above. Later on, the notion
of Proofs of Secure Erasure (PoSE) was introduced to secure code updates [KL15; PT10]. PoSE-
based approaches build on a challenge-response protocol that requires the prover to fill its entire
memory with data, in turn overwriting any malicious code. Although such solutions can be ap-
plied to many devices, as they require a small amount of read-only memory, they assume that
a network adversary only communicates with the verifier but not with the prover device, which
is a strong limitation. Recent work focuses on scalable updates in large mesh networks [KK16].
In contrast to our work, it imposes the use of asymmetric cryptography, involving a heavy com-
putational overhead and a large memory footprint. There are also platform-specific security
extensions such as cryptoBSL [Tex15] and STM32 PCROP [STM16]. While they are focused on
secure boot and IP protection, it would be interesting to evaluate their use in the context of
remote attestation and recovery.
8.2. System Model and Goals
In this chapter, we specify our system model, discuss the adversaries’ capabilities and describe
the general procedure of remote attestation.
8.2.1. System Model
For our solution we consider a setting with two parties, a verifier V and a prover P. V is interested
in validating whether P is in a known-good software state, and for this purpose engages in a
remote attestation protocol with P.
According to Section 2.2, P is modeled as a commodity, low-cost embedded device as it may be
found in personal gadgets, or smart home and smart factory appliances. In order to minimize
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manufacturing cost and power consumption, such devices tend to be single-purpose Microcon-
troller Units (MCUs) with often just the minimum memory and compute capabilities required to
meet their intended application (cf. Figure 2.1). When programmed via low-level interfaces such
as Joint Test Action Group (JTAG), many devices also allow to customize this early stage(s) of
boot. We will revisit this property when implementing our Root of Trust (RoT) in Section 8.5.
Note that in the IoT context, the attestation verifier V is typically the owner of P (e.g., fitness
trackers or USB thumb drives) or an operator who is responsible for managing P on behalf of
the owner (e.g., smart factory or smart city).
Further, such devices usually exhibit very limited communication, foremost in low-energy scenar-
ios, such as devices that use Bluetooth-Low-Energy for exchanging information. This allows for
communication patterns to be arranged in advance. As a consequence, generic communication
and key exchange protocols with many participants are neither required nor supported.
8.2.2. Threat Model
The adversaryA controls the communication between V and P and can compromise the firmware
of P at will. In more detail, A is granted full control over the communication channel (Dolev-Yao
model) and thus can eavesdrop, inject, modify, or delete any messages between V and P. A can
also compromise the higher-level firmware on P, i.e., the MCU application, whereupon A has
full control over the execution and can read from and write to any memory.
However, we assume that A is unable to bypass hardware protection mechanisms, such as read-
ing data from memory regions that are explicitly protected by hardware. We also exclude a
comprehensive discussion of physical attacks as these require an in-depth analysis of the partic-
ular hardware design and are outside the scope of this work. Instead, we consider only a simple
hardware adversary who may attempt to access documented interfaces such as JTAG, and re-
place or manipulate external System on Chip (SoC) components like external memory or radios
(cf. Figure 2.1). We also assume that the verifier does not collaborate with A, in particular, V
will not disclose the attestation key to A.
8.2.3. Remote Attestation Game
Remote Attestation is a security scheme where a verifier V wants to gain assurance that the
firmware state of the prover P has not been subject to compromise by A. Following the common
load-time attestation model [PMP11], we define the firmware state of P as an ordered set of
k binary measurements M = (m1,m2, . . . ,mk) that are taken as P loads its firmware for execu-
tion. Since the chain of measurements is started by the platform’s RoT, it is assumed that any
modification to the firmware state is reliably reflected in at least one measurement mx .
To gain assurance on the actual state M ′ of P, V and P engage in a challenge-response protocol.
This culminates in the construction of an attestation report r ← at testAK(c,M ′) at P, where c
is a random challenge and AK is an attestation key agreed between P and V. V accepts P as
trustworthy, i.e., not compromised, if the response r is valid under chosen values (c,AK) and an
expected known-good state M (i.e., M ′ = M).
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8.3. Boot Attestation
In this chapter, we introduce our Boot Attestation concept and protocol, extract hardware re-
quirements and analyze its security with regard to Section 8.2.3.
8.3.1. Implicit Chain of Trust
Traditional attestation schemes collect measurements in a secure environment, such as a TPM or
Trusted Execution Environment (TEE), which can be queried at a later time to produce an attes-
tation report. They support complex software stacks comprising a large set of measurements and
allow a multitude of verifiers to request subsets of these measurements, depending on privacy
and validation requirements.
In contrast, our approach is to authenticate measurements mx of the next firmware stage x im-
mediately into an authenticated state Mx , before handing control to the next firmware stage. In
this way, mx is protected from manipulations by any subsequently loaded firmware application.
The new state Mx is generated pseudo-randomly and the previous state Mx−1 is discarded. This
prevents an adversary from reconstructing prior or alternative measurement states. The final
state Mk, seen by the application, comprises an authenticated representation of the complete
measurement chain for reporting to V:
Mx ← PRFAK(Mx−1,mx). (8.1)
As typically no secure hardware is available to protect AK in this usage, we generate pseudo-
random sub-keys AKx and again discard prior keys AKx−1 before initiating stage x:
AKx ← KDFAKx−1(mx), with AK0← AK. (8.2)
Note that we can instantiate Pseudo-Random Function (PRF) and Key Derivation Function (KDF)
using a single Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC). The measurement state Mx
has become implicit in AKx and does not have to be recorded separately.
The approach is limited in the sense that the boot flow at P dictates the accumulation of mea-
surements in one or more implicit trust chains M . However, for the small, single-purpose IoT
platforms we target here, there is typically no need to attest subsets of the firmware state as this
is possible with TPM Platform Configuration Register (PCR). The next section expands this idea
into a full remote attestation protocol.
8.3.2. Remote Attestation Protocol
Figure 8.1 provides an overview of a possible remote attestation protocol utilizing the implicit
chain of trust and a symmetric shared attestation key AK. On the right-hand side, the prover P
builds its chain of trust from the Root of Trust to a possible stage 1 (boot loader) and stage 2
(application). Once booted, the prover may be challenged by V to report its firmware state by
demonstrating possession of the implicitly authenticated measurement state AK2.
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Figure 8.1.: Schematic overview of one possible instantiation of our Boot Attestation scheme as
part of a remote attestation protocol.
The detailed protocol works as follows. The prover hardware starts execution at the platform
RoT. This “stage 0” has exclusive access to the root attestation key AK0 ← AK and an optional
boot nonce NB. It derives AK1 as HMACAK0(NB,m1), with m1 := (star t1, size1,H1) defined as
the binary measurement of the firmware stage 1. Before launching stage 1, the RoT must purge
intermediate secrets from memory and lock AK against further access by firmware application.
Execution then continues at stage 1 using the intermediate attestation key AK1 and measurement
log (H1,NB)1.
The scheme continues through other boot stages x ∈ {1, . . . , k} until the main application/run-
time has launched in stage k. In each stage, a measurement mx+1 of the next firmware stage
is taken and extended into the measurement state as AKx+1 ← HMACsAKx (mx+1). The prior
attestation key AKx and intermediate values of the HMAC() operation are purged from memory
so that they cannot be accessed by stage x + 1. Finally, the measurement log is extended to aid
the later reconstruction and verification of the firmware state at V.
Once P has launched the final stage k, it may accept challenges c ← NA by a remote verifier
to attest its firmware state. For P, this simply involves computing a proof of knowledge r ←
HMACsAKk(NA) and sending it to V together with the measurement log. Using this response,
the verifier V can reconstruct the state M ′ = (m′1, . . . ,m′k) claimed by P and the associated AKk.
V can then validate and accept P if M ′ = M and r = HMACsAKk(NA).
Note that for the devices we target, k tends to be very low. Typical MCUs load only one or two
stages of firmware, which helps keeping the validation effort at V manageable, even for large
amounts of valid platforms (AK,M).
We emphasize that the protocol described here only considers the core attestation scheme. A
complete solution should also consider authorizing V towards P, protecting the confidentiality
of the attestation report and linking the attestation to a session or otherwise exchanged data. As
part of an authorized attestation challenge c′, V may also include a command to update NB and
reboot P to refresh all AKx . However, while the implications of managing NB are discussed in
Section 8.3.3, the detailed choices and goals are application-dependent and outside the scope
of this work.
1 We consider (star t x , sizex ) as well-known parameters here, since the individual mx would typically encompass
the complete firmware image at a particular stage.
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8.3.3. Security Evaluation
In the following section, we analyze the security of Boot Attestation based on the adversary model
and attestation game defined in Section 8.2.2 and 8.2.3. We will show that Boot Attestation
is able to provide the same security as all load-time attestation approaches, such as TPMs-based
attestation schemes [Tru11]. For this purpose, we consider the relevant attack surface in terms
of network, physical /side-channel as well as load-time and runtime compromise attacks.
Network Attacks
The adversary A can eavesdrop, synthesize, manipulate, and drop any network data. How-
ever, the employed challenge-response protocol using the shared secret AK trivially mitigates
these attacks. More specifically, any manipulation of assets exposed on the network, including
H1,H2,NA or the attestation response r, is detected by Vwhen reconstructing AKk and validating
r = HMACsAKk(NA). The attestation nonce NA mitigates network replay attacks. A can cause a
Denial of Service (DoS) by dropping messages, but V will still not accept P.
Since AK is a device-specific secret, the intermediate keys AKx and final response r are uniquely
bound to each individual device. This allows Boot Attestation to function seamlessly with emerg-
ing swarm-attestation schemes, where the same nonce NA is used to attest many devices at
once [Amb+16; Aso+15; Car+17].
Physical and Side-Channel Attacks
A may attempt simple hardware attacks, using SoC-external interfaces to gather information on
intermediate attestation keys AKx or manipulate SoC-external memory and I/O. Boot Attestation
assumes basic hardware mechanisms to protect debug ports and protect intermediate values in
memory (cf. Section 8.4). Otherwise, the resilience against hardware attacks heavily depends
on the SoCs implementation and is outside our scope.
A could also attempt software side-channel attacks, such as cache, data remanence, or timing
attacks. However, as each stage i clears any data besides N,Hi+1,AKi+1, there is no confidential
data that a malware could extract from cache, RAM, or flash. Furthermore, the risk of timing
side- channels is drastically reduced as root keys are only used initially by the RoT. Implementing
a constant-time HMAC operation in the typically used non-paged, tightly coupled Static Random-
Access Memory (SRAM) is straightforward.
Load-time Compromise
A may compromise the firmware stage a of P before it is loaded and hence, measured. In this
case, A can access all intermediate measurements (m1, . . . ,mk), the nonces (NB,NA), and any
subsequent attestation keys (AKa, . . . ,AKk). Note that compromising the RoT (i.e., the initial
stage) is outside the capabilities of A. This is a reasonable assumption due to RoT’s hardware
protection (cf. Section 8.4) and minuscule code complexity (cf. Table 8.1).
Compromising the intermediate measurement state and keys allows A to build alternative mea-
surement states M ′a+n and associated attestation keys AK′a+n for positive integers n. However, A
cannot recover the attestation keys of prior stages a− n, as they have been wiped from memory
prior to invoking stage a. In particular, A cannot access the root attestation key AK, which can
only be accessed by the RoT. As a result, A can only construct attestation responses that extend
on the measurement state M ′a and the associated attestation key AKa. Moreover, load-time attes-
tation assumes that the measurement chain is appropriately set up to record the compromise, so
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that (M ′a,AK′a) already reflect the compromise and cannot be expanded to spoof a valid firmware
state Mk.
In practice, successfully recording M ′a will typically require a persistent manipulation or explicit
code loading action by the adversary. However, this is a well-known limitation of load-time
attestation and also affects the TPMs and other load-time attestation schemes.
Following a firmware patch to return stage a into a well-known, trustworthy component, a new
measurement and associated key chain is produced starting at stage a. A is unable to foresee
this renewed key chain, as this would require access to at least AKa−1.
Runtime Compromise
A may also compromise the firmware stage a at runtime, after it is measured, e.g., by exploit-
ing a vulnerability that leads to arbitrary code execution. In this case, A would have access to
the correct (unmodified) attestation key AKa, could bypass the chain of trust, and thus win the
attestation game. Note that this is a generic attack affecting all load-time attestation schemes,
including the TPMs [Tru11]. Even platforms supporting a Dynamic Root of Trust Measurement
(DRTM) cannot detect runtime attacks after the measurement was performed. However, Boot
Attestation performs slightly worse in this case since A may additionally record AKa and replay
it later on to simulate alternative measurement states and win the attestation game, even af-
ter reboot. Nevertheless, Boot Attestation allows to recover the platform and to return into a
trustworthy state, in the same way as with other load-time attestation schemes, by patching the
vulnerable firmware stage a and performing a reboot. This leads to a refresh of attestation keys
AKa, . . . ,AKk in a way that is unpredictable to A, thus enabling V to attest the proper recovery
of P and possibly re-provision application secrets.
To further mitigate the risk of a compromised AKa, Vmay also manage an additional boot nonce
NB as introduced in Section 8.3. Depending on the particular usage and implementation of P,
NB could be incremented to cause a refresh of the measurement chain without provisioning new
firmware. For instance, MCUs in an automotive on-board network may regularly receive new
boot nonces for use on next boot/validation cycle.
8.4. Hardware Requirements
In this chapter, we describe the hardware requirements of our Boot Attestation scheme in detail.
We formulate these as results here and not as system assumptions in Section 8.2.1, since the
exploration of alternative remote attestation schemes with minimal hardware requirements has
been a major research challenge in recent years [Eld+12; Fra+14; Koe+14b; Noo+13]. In par-
ticular, remote attestation schemes proposed so far still require a secure co-processor or custom
hardware security extensions in order to support the secure recording and signing of measure-
ments. Alternative approaches using a software-only root of trust still require strong assumptions
on the operating environment and implementation correctness, which has precluded them as a
generic attestation solution for IoT [Cas+09; Li+15].
In particular, this requires (cf. Francillon et al. [Fra+14]):
• Exclusive Access to AK: the adversary would easily learn AK.
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• No Leaks: the adversary would learn information about AK that could lead to an advantage
in computing a valid r.
• Immutability: the adversary could change the code to move k to unprotected memory.
• Uninterruptibility: the adversary could move malware around during attestation, which
helps escape detection.
• Controlled Invocation: the adversary could invoke Attest anywhere, which might cause it
to be interruptible and/or skip sanity checks on input parameters.
Leveraging the implicit chain of trust, our Boot Attestation scheme avoids the requirement for
a hardware-isolated attestation runtime. Specifically, we only require the following hardware
security features:
RoT Integrity
The RoT is critical for initializing the chain of trust and protecting fundamental platform assets
such as AK. Our scheme requires RoT integrity in the sense that it must be impossible for the
adversary A to manipulate the RoT firmware, and that the RoT must be reliably and consistently
executed at platform reset. In practice, this requires hardware access control on the RoT code
and data region, but also hardware logic to consistently reset the SoCs’s caches, DMA engines
and other interrupt-capable devices in order to reliably execute RoT on power-cycle, soft-reset,
deep sleep, and similar events.
While RoT integrity is well-understood in terms of supporting secure boot or firmware manage-
ment, we know of no Commercial Off-The-Shelf (COTS) MCU which natively supports a RoT for
attestation. To realize Boot Attestation on COTS MCUs we therefore require an extension of the
RoT integrity requirement: The device owner must be able to customize or extend the initial boot
phase to implement an attestation RoT, and then lock or otherwise protect it from any further
manipulation. As we will show, many COTS MCUs actually offer this level of customization prior
to enabling production use.
AK Protection
Boot attestation requires that the root attestation key AK is read-/write-locked ahead of ex-
ecution of the firmware application. This typically requires the RoT to initialize some form
of memory access control and then lock it down, so that it cannot be disabled by subsequent
firmware stages. While such lock-able key storage is not a standard feature, we found that
most COTS MCUs offer some kind of memory locking or hiding that can be used to meet this
requirement (cf. Section 8.3.3).
AK Provisioning
Provisioning of a new attestation key AKnew involves replacement of its previous instance, con-
ducted by the RoT. Hence, in order to support provisioning, AK must further be writable by
the RoT exclusively. However, this procedure is preceded by the secure negotiation of AKnew.
During this process the endorsement key EK is used to provide authorization and confidentiality
of the new attestation key AKnew. Thus, during key provisioning the RoT must read EK and then
lock it against read attempts by latter firmware stages, basically resembling requirement of AK
protection.
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State Protection
When calculating measurements mx and attestation keys AKx , the respective firmware stage
must be able to operate in a secure memory that cannot be accessed by later firmware stages
or other unauthorized platform components. This includes protecting intermediate values of the
HMACs calculation as well as the stack. In practice, this requirement breaks down to operating
in memory that is shielded against simple hardware attacks (cf. Section 8.2.2), such as the SoCs
on-DIE SRAMs, and clearing sensitive intermediate values from memory before handing control
to the respective next stage.
Debug Protection
Once programmed and provisioned, the device should reject unauthorized access via external in-
terfaces such as UART consoles, JTAGs or SWD debug interfaces [CBW17]. Strictly speaking, this
requirement is sufficiently addressed if the above integrity and confidentiality requirements are
met. However, we list it here as separate requirement since debug access and re-programming
protections are typically implemented and enabled separately from the above general implemen-
tation requirements.
Overall, we can see that Boot Attestation side-steps requirements for protecting the initial call
into the secure environment and inhibiting interrupts during execution - including resets - which
are not achievable with established hardware protection mechanisms and therefore also not
feasible on commodity COTS MCUs [Eld+12; Fra+14].
8.5. Proof-of-Concept Implementation
We selected the Stellaris LM4F120H5QR to evaluate the implementation of our proposed scheme
and to provide an overview of the associated costs. The implementation comprises extending the
RoT for measuring the firmware application and deriving an attestation key, as well as initializing
the hardware key protection for AK and EK. Note also that there is no intermediate boot loader
stage on this device as the application image is directly executed by RoT (cf. Section 2.2.2). An
overview of the implementation footprint is provided in Table 8.1. Note that a brief review of
the datasheets of the device types evaluated for Physically Unclonable Function (PUF) behavior
in this thesis (cf. Chapter 4.2) suggests that most of them also meet hardware requirements of
Boot Attestation (cf. Section 8.4), including the ATMega328p, PIC16F1825, the PandaBoard as
well as the Intel Galileo. Naturally, a full implementation and validation is required to ensure
that the respective platform controls are accurately documented and sufficient in practice.
For the purpose of implementing a proof-of-concept, we leveraged FreeRTOS [Rea16] as a
firmware stack, as it is freely available, pre-configured for the Stellaris and as it exhibits a small
memory footprint.
Integrity Protected RoT
The Stellaris supports RoT code integrity by enabling execute-only protection to those flash
blocks that store the boot loader. In particular, by setting register values of FMPPEn and FMPREn
to ‘0’, read and write access to the boot loader section is disabled while keeping it executable.
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Protection of AK & EK
Although the Stellaris provides memory protection for flash [Ash12], we decide not to use it for
secure key storage. Despite that individual blocks of flash memory can be read-protected, it is
yet possible to execute said blocks. This could enable an attacker A to extract bits of AK or EK.
A can try to execute respective memory regions and infer information by interpreting resulting
execution errors. Instead, we securely store AK and EK on the internal Electrically Erasable
Programmable Read-only Memory (EEPROM) module. The Stellaris platform provides register
EEHIDE that allows for individual 32B EEPROM blocks to be hidden until subsequent reset.
PUF-based Storage of EK
It is also possible to securely store EK using a fraction of the on-chip SRAM as a PUF. Previous
work supports the use of SRAM as PUFs for key storage [MTV09; SL12]. Indeed, the SRAM-based
PUF instance of the Stellaris has already been characterized in [KSK15]. Using PUFs as a key
storage significantly increases the level of protection, as PUF-based keys are existent only for a
limited period [Arm+10]. Especially for long-term keys, such as EK, this is a desirable property,
which is otherwise hard to achieve on low-cost devices. To evaluate this option, we implemented
a Fuzzy Extractor construction based on [Bös+08]. On start-up of the device, a fraction of the
SRAM start-up values are used as a (noisy) PUF measurement X . Using X and public Helper
Data W that was created during a prior enrollment phase, the Fuzzy Extractor can reconstruct
EK. For details on the interaction with SRAM-based PUFs, we refer to [Sch+14]. Assuming a
conservative noise level of 15% in the PUF measurements X , which is a common value used in
literature [Bös+08], and applying a (15,1,15) repetition code as part of the Fuzzy Extractor, we
achieve an error probability of 10−9.
Debug Protection
The boot loader is further protected from attempts to replace it by malicious code by disabling
access to JTAG pins. For this purpose bits DBG0, DBG1 and NW, part of register BOOTCFG are set to
‘0’. This leaves a subset of standard IEEE instructions intact (such as boundary scan operations),
but blocks any access to the processor and peripherals.
8.6. Performance Evaluation
In the following section, we present evaluation result with focus on memory footprint and run-
time. Numbers are given for the RoT and key protection logic. Values for the RoT are further
separated with respect to RoT base logic (memory management, setup of data structures) and the
HMAC implementation. Runtime results of the HMAC functionality are given for a memory range
of 256 bit, i.e., a single HMAC data block, and a 32 kB region that reflects larger firmware mea-
surements. For both memory footprint and runtime, we further provide numbers with respect to
two different compile time optimizations. The detailed results are given in Table 8.1.
Memory
For memory consumption we consider static code segments (.text) and read-only data
(.rodata) segments of the firmware image. Table 8.1 lists results for compile optimizations
towards size (-Os) and runtime (-O1). Using the most memory-efficient setting, the scheme
requires a total of about 3.1 kB on the Stellaris. This may seem large compared to the 700B
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Size (Bytes) Runtime (ms)
Component -Os -O1 -Os -O1
Base ROM 702 712 0.79 0.63
Root of Trust (RoT)
Base Logic 336 340 < 0.01 < 0.01
HMAC-SHA2 (256 bit) 1828 1836 3.04 3.04
HMAC-SHA2 (32 kB) 1828 1836 312.26 312.26
AK Protection
EEPROM 516 580 0.01 < 0.01
EK Protection
EEPROM 516 580 0.01 < 0.01
SRAM PUF 1662 1980 46.44 46.42
Table 8.1.: Implementation overhead with respect to runtime in milliseconds (left) and memory
overhead in Bytes (right) for the TI Stellaris (ARM), with compiler optimizations for
size (-Os) and runtime (-O1).
footprint of the base ROM image (i.e., excluding the firmware application), but is only 1.22% of
the total available flash.
Runtime
Additional runtime introduced by our scheme mainly results from HMAC operations in order to
compute attestation measurements, with the key protection logic introducing only little over-
head. The right-hand side of Table 8.1 lists runtime overheads of our implementation. As to be
expected, the main overhead is caused by the HMAC function which depends on the concrete
size of the next stage to be measured. We give 256B and 32 kB as reference points to estimate
the cost hashing the KDF output and a larger firmware, respectively. The Stellaris takes 312ms
for hashing 32 kB. In contrast, the key protection logic adds negligible runtime. It takes less
than 0.02ms in the worst-case. Lastly, the SRAM PUF is by far the slowest key storage solution
for EK on the Stellaris, taking almost half a second. This is due to the costly error correction
of the PUF measurements. As a reference, the unmodified base ROM, without our extension,
takes on average 0.7ms on the Stellaris and 6ms. Note however, that key storage for EK can be
implemented more efficiently on various other device types, leveraging their respective memory
access control mechanisms.
8.7. Chapter Summary
In this chapter, we explored a novel lightweight remote attestation scheme for low-cost COTS
MCUs. We showed that it is possible to narrow down hardware requirements of the targeted
MCUs and even to enable the extension of already deployed devices. We demonstrated practi-
cability and efficiency of implementing our scheme on two representative MCUs and proposed
extensions for usage in real-world scenarios.
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For future work, we will investigate the support of additional device types, to widen the scope
of applicability. A second effort will be taken to develop protocol extensions, such as symmetric
sealing of assets (i.e, sensor values, etc.), establishment of trusted channels or means to log
provenance of such assets, especially if they are computed on flash-based media that employ our
scheme.
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Chapter 9
Conclusion
This chapter summarizes the main contributions of this thesis and concludes whether and to
which extent the research question formulated at the beginning was answered and whether the
research goal was accomplished.
The main research goal of this thesis was to establish trust in devices that belong to the class
of low-cost commercial off-the-shelf microcontroller platforms, given that such devices usually
lack the implementation of secure hardware. Hence these devices usually fail to provide decent
security solutions albeit being used in privacy- and security-critical environments.
For the purpose of realizing the research goal, the concept of intrinsic memory-based Physically
Unclonable Functions (PUFs) was used as a central means. Based on the concept of PUFs, the
research question of this thesis was derived, which ought to answer whether variations in the
physical behavior of standard memory components found on such Commercial Off-The-Shelf
(COTS) embedded devices can be used as instances of PUFs and subsequently as a lightweight
anchor of trust for security-related protocols.
In Chapter 4 we proved that PUF instances can indeed be found in standard memory components,
namely Static Random-Access Memory (SRAM) and Dynamic Random-Access Memory (DRAM),
implemented on low-cost devices. In addition, in this chapter we showed that it is possible to
successfully interface the PUF instances by software modifications only. Lastly, this chapter pro-
vided exhaustive evaluation results of the PUF characteristics that were proven to be of high
quality, qualifying them for the subsequent implementation as hardware-building blocks of se-
curity applications. Hence, the existence of physical variations and the practicability to exploit
them, i.e, to make them measurable by software, was successfully proven in this chapter.
Chapter 5 presented a first application of the previously found PUF instances. In particular, this
chapter focused on the first phase of firmware execution, i.e., the boot phase. As was shown
in this chapter, it is possible to interface intrinsic memory-based PUFs from within a modified
commodity boot loader and to robustly derive a key that can be used to decrypt subsequent parts
of the firmware. Hence, we showed that by relying on the concept of PUFs, it is possible to
securely bootstrap firmware on low-cost devices.
Having considered the security of the boot phase of firmware execution, Chapter 6 dealt with the
integrity of firmware in the subsequent stage of its actual execution. Therefore, a scheme was
presented that achieves hardware-software binding and integrity protection at the same time by
combining the concepts of PUFs and self-checksumming checking code regions. As was shown in
this chapter, this method again is software-only, hence applicable to low-cost commodity devices
and is at the same time efficient enough to impose only a negligible performance overhead.
Chapter 7 focused on the establishment of trust in the mutual authenticity of remote devices. For
this purpose a lightweight mutual authentication protocol was presented. The protocol leverages
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the decay-based DRAM PUF presented earlier in this thesis and was specifically tailored to the
highly constrained hardware capabilities of the targeted device class. In contrast to the majority
of existing PUF-based authentication protocols, the proposed solution does not require error-
correction, which has been shown to be too costly for implementation on low-cost devices.
Lastly, Chapter 8 covered the scenario of securely attesting the software state of a remote com-
puting platform, which is a fundamental requirement in order to establish trust in interconnected
devices. In particular, the chapter showed how on-board hardware primitives of low-cost devices
can be exploited in order to realize a lightweight remote attestation protocol that further allows
for safe recovery after potential device compromise. Along with other hardware primitives the
solution leverages intrinsic memory-based PUFs to provide compatibility with a wide spectrum
of IoT devices and legacy sensors.
We conclude that in this thesis, it was shown successfully that the concept of PUFs, with special
focus on intrinsic memory-based PUF types, is an attractive and efficient solution to implement
a hardware-based security anchor on otherwise unprotected low-cost devices and hence to al-
low for the implementation of lightweight security protocols and applications. The favorable
properties of intrinsic memory-based PUFs in particular, namely their inherent existence in stan-
dard hardware components as well as their uniqueness and identifying properties, make them
a natural candidate for establishing trust anchors on otherwise unprotected low-cost devices.
As was demonstrated in this thesis, these PUF instances can be instantiated by software-only
means, hence no hardware modifications are needed. In this way, legacy devices can be sup-
ported and even retro-fitting PUF-based security solutions to devices which have already been
deployed is allowed. Thus, relying on intrinsic memory-based PUFs is the most attractive solution
for establishing trust on such devices that fail to implement traditional security solutions.
Future Work
Although this thesis strives to be a comprehensive treatise on the subject of securing embedded
devices via intrinsic memory-based PUFs, working on this topic led to further fields of research.
These fields themselves comprise so many aspects that each of them individually could produce
research results similar to the scope of this thesis at hand. Given the time limits of the process of
the doctoral research process, these topics were not considered at a level of detail that would be
appropriate. Nevertheless, the following section gives pointers to associated research fields that
naturally follow the topics discussed in this thesis.
While the nature of the content of this thesis is primarily constructive, i.e., the majority of solu-
tions presented strive for establishing trust and not attacking existing schemes, the logical next
step is to analyze the resistance of the presented solutions against attacks. In particular, given
the targeted devices types and the presented implementations of security protocols and applica-
tions, it would be illustrative to observe how effective different types of attacks can be. Given
the often observed non-uniformity of PUF responses and high biases within these, an in-depth
research of potential information leakage due to the applied Helper Data system (i.e., the Helper
Data itself) would be imperative prior to productive deployment. Furthermore, the investiga-
tion of side-channel attacks, especially during the reconstruction phase of the fuzzy extraction
of secrets, can reveal how the implementation of the PUF interface can be optimized towards
the physical properties of the underlying hardware to be side-channel resistant. Lastly, although
there are already works in the literature that deal with invasive attacks against particular PUF
implementations, there is a lack of contributions that deal with highly integrated components,
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which are usually found on microcontroller and System on Chip (SoC)-based platforms. The
memory components that are used in this thesis for instantiation of PUF instances are usually
on-die and on modern SoC devices, they are organized in a Package-on-Package (PoP) fashion,
i.e., they observe a stacked “horizontal” structure, which intuitively complicates known invasive
attacks and might mitigate some of them entirely. Finally, a comprehensive analysis of attacks,
the involved efforts and their success rate would allow for a detailed physical attacker model to
be formulated that goes beyond the notion of zero security in the presence of such an adversary,
that is used in many works [Hel+13]. Knowing lower bounds on the time- and resource-wise
effort of different types of attacks would allow for designing security protocols in such a way
that takes such bounds into consideration, whereas currently, respective protocols have to rely
on rather vague assumptions [Ibr+16].
A second field of research that joins the matters discussed in this thesis is about the integration of
intrinsic PUFs in classical security protocols. In particular, while PUFs have been proposed to be
used as building blocks for basic security protocols, such as oblivious transfer [Rüh10; RD13], bit
commitment schemes [Brz+11] and key exchange [DR12], these works usually treat PUFs as an
abstract black box that omit peculiarities of different PUF types that indeed have an influence on
the design of the constitutive protocols. Hence, it is desirable to have a thorough understanding
of the practicability to use actual implementations of intrinsic PUFs as building blocks (i.e. as
sources of entropy) for such basic security protocols and how their hardware related side-effects
affect the security proofs and the overall design of respective protocols.
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